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# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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CAPE VERDE

REPORT ON PRESIDENT PEREIRA'S VISIT TO UNITED STATES

Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 11 Oct 83 p 4

[Text] The president of the Republic of Cape Verde, Aristides Pereira, paid a successful visit to the New England states, where the largest number of Cape Verdians are located (Massachusetts and Rhode Island). This report was provided on Monday by VOZ DA AMERICA correspondent Manuel Quaresma, who followed this visit by the Cape Verdian chief of state to the United States closely.

President Aristides Pereira was warmly welcomed by the state and local governments and the Cape Verdian communities he visited. That correspondent went on to say that this visit served to emphasize the presence and the importance of the Cape Verdian community in the United States and similarly to contribute to the prestige of that community and its leaders and to the encouragement of organizations supporting them.

Meeting With Reagan

On Monday, the third, President Aristides Pereira talked with President Ronald Reagan at the White House. On his arrival in Washington, there were welcoming ceremonies at the airport, following which President Pereira and his entourage proceeded directly to the White House.

He was welcomed there with demonstrations of great friendship by President Reagan. The two statesmen then withdrew for an extensive private session. After their meeting, there was a photographic session, but no statement was issued to the press.

Later, however, the White House spokesman announced that during their meeting, Presidents Reagan and Pereira had discussed the drought which continues to pose an excessive threat to the African Sahel region.

This was the point on which President Pereira launched his special working visit to Washington. During their talk, the two statesmen further discussed issues inherent in the discussions of Namibian independence. The role of Cape Verde in these discussions was also taken up.

It will be remembered that President Pereira is also the acting president of the Inter-State Committee to Fight the Drought in the Sahel (CILSS), an organization created 10 years ago in Ouagadougou in which nine nations in this African region have membership. They are Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Gambia, Upper Volta and Cape Verde.

Moreover, it was in his capacity as president of that organization that the president of Cape Verde paid an official visit to the United Nations, where he spoke before the General Assembly for the first time.

According to the final communique issued by the White House spokesman, President Aristides Pereira, speaking on behalf of the Inter-State Committee and the some 30 million individuals it represents, expressed his thanks for the aid provided by the United States. That same spokesman said that President Reagan expressed his satisfaction with the statements made by President Aristides Pereira about his active and substantial participation in the peace process in the southern part of Africa.

#### Talks Between Angola and South Africa

During his visit to New England, President Aristides Pereira spoke a number of times of the fact that Cape Verde has served as the host nation during talks between Angola and South Africa. However, in the course of the press conference he held in connection with the United Nations sessions, the Cape Verdian leader refused to make any statements about those talks, asserting that such statements could only threaten their advance.

Moreover, President Pereira expressed the view that more work is necessary before other statements are made.

American government bodies, in turn, praised Cape Verde's role as a mediator between South African and Angola, and also referred to the influence President Aristides Pereira has in other Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa. President Aristides Pereira himself had stated during a dinner at which he was a guest in Sinagoga, New York, that he is the oldest chief of state of any Portuguese-speaking country in Africa. He added that he is in constant contact with the other presidents.

As the final statement by the White House spokesman also noted, another subject dealt with by Presidents Reagan and Pereira during their talk was the contribution made by the Cape Verdian community in the United States to the improvement in relations between the two countries.

As provided for on the schedule, President Aristides Pereira met with various groups representing that community during his visit to the states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island. During these meetings, President Aristides Pereira talked repeatedly about the historic and glorious bridge which for about 150 years has linked the Cape Verdians in the United States with those who continue to live in the mother country.

#### Cape Verde's Main Asset

It will be recalled, moreover, that the New England visit ended on Sunday, the second. In the statements made to the Cape Verdian communities in the two states he visited, President Aristides Pereira spoke of the glorious bridge which throughout the years has linked the Cape Verdians scattered throughout the world with the mother country. The president further spoke of the contributions made by the Cape Verdians and the churches and other organizations existing in that country to the Cape Verdian liberation movement.

President Pereira also spoke of the contribution made by the emigrants who have returned to their homeland and invested in it. He further added that the sons of Cape Verde are its main asset. He also spoke of the gift of the schooner Ernestina made by the people of Cape Verde to the people and the government of the United States as a symbol of the mutual relations between the two peoples over more than 150 years.

In this connection, he added: "The bonds which link our two peoples are a source of great pride to the two nations, both the United States and Cape Verde. And it is also with satisfaction that we note that the governments of the two countries are continuing to be deeply committed to making these bonds ever more concrete and effective for the good of our peoples."

President Pereira stated that the presence of the Cape Verdian community in America plays a direct role in the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries and in the foreign policy of Cape Verde. He further added: "These relations are characterized above all by a climate of great understanding, mutual respect and nonintervention in the domestic affairs of each of the two countries. The United States was one of the first countries to respond to the appeal for food aid to Cape Verde in 1975. Through the USAID, the United States continues to rank high among the countries aiding Cape Verde."

Aristides Pereira said further that U.S. aid to Cape Verde has been seen in the financing of projects for electrification, the desalinization of water and school construction, in addition to the food aid, which has helped to alleviate the shortages caused by the drought. He further added that the visit paid by the vice president of the United States to Cape Verde last year, among others, provides an example of the fruitful dialogue developed between the two countries since 1975.

On the subject of the foreign policy of the Cape Verdian state, President Pereira said: "The Republic of Cape Verde pursues a strict policy of non-alignment, respect for and support of the cause of national emancipation of the peoples, and absolute respect for international norms and diversification of relations. We have worked with determination toward the encouragement of peace within the community of nations, particularly in our African region. You should know that meetings for the normalization of relations between Angola and South Africa have been held in our country."

#### Pride in Progress

Where the domestic policy of his country is concerned, President Aristides Pereira said that the Cape Verdians are proud of the progress made in such realms as reducing malnutrition and infant mortality, increasing the number of doctors, improving educational and housing structures and creating a transportation infrastructure. The president further stated that the implementation of the first plan for the development of Cape Verde has already begun to impose a new dynamics on the channeling of aid to priority sectors, with a view to deriving the greatest advantage from each investment made by the partners of Cape Verde, the United States in particular.

PRIME MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 11 Oct 83 pp 2-3

[Interview with Prime Minister Pedro Pires; date and place not given]

[Text] Increased Exports Based on Fishing

Media: Again with reference to the secretary general's speech, in which he said he was quoting Second Congress decisions to the effect that industry should become a key sector in our development, and fishing should become one of the main axes of our economy, priorities which moreover were stressed in the First National Development Plan (PND).

Our question is whether this will mean priority for these two sectors (at least in the investments sector) over agriculture, in view of the uncertainty of rainfall in Cape Verde.

Pedro Pires: We must examine all of this within the context a broader reality. We have the National Development Plan, through which the goals are established, while each sector has its projects. Moreover, what we plan to do until the end of this plan is to carry it out or seek to carry it out correctly.

As to the analysis, it is generally correct to say that the development of Cape Verde depends on its industry. Agriculture has its role, which is already established, and which we have examined. On the one hand, agriculture must produce the maximum. It must seek to derive the greatest advantage in order to provide a food supply, and must create around it some agroindustrial units such as to produce certain surpluses for export. It is further necessary to bear in mind that within the agricultural field, there is the whole problem of employment, in other words, the projects of the agricultural sector have as their primary goal employment. However, in production, agriculture has a role to play which is clear, but on the other hand, where the employment policy and the social policy are concerned, the farm sector also has an important role to play. When we think of agriculture in Cape Verde, we should not think of the agriculture of our day, of the techniques presently used for farm production. We must realize that we must advance, opting for an agricultural sector which is suited to our climate and to our water resource potential. But this immediately presumes the use of new techniques. In other words, if we are to view the problem properly, agriculture will have to be adapted to our national conditions.

Even so, since it suffers from great limitations, it is obvious that we must seek the solution in industry. Therefore we must have great perspicacity and the ability to conceive of, search for and understand the means of developing this domestic industry. This is the reason for the importance of this sector. The important thing is not what we have now (although we already have something) but the role which will fall to it. This will certainly mean that within a few years, this role will be reflected in our investment program. But we must bear in mind that the industrialization of Cape Verde is not a simple thing, and there are many questions to which we must provide a response. It is not a simple thing to set up such an industrial sector, but bearing in mind the limitations imposed on our agriculture by our national reality, industry will have an important role to play.

Turning to the fishing sector, the problem is slightly different. The question is more or less the following: how to derive benefit from the existing potential, although it is limited. We can now say that fishing is a priority issue, which must be resolved in the short term. We see that there are some limitations, but there can be no doubt that we have a sector in which the potential, although limited, exists. How can we utilize it in the short run? It seems that this is the problem in fishing. We have resources available, inevitably limited, because, we are told, they do not exist in great abundance. However they must be utilized now, such as to contribute to resolving the food problem and also the problem of export. We must increase our exports on the basis of the fishing sector.

#### Priority Concern for Vulnerable Groups

**Media:** Mr Prime Minister, in view of the importance taken on by athletics in our country, and covered moreover in a Second Congress resolution, will the government not plan to create a secretariat of state for sports within the short or medium time range?

**Pedro Pires:** We are not thinking of a sports secretariat. Without minimizing its importance, our view is that this sector needs to grow, until the way in which athletics should be organized in our country becomes clearer, so that we will know if in fact there should be a secretary of state for this sector or something different.

The reason is that we must devote our attention to economic activities and administrative activities while athletics is something different, in our view. The results of athletic activity are indirect, and are investments in a social sector. Now the tremendous limitations with which we are faced in the economic sector and the need to devote concern to other social sectors, primarily education, and therefore the schools, must be borne in mind. For our part, where the country is concerned we spend a great deal on education and other sectors of extreme importance such as health, on which we spend a great deal too. But there is also another social sector which has been our concern and for which we do not yet have a solution. That is the aid for what we call the vulnerable groups. In our country we have many elderly people in the rural sector and the cities. Some have families and others do not. In addition, we have rather aged persons on the labor fronts. It is

obvious that to have individuals over 65 years of age on the labor fronts means lack of concern with productivity, and any kind of work these people may have to do is difficult. This is one of the great concerns at this time: how to resolve this problem, even if only partially. The social sector in our country is a costly one. There has never been any welfare system, but with the drought, we are faced with a situation of deterioration in the capacity and the potential of these people in certain areas of our country. For a long time it has not rained in Cape Verde. For example on the islands of Santo Antao and Sao Nicolau, and even other islands, we find areas where, although there is some population, gradual emigration is to be seen. It is precisely these emigrants we find in some cities and who merit our concern.

But as compared with all of this, we are not yet in a position to establish a welfare system which could cover these people, while on the other hand we cannot ignore this problem. This is one of the serious issues we must resolve this year and next, and for which we are seeking a solution.

Athletics is part of the educational system, indeed, but it is also a part of leisure time activities. Therefore I think that this subject should be dealt with on these two levels: the school level, and the general level. On the school level integration seems simpler, and should be a matter of cadres and structures. Now extracurricular sports should be duly assessed in order to have a clear idea of our future direction. For where sports are concerned, the citizen has a role to play inasmuch as there are a number of groups, clubs, associations, etc., and it is essential that each citizen play his part. But (there must be reasons) we find that in our country, the association concept does not function fully as yet, and it is our impression that there is in fact a need to find a way to develop associations and to ensure that the existing clubs and associations and other types of organizations in this field function better, and that the best solution is found.

I do not think that the state should take over athletics, and there should not be very great participation by the state. Our role should be above all sponsorship. It seems to me that the clubs have an important role to play in our country within the context of popular participation.

However, as I have said, we are not yet thinking of a secretariat of state for sports or for youth and sports as exists in many other countries. It is possible that a different solution will be found.

#### **Resolving the Speculation Problem**

**Media:** Mr Prime Minister, much is said at national meetings, either on the preceding points on the ANP agenda, or in the party meetings, about problems having to do with the Secretariat of State for Trade and Tourism.

For example, there is the ever-increasing number of greedy individuals who speculate as they wish in connection with the inadequate supplies on some islands. We wonder if this could have had a certain weight in the change in orientation at the Secretariat of State for Trade and Tourism, although the resignation was at your request. Moreover, it was the president himself who

called attention, at the swearing-in ceremony, to the need for stricter control of prices and distribution of agricultural products.

Pedro Pires: We would not link the resignation of the former secretary of state for trade and tourism with the difficulties in the trade sector. It should be noted that this sector is one of the most sensitive, bearing in mind that a good part of the goods we need are imported, and also that we are a group of islands. Sometimes people reason as if we were a single block of territory, and fail to take into account the difficulties created by the simple fact that we are made up of islands. We do not always take into account the costs imposed by this geographic fact. For example, to get a product to an island, how many loading, unloading and storage operations are needed? What disturbance, what need for organization this involves! Apart from that, it is a difficult sector, because we have various limitations. Our country does not have abundant foreign exchange resources. Obviously, the principle of import ceilings has been established and there is an annual foreign exchange budget. Now this budget, although indicative, does not suffice for the import of everything the people want. This leads to a series of problems, but on the other hand, the drought situation has reduced domestic farm production. It is clear that there is a large quantity of money in circulation, and there is some purchasing power to which the money sent by emigrants and resident foreigners adds. But we must bear in mind that we are a small country. In Cape Verde, we can resolve our problems with little, but on the other hand, small things can complicate our problems. The activity of a limited number of individuals with considerable purchasing power and a good standard of living can perfectly well disorganize the market in Praia. In other words, we must see that the speculation and price problem cannot be resolved by administrative measures alone. Obviously, there have not been administrative measures, but rather a lack of them, which may have complicated this problem. But this problem cannot be resolved in this way alone. No, it is by supplying the market that this can be resolved. And many times, such measures can give rise to a black market which is much more terrible than the present speculation or rise in prices in Praia. We must understand the difficulties with which we must deal in this sector and the need for a better solution. It is clear that an effort must be made to ensure that the producer, rather than the middleman, profits most from the situation. We must however also make an effort to protect the consumer, and on this we are ill-agreed. Just a short time ago we held a meeting on the problem of speculation and the rising cost of living, and we took up the various factors involved in this problem (obviously, often viewpoints diverge), as the most important factor in the increase in inflation in Cape Verde. Thus we outlined certain measures which we will seek to implement, and we will make a greater effort in the direction of increasing farm production with a much more rational price policy, because price listing is very difficult in this connection. There are people who think that with price listing, a solution is necessarily provided for this problem. But when there are shortages, it is not known if price scheduling functions. I personally do not believe that it does when there are shortages, because the problem centers in practice on food products, and those domestically produced above all. Now without satisfactory domestic production, we do not see how this problem can best be resolved. It is clear that the consumer can defend himself. Our country sponsors the establishment of cooperatives. We will advance with the

establishment of consumer cooperatives in Praia. In addition to moving ahead with an increase in production, it seems to us that in fact another step would be devoting due attention to consumer cooperatives. Nor can we ignore administrative measures, but it is necessary to see which ones would be best.

#### Improved Marketing Circuit

Now, the Secretariat of State for Trade and Tourism has little to do with a certain fringe aspect of domestic trade. To date it has played a minimal role where food products are concerned. We must, through better coordination among the various departments (those responsible for production, those concerned with trade and those which direct administrative activity), see what can be done in this connection.

We must also consider how best to organize imports, with better coordination between domestic production and supplementary imports. We must encourage and direct matters toward better coordination among these sectors, and here I think we can find a solution to these problems. It is clear that the problem of improving the circuits for the marketing of domestic products exists, but we must see what measures may perhaps be unnecessary or are hindering the process, above and beyond the fact of our scattered geographic location. But if more restrictive measures are adopted for the islands, our insularity will be increased and this will make the distribution of goods harder.

We have not followed this matter closely, but it seems to us that we must find a way of facilitating the inter-island distribution of products. For example we could facilitate the distribution of products from Fogo in Praia. Although the Island of Santiago produces a great deal, there may be times when the production of one could supplement that of the other. We could facilitate the transport of products from Praia to São Vicente and so on.

There are some islands, such as Sal, where the link is different, but this is a problem of control and direction, the problem of the private role in distribution. The "rabidante" is a private individual. We must see that the state cannot enter into this type of marketing of perishable products. Even with goods which are not perishable, we have difficulties. There is a lack of due attention to state goods. We think that there are areas in which the private sector and organizations such as cooperatives should function, because there are things the state cannot do, for if it does it will fail. We must understand the state of the development of our people and our own state of social development. Some continue to think that the state should always lose, and should never profit. The attitude is that it does not matter if state goods are damaged, because they have no value to individuals. And there is often an effort to consider those who are wrong in the right when some problem arises with the state, on the basis that the state should give everything and even more, should pay for everything. In principle it should not make a profit, should never be right, etc., etc. Our attitude toward state property leaves much to be desired. Therefore if this is the case, the state should take the proper precautions to avoid action in matters in which it may have many difficulties and many failures. Our state has a concept of its limitations in the economic sector, as to where it should intervene and where it should not.

## Foreign Interference in Trade

In the trade sector, there are factors seriously disturbing commercial activities. This is the reason for concern on the part of those who pay taxes and engage in fact in trade. There are goods which come from Dakar without a license, via clandestine or other transport, as well as from Lisbon, such that a number of persons get involved in trade. We must see who is engaging in trade, who pays taxes, who pays employees, etc., although it is necessary to bear their rights in mind.

According to our most recent information, there is a large flow of goods purchased in Portugal into Dakar and probably the United States. In this connection, we have great capacity for invention, but this is disturbing our whole work program. We seek to understand others, but they must understand us too. We try to understand the reasons which lead an individual to bring goods from Portugal instead of money. We understand this and we can understand other things, but we must see that import without the expenditure of foreign exchange is a legal violation, and we must have foreign exchange reserves and manage them correctly. There is a need to see all of this properly, bearing in mind the difficulties we have in restraining such activities, because the exercise of certain types of commerce may perhaps be a supplementary activity. It can also be a way of life, but what it must not be is a means of fleecing others. We must see to it that it is not a means for someone to ruin someone else. What is needed is to respect the rights of others and to avoid exaggeration in this field. I have mentioned some examples to show the complexity of this sector, the various intervening factors, the existing problems, and above all, the delicacy of this sector. It will be difficult to decide in such a way as to please everyone. We have already presented some of its aspects, but there are many others, ranging from speculation on overbilling, etc., which complicate our trade. What I can say is that, taking the weakness of the country into account, its productive structure above all, but also the fact that we have heavy emigration--all of these things are conditioning factors and give our country its own characteristics, problems and limitations. What is needed, and it is in this direction that we will work, is to establish discipline in the sector gradually, to find the mechanisms which will enable us to resolve and settle the problems encountered. Bearing the complexity of the sector in mind, we can only proceed gradually and partially to resolve these problems. But the other issue will not be simple.

Despite everything, the difficulties we have, the characteristics inherent in our economy and the drought, and finally the weakness of our productive apparatus and our exports, I think that in comparison to many, our market is much better supplied. And we can say that the black market in Cape Verde (it is possible that one exists) is not among the most alarming in comparison to what happens in other countries. Only we cannot be complacent about others' evils, but must act such as to improve the activities of our administration and our state. The changes, the alterations and steps which have been and will be adopted will move in this direction. But we think that in order to resolve the problem of supply and the high cost of living, it is necessary to increase production. We will insist on this. However, the participation of

the consumer citizen, whose duty it is to defend this concept through self-organization, is necessary.

#### Review of Media

**Media:** The appointment of a secretary of state for mass media suggests profound improvements in this sector. What national news policy will be defined? That is, what priorities will there be in the existing domestic media structures or those which will be created, and what will their characteristics be?

**Pedro Pires:** A great difficulty faces the media because they enter peoples' homes daily, or are found on the streetcorners, in the case of newspapers.

The radio goes right into the home. Therefore its errors are known, because it works in public. The errors and shortcomings of other departments are not so well-known, because they work in private, which makes it difficult to assess their mistakes. Thus the media, which are a concern of us all, are much criticized. Everyone wants to know if they are or are not fulfilling their role. It is obvious that reporting suffers from the evils from which we all suffer, because everything which is done must have a tradition and requires accumulated experience. Now the media do not have such a tradition in our country.

I think that we should view the media from a different angle. What training should the newsman have? How should a news team be made up?

Perhaps we should go deeper in our analysis, asking what news is in fact and what its techniques should be. It is necessary to see that news should not be limited to relating the facts, but that its role is above all to create an awareness or to educate. If we begin with the principle that news is not only reporting, we must also seek to see clearly what it is, what the characteristics of news cadres are, and we must work toward obtaining such cadres. We cannot say that we are not making efforts in the news sector, but what we can say is that we have not succeeded yet. But why have we not succeeded? We must go deeper into the analysis of this question. It is obvious that to produce good media results we must have, apart from good equipment, good news teams, because the human factor is the most important. Therefore we must establish what the characteristics of the newsman are. We must bear in mind that the media in our country should not be limited to the reporting of news. We must have information oriented toward the strengthening of national awareness. It must combat distortions, alienation, and foreign influences which push us toward a certain type of behavior and divert us from a proper analysis of the facts.

Our media, in my view, have lacked a certain element--opinion.

We can say that we have avoided having opinions because it is very difficult for government reporting to express an opinion under our conditions. It seems to me that this is the great problem.

But we must review the media again. To do so, it seems to me that an important directive needs to be implemented: the establishment of a national body to study the media sector and provide guidelines. It could perhaps be a national information council or something of this sort. It is important to find such a focus for contemplation and discussion so that our information sector can acquire its own style.

We must examine and discuss the career problem carefully. But one cannot have a career without qualified professionals. The media will not be able to attract people without offering a career guarantee. Unfortunately, a large part of the problem centers on material incentives. If there is a need to discuss our media style, it is necessary to focus on the career problem as well.

We must discuss and resolve all of this, establish a work program, so that we can achieve reasonable information service measuring up to our desires. This is a very delicate sector, and for this reason requires much work. It is not simple and in this sector, we are rather demanding.

5157  
CSO: 3442/35

BARDAI DENOUNCES NUMAYRI, U.S. BASES IN SUDAN

AB231940 (Clandestine) Bardai Chadian National Radio in French 1800 GMT  
23 Nov 83

[Text] While the OAU is trying to bring the parties involved to a roundtable conference, American imperialism is busy with [words indistinct] in the FAN political and military setup. Chester Crocker, American assistant secretary of state, did not even hide it when he urged Zaire and Gabon to support the master blackmailer of Ndjamena, Hissein Habre, during the settlement of the Chadian crisis. The time was also chosen by the agent Numayri of Sudan to travel to Washington. To the big boss of the White House, the Sudanese dictator presented a dramatic picture of the situation in southern Sudan. He alleged that in that region, (?Cubans), Ethiopians, and Libyans through their physical presence, are supporting opponents in southern Sudan. He need not do more to move Ronald Reagan. The latter, who had launched an anti-(?Soviet) crusade in Africa [words indistinct] in Latin America, will now examine the requests for military assistance by the agent Numayri.

We know that for some years now, four American military bases have existed in Sudan. These bases served as supports for the recent American maneuvers named "Bright Star." These bases are aimed at Chad, Ethiopia, and Libya and the last one is aimed at the center of the country in order to support the Sudanese regime against any internal upheaval. This means that Sudan has become a big American base that is a (?threat) to the independence of the people of Africa and the Middle East. Of course, in his talks with his American protector, the Sudanese puppet also interfered in the Chadian issue in order to support his requests. As can be seen [words indistinct].

CSO: 3419/189

EOUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEFS

**EXPATRIATE EQUATO-GUINEANS DESIRE RECONCILIATION--**If an agreement could be reached between the present regime and the opposition-in-exile, 140,000 Equato Guineans could return home, according to the Co-ordinator of the "Reorganising Executive Council", Manuel Ruben N'Dongo. Sen. N'Dongo, speaking in Lome, said the main colonies of expatriat Equato-Guineans were in Gabon (80,000), Cameroon (30,000) and Nigeria (15,000). He appealed to the Central African Heads of State, who were at the time meeting in Libreville, to lobby for a reconciliation between political forces from his country.  
[Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3455, 31 Oct 83 p 2541]

CSO: 3400/295

GABON

BRIEFS

FOREIGN MINISTER IN BRAZIL--Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Martin Bongo has concluded his visit to Brazil and will leave Rio de Janeiro today for Libreville via New York. Yesterday Mr Bongo held a final round of talks with his Brazilian counterpart Ramiro Guerreiro. The joint communique issued at the end of Minister Martin Bongo's official visit underlines the convergence of views between Libreville and Brasilia. The two sides stressed the need to step up their relations in the fields of agriculture, merchant marine, telecommunications, energy, and tourism. [Text] [AB250750 Libreville Domestic Service in French 0600 GMT 25 Nov 83]

CSO: 3419/189

## GOVERNMENT MUST REPORTEDLY IMPLEMENT RDP REPORT TO END CORRUPTION

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3457, 14 Nov 83 pp 2610, 2611

[Text] THE RECENT happenings within government circles involving several people accused of theft of very large sums of money have given a great cause for concern for the disturbing increase of misappropriations of public funds by lower grade civil servants.

One of the major functions of a national government is the effective management of its financial resources. This function calls for the recruitment of trained, mature and honest people whose experience and record of performances qualifies them to carry out the intricate functions of government financial management and control. One of the many problems that besets the bureaucracy in The Gambia is the appointment of inefficient people to jobs which require a high sense of responsibility and commitment. Nepotism has also had its ruinous effect. Pressure groups with enormous influence have in one way or the other secured appointments for people who they may consider to be qualified but appointed for a job totally unrelated to their fields of training. Thus the common saying in The Gambia, "square pegs in round holes" now obtains.

One factor, contributing to the cause for concern is the allocation of financial responsibilities to junior civil servants. The burden of financial responsibilities as guided by government Financial Instructions is by no means light. In the past, one would hardly see young faces behind cashier counters. But today, low-income young men who are more susceptible to temptations and without the slightest regard for the consequences of their actions can be seen recklessly signing cheques whilst others hurry to check and pass their vouchers. This observation does not disqualify young Gambians from holding

positions of responsibility but only if they are paid salaries commensurate with their functions. Indeed such incentive is needed for both young and old since the position of a financial officer requires equal commitment from both age groups.

### Reduced spending power

The cry over general wage increases grows louder as inflation bites deeper into the national economy and also into the earning power of the junior civil servant. The ever increasing cost of living to the end of every month leaves him more desperate than ever. The majority of young men in key financial positions are more vulnerable to the pressures of the extended family system and therefore require greater insulation from corruption. As is evident, the lower grade clerk assigned to draw out vouchers to receive cash payments without the salary commensurate to his duties is more inclined to yield to the temptation of corruption. Through the manipulation of an ill-designed system of financial control the Treasury system in The Gambia is now subject to the unscrupulous machinations of poorly-paid civil servants.

### Administrative loopholes

The public financial system in The Gambia is an archaic institution inherited from the British colonial rulers. The system has so many loopholes through which civil servants can tap government consolidated funds. The fundamental loophole in the system is that because of the lack of a state

organisation entirely responsible for supplying government material needs, the government is obliged to purchase most of its material requirements from recognised commercial agents. One only needs to draw out a Local Purchase Order (LPO) from any government department to make a purchase on behalf of government. The impossibility of checking this system from falling into abuse is evident. As such, the disturbing increase in the misappropriation of public funds cannot be ignored by those whose concern for accountability is foremost.

It is common knowledge that LPOs can be processed by junior civil servants without a check system through which it could be assured that a purchase had actually taken place or that the prices have not been inflated. These loopholes inherent in financial control encourage poorly paid civil servants to fiddle with public funds. The manipulation of government finances as was evident in the case of the Rural Development Project Report, in which both senior and junior civil servants were implicated, illustrate the ease by which government-consolidated revenue could be subject to abuse.

In order to remedy the current rampant practice of officials misappropriating public funds, the government must be seen to have the will to implement measures that would hinder the growth of such malpractices. It is disappointing that the government, in its anti-corruption practices has failed to implement the recommendation contained in the Rural Development Project Report. The civil service is beset with many institutionalised structural problems. Firstly, Gambian civil servants are generally poorly paid. Salary levels range within a grading system based on qualifications, experience and long service. The difference in salary scale between the lowest (eg a financial clerk) and that of a head of department is such that the former who is responsible for the bulk of government financial transactions with similar or greater domestic expenses, earns almost ten times less than his head of department. Thus it is foolhardy to allow junior civil servants to handle government financial transactions that involve large sums of money such as the payroll of a whole department or ministry.

The solutions to these problems cannot be immediate, since the archaic system inherited from the British colonialist requires a complete overhaul to meet the current realities in The Gambia. The fail-

ure of the government to implement the recommendation contained in the Rural Development Project (RDP) Report indicates the government's unwillingness to eradicate the misuse of public funds by public officials.

Government action in the case of the RDP Report would leave one with the impression that the misappropriation of public funds is not a serious crime, and as such, government civil servants need not fear any legal action that could serve as a deterrent to the widespread occurrence of financial mismanagement in public places. As a result civil servants who are implicated in the RDP Report have very little to fear.

In the RDP Report summary (p.7) the following recommendation appears:

"The project manager Mr. Francis A. J. Mboge and the projector Mr. George Lowe be both held accountable for deliberately disregarding the original arrangement for the disbursement of the \$2.2m. credit for farmers of co-operative societies within the project area and thereby exposing the funds to abuse."

Mr. Mboge, the former Secretary-General of the Civil Service was honourably retired with all remunerations due to him paid in full. One wonders why the Gambian government decided to ignore the recommendations of the report. There are other matters arising from the RDP report where the government could set a good example.

In order to curb the current malpractices in financial departments, there is need for the government to reform the whole financial control system. One immediate action that government could take is the appointment of trained and responsible officers with salaries commensurate with their duties. This would require the abandonment of putting "square pegs in round holes" in favour of putting the right personnel in the right job.

The will to take the appropriate action on culprits already implicated could serve as a deterrent to all civil servants. It is therefore deemed appropriate at this stage for government to take the recommended actions contained in the RDP Report. If no positive action is forthcoming from the Gambian government, the occurrence of financial mismanagement will be beyond control as was the case of "vouchergate" in Sierra Leone. Public financial management requires professional training and responsibility. It is therefore unwise to appoint high

school graduates to positions of financial control.

The realities in The Gambia are such that the government in its drive to curb the misuse of public funds must be seen to treat all such matters without fear or

favour. One would therefore expect the Gambian government to implement the recommendations of the RDP Report as it has done in the case of the External Aid Report.

CSO: 3400/302

GAMBIA

BRIEFS

JAWARA HOSPITALIZED IN LONDON--Banjul, 25 Nov (AFP)--President Sir Dawda Jawara of Gambia is in hospital in London with a "slight fever," Banjul radio announced Thursday. An official spokesman said there was "no cause for alarm" about the health of the 59-year-old Sir Dawda, who has dominated the political life of the small West African state for the past quarter of a century. The radio said he had left here last weekend for London on his way to the Commonwealth summit in New Delhi. [text] [AB250733 Paris AFP in English 0721 GMT 25 Nov 83]

CSO: 3400/310

## AUSTERITY, STABILIZATION MEASURES DISCUSSED

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3454, 24 Oct 83 p 2435

[Text]

THE GOVERNMENT of Ghana is scheduled to agree with the World Bank at the end of this month on a programme for total removal of the subsidy on fertiliser imports (which the April budget had cut from 50 to 25 per cent). Meanwhile, the 70,000 tonnes of fertiliser imports for this year are expected to increase food production by about one-quarter, given successful distribution. However, initial consignments have run into the distribution problems discussed in the transport survey we are publishing (see page 2447). And all this before farmers face the full cost of their fertiliser, and before other problems of production and distribution are seen to have been alleviated, thanks incidentally to World Bank credits.

The fertiliser case indicates the situation facing the PNDC. It is as if the PNDC is one quarter of the way across a tightrope economic policy; the pole it is using for balance is heavily loaded at one end by the IMF and World Bank, and less heavily at the other by potential donors of bilateral aid; waiting beneath the tightrope are the Ghanaian people, every day bearing the full burden of the enterprise.

Meanwhile, the typical IMF package for imbalance of payments — cutting imports and public spending while increasing exports — runs into the austerity and protectionism of OECD countries and what the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) describes as a logical inconsistency: all countries cannot export more and import less, and less imports by developing countries means less exports from developed countries and more unemployment all round. There is little dispute that the IMF promotes trade and exchange liberalisation while clients like Ghana are suffering falling export revenue and rising debts. So where does all this lead to?

The recent devaluation by some 990 per cent in Ghana gives some indications, but no definitive answer. In the absence of a statement by Dr. Kwesi Botchway, the Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, at the time of going to press, one is forced to speculate that

administration of the export bonus and import surcharge system has been a failure. Certainly, some importers have sought to exploit human loopholes in the surcharge system, and in this period of accountability, have been more than reluctant to expose their dealings by working through the banking system.

Evidence of this came earlier this month when the Finance Ministry warned beneficiaries of import licences under the World Bank reconstruction credits to utilise the facility. It appears that the bridging loan of \$100m. from Standard Chartered Bank and the \$40m. quick-disbursement World Bank credit have been inadequately utilised at the Ghanaian end, which would prejudice donors' minds next month in Paris. From this, it seems that early implementation of a single exchange rate on the higher side (at C30 to US\$1) is meant to push the Ghanaian private sector into line, and to minimise some of the continuing import licence malpractices.

In simplifying administration, the undisguised devaluation also means to further the work of stimulating local production, increasing exports and attacking the black market which is said to divert about \$100m. annually from Ghana's external account. One can expect more play on sales, excise and import duties to help widen the tax base and keep projected government revenue near the optimistic projection of over C1,000m. in this fiscal year.

The social impact becomes ever more important. The general price levels (official and "parallel") are not expected to rise dramatically, and the import repricing that preceded the April surcharges and now this devaluation are supposed to keep prices of some basic commodities fairly stable. What is in greater jeopardy is the social programme of the PNDC, its development budget and the intricate mechanism intended to achieve more equitable income distribution in Ghana. Nothing further has been heard about the net wealth tax against super-profits of businessmen. The degrees by which producer prices and wages are adjusted to the new exchange rate will be significant. To the credit of the PNDC, the consumer price index rose by about 30 per cent last year against 116 per cent in 1981. But calculation of the real rate of inflation is needed for honest planning in view of the still huge gap between official and parallel markets.

The point here is how closely incomes will keep in touch with inflation in a period when the PNDC intends to pass full costs on to the public by ending all subsidies during this budget. The game is tricky: how to stimulate exports in unreceptive markets, restrict local demand and ration by supply and price, while stimulating production and productivity all at the same time as cutting public spending. What is definite, however, is that the burden of austerity and stabilisation programmes demonstrably falls on to the already bowed shoulders of ordinary people. International economic conditions and multilateral conditionalities force governments seeking equitable social

transformation to temporise on their social policies, ironically in the interests of stabilisation.

The Rio de Janeiro branch of the ruling party in Brazil recently warned that the actions of "hungry masses" might lead to a "restoration of authoritarianism" or the emergence of "charismatic and messianic leaders who could suddenly come to power". Ghanaians might usefully ponder any parallels. The PNDC certainly needs to improve its political presentation of austere economic measures in order that a popular government with progressive intentions does not end up as a military regime enforcing the less-than-successful IMF policies.

CSO: 3400/289

## PRICE INCREASES GIVEN; AUSTERITY MEASURES DISCUSSED

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3455, 31 Oct 83 pp 2503-2504

[Text]

**I**N WHAT has come as a shock to many people, the PNDC has raised petrol, beer and cigarette prices. At the same time, the exchange rate for the cedi has been raised to C30 to one dollar — an across the board devaluation. The cedi has long been pegged at C2.75 to the dollar and had only recently been exchanged under a complicated surcharge and bonus regime introduced in the Austerate Budget of April 21, 1983. Premium petrol now sells at C35 a gallon up from C25, whilst Regular petrol sells at C30.50 instead of C21.50. Diesel is now C24 up from C15.90. Kerosene, a key fuel for the poorer urban sectors and the rural areas is now C20 a gallon. Rural dwellers (well over 80 per cent of the population) have long been struggling to cope with the earlier C13.20.

With a target date of June 1984, the intention seems to be to pass on the full cost of petrol to consumers in an incremental manner, eventually arriving at a figure of over C50 a gallon, an agreement concluded with the IMF.

An October 10 statement from the Ministry of Fuel and Power said the government subsidises petroleum to the tune of C1,300m., tying up money which could be used for development purposes. It is clearly hoped that the money consumers will now pay can be used to finance various programmes. High on this list is a World Bank-approved \$120-150m. scheme to rehabilitate and expand the Tema refinery. The World Bank is expected to provide dollar financing for this, whilst cedi funds are required from the Ghana government. Earlier, the Secretary for Fuel and Power, Mr. Appiah Korang has emphasised the importance of the refinery project in a nation-wide discussion programme just before the increases.

He stated that it was central to the more effective use of Ghana's petroleum resources, as the upgrading of the refinery would enable local processing of fuel oil residues. Left over in large quantities from refinery operations, they are presently resold to foreign buyers. As an end product, Ghana could in the future expect bitumen and cooking gas, he stressed.

This year, Ghana is expecting \$33m. from the sale of residual fuel oil, while it routinely imports bitumen from India and other sources.

The other price increases are really a form of indirect tax. Beer now costs C35 a bottle up from C20 whilst cigarettes are up from C40 to C50 a packet. On the black market, a packet of cigarettes has been known to fetch C140 making the new cigarette prices quite reasonable.

Ghana's tax revenue position has traditionally been very poor, and it is to meet shortfalls that these price increases have been effected. Following a "semi-Robin Hood principle", the official statement said the funds raised would be used to meet existing financial commitments to workers and fund a well-drilling programme in the rural areas. The intended beneficiary areas are currently critical of the junta. A significant wages bill requires payment following new payment structures announced recently, whilst the prolonged drought and crisis of rain-fed agriculture has made the search for water imperative. Already rumblings have been reported over delays in paying the new wages and salaries.

To benefit fully from these measures, the regime will have to improve its revenue-collecting mechanism. In previous years, large sums of money supposed to be

	Ivory Coast	Togo	Ghana (April 1983 budget Prices)
Premium	\$3.47	\$2.04	\$1.62
Regular	\$3.28	\$2.74	\$1.39
Gas Oil	\$2.39	Not available	\$1.04
Kerosene	\$1.49	Not available	\$0.85

Figure 1: Ghana's April petrol prices compared with those of neighbouring countries

	Mar. '74 to Jan. '75	Aug. '75 to Dec. '76	Jan. '77 to Sep. '78	Sep. '78 to Dec. '79	Dec. '79 to No. '80	Nov. '80 to Mid '81	Mid '81 to Apr. '83	Apr. '83 to Oct. '83	Oct. 1983
Premium	1.20	1.60	2.00	3.50	7.50	10.50	12.50	25.00	35.00
Regular	1.10	1.40	1.60	3.00	7.00	10.00	11.50	21.50	30.50
Kerosene	0.65	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.50	5.00	7.00	13.20	20.00

Figure 2: Petrol price increases in cedis since 1974

the indirect tax proportions of goods sold were not paid to central government by the large firms, including the beer and cigarette companies. Not only did they remain unpaid, but the government agencies responsible made no effort to collect them, leaving the firms free to use such monies for commercial purposes, if they so wished.

Despite official silence on the external source of these measures, many people are targeting the IMF as the prime-mover of these further austenencies. The Fund has granted Ghana a \$377m. credit in return for certain measures: the feeling in Accra is that these are only some of the measures demanded by the Fund.

So far, public reaction has been muted, though worried. The most concern has been with the broad price increases that will inevitably follow these measures. Heading the list of worries is the effect on food prices in what is still a precarious food situation. For travellers, urban transit passengers and traders, the greatest area of concern is the inevitable increase in the high charges already being demanded by private transport owners. This sector carries the bulk of the nations traffic and usually increases its fares much higher than the government-owned sector.

Despite their significant social costs, the financial arguments underlying the joint demands of the Fund and the government for sacrifices in the area of petrol are sound in banking terms. Traditionally, though

Ghanaian governments have spent considerable foreign exchange sums on petrol, they have refused to pass the full equivalent in cedis on to the consumer. Thus even the furore-causing prices introduced in April were significantly lower in dollar terms than obtained in neighbouring countries, showing a significant subsidy (see figure 1).

Despite the hesitancy in increasing cedi prices however, a tendency for increase has been clearly discernible, as the figures in figure 2 show. The PNDC is clearly moving boldly in an area where there has been much tardiness.

Internal cedi costs are not the only problem. The percentage of foreign exchange returns taken up by imported crude has also been increasing in a striking manner. Whereas prior to the 1973 oil crisis, the imported crude bill averaged only C44m. to C50m., in 1981, as much as C963m. was spent on oil imports. Out of a total of C2,470m. spent. The fuel residue which is exported and helps to offset costs by contrast earned only 129m. cedis. At the end of the day therefore, almost 39 per cent of the foreign exchange earnings had gone into meeting crude oil bills. The trend continued in 1982, when for the first six months, the crude-oil outlay was over one-third of the available foreign exchange resources. The high outlay on petroleum products has seriously compromised the ability to import raw materials, spare parts,

and food, resulting in the following significant dislocations in import licence issuance. In 1979, petroleum took up 28 per cent of the import licences issued; in 1980 it was 43 per cent falling only slightly to 39 per cent in 1981. In its 1982 budget statement the PNDC targeted a reduction of 20 per cent of the import licence quota, by 1985, but it remains to be seen whether this is not over-optimistic, as the high costs continue.

For 1983, the \$360m. estimated for petroleum products still takes up more than a full third of the \$1,200m. required for imports.

To be able to borrow on the international money market, the regime sorely needs the certificate of good financial behaviour that adherence to the IMF programme provides.

The Ghanaian economy, especially the export sector on which it is completely dependent, is in such tatters, that the PNDC cannot afford to ignore IMF recommendations at this time, despite what may well be a high social cost, in terms of popularity and suffering. What makes "good behaviour" even more imperative is a proposed donor's conference in November to seek international loans principally to rehabilitate the cocoa, timber, and mining sectors as well as import food stuffs. The latter has become extremely crucial since the harvest has once again been poor.

Clearly, there are no easy choices for this government which on December 31, 1981 set out so determinedly to lead Ghana on the road to prosperity and social justice.

CSO: 3400/295

## 'COMPRADORS' SIT ON CEDIS; BUSINESS PEOPLE IN QUANDRY

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3456, 7 Nov 83 p 2548

**[Text]** THE PNDC had no alternative but to increase the prices of beer, cigarettes and petroleum products, according to the Secretary to the National Defence Committee, Professor Mawuse Dake in a speech to Obuasi mineworkers. While claiming the support of both "socialist and capitalist-oriented people" for this position, Prof. Dake — who is something of a trouble-shooter for the PNDC — made it clear that some capitalist-oriented people do not agree with the government's economic policy.

He said "self-interested compradors" were refusing to use available foreign exchange to import raw materials and goods for the manufacturing sector, and were rather seeking concessions from the PNDC so they could channel their goods when production began to old customers promoting kalabule. The result was under-utilisation of available import licences: of the \$100m. bridging loan obtained in April from Standard Chartered Bank to service the manufacturing sector, only \$40m. had been used.

Prof. Dake gave a political expression to the problem: the "stubborn compradores" were sleeping on wads of cedis needed to support the foreign exchange component to service the system so as to compel the government to capitulate on its recovery programme and have it rejected by the people of Ghana. In order to generate the cedi revenue needed to keep within sight of the 1983 revenue target of over C18,000m. the PNDC had no choice but to reduce the petroleum subsidy and raise beer and cigarette prices.

An editorial in this journal two weeks ago noted the warning from the Trade Ministry for import licence beneficiaries to utilise the World Bank import reconstruction credits — ironically made under the quick-disbursement facility. It stands to

reason that a visible capacity to absorb foreign credits would help in obtaining further credits, especially with a donors' conference in Paris just around the corner. Prof. Dake's comments (the first from a relatively senior government official) on recent economic measures give some slight indications of current problems.

Business people in Ghana are in a quandary: how to stay on the right side of current laws and regulations in the general climate of accountability, and yet seek to make the windfall profits available in the overheated economy. Their particular problem points to a more fundamental one: the uneasy relationship between the deregulation and free trade principles underpinning IMF prescriptions, and the controls judged necessary by the PNDC to lay a foundation for economic recovery.

Something of a vicious circle is in force: probity, financial discipline and the policy of strengthening the banking sector (begun in the 1982 budget) are meant to service multilateral and potential bilateral credits which are to revive the export sector and maintain an austerity level of imports for consumption and production; the government's revenue base must be substantially widened, but profit margins for producers must be contained within sight of consumer purchasing power which itself has fallen; "rational" behaviour in the primary and secondary sectors in a regime of price controls, coupled with demand restriction will tend to subvert attempts to undermine the parallel market.

In this light, Prof. Dake's view that Ghanaians will complain because they are yet to acquire patriotism and national consciousness does not answer all the questions, and "concerted effort, political will and determination" do not straighten out basic kinks in economic policy.

## WORKERS TAKE COLLECTIVE ACTION TO AVERT LAY-OFFS

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3546, 7 Nov 83 pp 2552-2554

[Text]

ON READING critically through Ghana's newspapers it becomes increasingly clear that redundancies and unemployment are becoming a threat for many working people. As the issues have surfaced in the press, a flurry of official statements as well as a slowly unfolding National Mobilisation Programme, have sought to provide some beacons for those threatened by the murkiness of losing their jobs. In the absence of any comprehensive government policy however, it is the independent actions of the workers themselves that have effectively resolved the problems to date.

The successful workers' actions include the workers' take-over of Ghana Textile Printing (GTP) and Juapong Textiles Limited, both subsidiaries of Unilever's textile operations; the occupation for one month of Cadbury-Schweppes' local subsidiary Allied Foods leading to the unconditional re-instatement of all the workers and exposure of controversial company policies. Also significant are efforts by VALCO workers to get a comprehensive resettlement programme following the series of closures of the American-owned Tema aluminium smelter. Also pending are lay-offs at Union Carbide, a trans-national subsidiary at Tema. Here, the company had reportedly been directed by its US headquarters to lay-off all its employees, and this was in process, whilst the negotiations with the Ministry of Labour had come to no definite conclusion. Lay-offs at the French-owned CFAO, Afro-media and at least 14 other firms were also said to be in abeyance since managements feared independent workers' actions patterned on the Cadbury or GTP model.

The slowness of the government is partly traceable to the deeply ingrained attitudes of those labour ministry officials, appointed from before December 31 and still at post. Long accustomed to accepting the statements of management as decisive and final, a tradition has been built up in the ministry of acceding to requests for permission to lay-off workers without thorough investigation of the background circumstances. Thus whilst the new government has stated its commitment to protect the interests of workers, including naturally, unfair dismissals, the civil servants in charge of day-to-day work, have followed a diametrically opposed path, causing much embarrassment to the regime. Also contributing is lack of movement in initiating a comprehensive policy on redundancies demanded of the PNDC by Tema workers from as far back as the GTP, JTL incidents in October 1982.

Following the Cadbury occupation, however, moves have now started to deal with the situation. The Secretary for Labour Mr. Ato Austin has resurrected from the ministry's files, a 1972 directive conveniently ignored by labour ministry bureaucrats and employers. On the basis of this directive which clearly establishes criteria for redundancy as well as the general commitment of the PNDC, to the welfare of workers, a stop has been put to all redundancies. What is required from management now is consultation, discussion and in-depth investigation with the involvement of both the ministry and workers. Redeployment into production of raw materials locally where this is feasible, is also to be accorded priority as

opposed to outright lay-offs. For the medium term new legislation on redundancy is being drawn up, envisaging joint contributions by employers and government to a redeployment fund. The ministry of industries has also joined the official flurry of concern. In its public statement it warned managements to desist from selling off raw materials and limited quantities of plant and machinery. According to the ministry, it had observed that such actions were then made a basis for declaring workers redundant, and it regarded this as patently illegal.

The National Mobilisation Programme, has also started work on a scheme for redeployment into agriculture, whilst the World Bank is prepared to finance a retraining scheme for laid-off civil servants.

The key reasons given by management is justification for their proposed lay-offs has been shortages of raw materials due to lack of foreign exchange. This is unsurprising since about 64 per cent of the industrial raw materials needed in Ghana are imported, and the export sector, that is the cocoa, gold, manganese and timber industries, which earn these monies are in a state of almost total collapse.

## Company interests

Even so, there are clear instances where the response of managements seems not to have been as imaginative as the crisis circumstances demand. For the two Unilever textile mills seized by workers for example, the excuse of shortage of cotton, material which Ghana can produce in abundance, was clearly inadequate, and the way out, as the workers indicated in the pre take-over discussions was a redeployment of the affected persons into cotton production. This kind of backward integration, however may not always suit its corporate interest, especially where it is a foreign company. Thus for GTP the real reason behind management's objections seems to have been the fact that growing cotton in Ghana would destroy long-established inter-company managements through which Unilever subsidiaries elsewhere supplied cotton for the Ghana operations, such as from Senegal. The only kind of agricultural redeployment they would accept was redeployment into vegetable production — very distant from cotton, and totally unacceptable to the

workers since it offered them no chance of ever getting back to the factory.

The threatened lay-offs at Cadbury were somewhat similar to the UAC situation. Some of the imported raw materials currently in short supply can be produced locally, but the workers' demands for such a redeployment were brusquely turned down by management. Their reason was that their directives from Cadbury-Schweppes in London indicated no desire to grow sugar or malt which is extractable from sorghum, millet or corn locally. Also capable of being supplied locally, and demanded by the workers, are egg powder and starch, used in Bournvita (a chocolate drink), and Cadbury's locally marketed brand of custard.

Clearly where it is an issue of redeployment to produce raw materials locally, conflicting interests may arise. Those transnational subsidiaries eager to maintain export/import links with their principals and subsidiaries may be hostile to such proposals, and any national policy directing redeployment into local substitutes must take this possibility of strong foreign-company hostility into account. These after all, are the extra-legal channels traditionally used for over-invoicing and general transfers of capital and profits and all efforts will be made to maintain them.

## Government streamlining

Foreign owned companies are not the only entities threatening redundancies. The government itself, in pursuance of sensible and economically rational policies in industry, the civil service, and public corporations has targeted significant numbers from areas of over-employment to leave their jobs and assume new roles over a phased period of time. In industry for example, there are numerous registered assembly plants, plasticware factories and textile mills. However many of them produce nothing, serving as a legal front through which their owners used to collect foreign exchange which was subsequently sold on the black market. Dr Botchway's policies to limit the number of these firms, and wipe out fake manufacturers, will however also affect workers in these establishments. The intention is to progressively redeploy them under the National Mobilisation Programme. The same applies with the soon-to-be trimmed down Civil Service.

This is not the first time high levels of redundancy have been faced by Ghana's working people. From February 1966 to February 1969 when the NLC was in power, the Labour Department recorded 70,491 lay-offs. These resulted from austerity measures demanded of it by the World Bank/IMF and the general witch hunt against Nkrumah's supporters in particular, and state enterprises in general. Around the same time, unemployment was unofficially but authoritatively estimated at between 500,000 and 600,000 — 15-20 per cent of the work force.

The official 1970 population census eventually recorded it much lower at 198,571 persons ie six per cent of the labour force. Of these, 141,467 were males (71.3 per cent) and 57,104 were female (28.7 per cent). Also significant were 9,134 persons registered as voluntarily unemployed, that is to say, people who had become so discouraged in their search for work that they had stopped.

Since that census, data has not been collected nationwide on a comprehensive basis, meaning that the true figure of unemployment in Ghana today cannot even be known. However, even assuming that the very modest level of six per cent of the labour force recorded in 1970, still holds, it would mean the total number of unemployed would be expected to reach 340,000 by 1985.

The limited data collected by the labour department suggests that the percentage of unemployed has increased significantly, arising as a logical consequence of the collapse of the economy, especially the industrial sector. Records taken from the labour department's 60 Public Employment Centres shows a tripling in the number of people turning up voluntarily to register as unemployed, jumping from 16,820 in 1971 to 35,030 in 1979. More ominously, job opportunities recorded by the department decreased sharply, falling from 79,635 in 1971 to 38,757 in 1979. The pattern of decline in job opportunities gives statistical concreteness to the overall decline in the economy. The manufacturing sector registered 16,620 job openings with the labour department. In 1979 it was 7,570. Construction saw a decline from 23,978 in 1971 to 6,852 in 1979, whilst the utility services saw a contraction from 1,255 in 1971 to 499 in 1979. Only mining showed a modest increase of 4,054 in 1971 to 5,559. Only a small proportion of employers have bothered to inform the

Labour Department when undertaking lay-offs, meaning that the Departments' figures are hardly comprehensive. Even so, the evidence since 1977 is quite striking. 49 establishments notified the Department about lay-offs between May 1977 and December 1980. In total they had on their staff rolls, a strength of 24,631 persons. 5,283 were eventually laid off after the Department stepped in to negotiate a reduction. On the enterprises' own calculations, the figures would have topped 10,000. Further, a Special Registration of Unemployed in the country, on a purely voluntary basis came up with 198,501. Doubtless, many people did not bother to register.

## Young unemployed

Even more disturbing than the figures is the age composition of those presently redundant and or unemployed. Most of the total unemployed in the 1970 Census were aged between 15 and 24. In the Accra metropolitan area for example, 58.7 per cent of the unemployed were in this age group, a fact confirmed nationwide 10 years later by the Special Registration exercise which recorded 53.4 per cent as coming from the same 15-24 age group. Most of those returned from Nigeria in February fall into this age group as well. With its youthfulness and restlessness, these significant numbers of people stand poised to be mobilised for negative politics if they see no stake for them in the current process of reconstruction. Thus even as thousands are engaged in constructive work, a few have taken to socially disruptive expressions of discontent. In the post-budget Kumasi demonstrations, some of the more socially marginal returnees played a significant role in alliance with students and other elements hostile to the PNDC. In other areas, they have been involved in clashes with the police, army, defence committees and citizenry generally.

What the population and labour experts call the "dependency ratio" also portends some danger for Ghana's reconstruction process. Dependency in this case means the extent to which non-working people (taken roughly as 65 years and above, and 15 years and below) depend for sustenance on the active labour force seen roughly as 15 years to 64 years. The dependency ratio in Ghana is high and is likely to increase.

In simple terms, it means that unless counterbalancing measures are systematically and urgently taken, redundancies and unemployment together may soon increase the number of dependants to alarming levels.

Already, redundancy and unemployment are affecting some of the laudable attempts of the PNDC to deal with shortages of essential items. A close reading of the newspaper stories on diversions, or thefts of goods meant for the people's shops, shows the social situation of many caught to date, as being unemployed or redundant. Opponents of the defence committee idea proudly hold this up to show that only "bad" people are in the defence committees. However the better view

seems to be that this strata of the lower classes, being unable legally, to acquire money to purchase goods, are tempted to steal.

This can hardly be held against them since they did not lay themselves off or destroy the economic fabric to an extent necessitating their own redundancy. As with the more general problem of redundancies and unemployment, it is only the implementation of a comprehensive programme of redeployment accompanied by a vigorous programme of public education and discussion, which can provide the answer. Various plans exist which the PNDC has declared itself committed to. What is left is resources, swift executive action to clear bottlenecks and efficient organisation.

CSO: 3400/303

## ACUTE PROBLEMS IN ROAD, TRANSPORT SECTOR EXAMINED

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3453-3455, 17, 24 Oct 83

[17 Oct 83 No 3453, pp 2404, 2406]

[Text] THE IMPORTANT role road transportation plays in a nation's economy is never in doubt: it is a key to national development. Road transport in Ghana accounts for over 85 per cent of passenger traffic. However, transportation, especially by road in Ghana has been chaotic for the past two years.

The State Transport Corporation (STC), the Omnibus Services Authority (OSA) and the City Express Service are the three main governmental organisations in road transportation. The birth of the STC dates as far back as 1901 when it was then known as the Government Transport Department. By Legislative Instrument, 414, the Department was re-established as a body corporate with the name, State Transport Corporation but did not commence operations until January 1, 1966.

The main objective behind the establishment of the Department was to provide labour and "human carrier" service to cater for the needs of the government as well as in the interest of trading and mining companies.

According to Mr. Edward Mpuah, acting traffic manager, the STC had 100 new and 248 old buses as at March 17, 1983, making a total of 348. Of this number, 318 buses are off the road, 268 due to lack of tyres and 50 for the lack of spare parts.

Mr. Mpuah named lack of tyres and spare parts, and inadequate import licences backed by letters of credit as some of the problems which hinder effective mobilisation of the Corporation's fleet. A source at the Ministry of Transport and Communications said that although the STC applied for £7.8m. worth of import licence in 1982, the Ministry gave the Corporation only £375,000 due to foreign exchange constraints.

Since January, 1982 the average monthly revenue of the STC has shot up from £2m. to £7m. and this has enabled the Corporation to pay off the total cost of their new Setra buses, amounting to £4m. The comparative comfort afforded the passengers, together with the high degree of professional competence and care shown by the Corporation's drivers are responsible for

Bus service to major towns  
from Accra

Town	1982	1983
Kumasi	10	2
Takoradi	5	2
Cape Coast	2	1
Bolgatanga	1	—
Aflao	3	1

### Operations of STC (1978-1982)

Description	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Roadworthy Vehicles	375	322	270	313	348
Buses in Operation	169	—	101	166	30
Routes Operated	84	87	87	110	107
Passengers carried (millions)	5.4	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.2
Passenger Mileage of Buses (millions)	937	528	312	480	—

the steady increase in patronage of its bus services.

Below is a projected chart were the STC's fleet to be fully mobilised:

The Omnibus Services Authority (OSA) is the prime mover of passengers within cities. By December, 1980, out of a nationwide fleet of 559 buses operated by the OSA, only 190 buses were on the road. As at February 28, 1983, out of a total fleet of 407 buses, 285 buses were off the road, due to lack of tyres and spare parts, leaving only 122 buses on the road.

The OSA needed £6m. worth of import licence in 1982 for spare parts for maintenance but lack of "almighty" foreign exchange made this good plan a fiasco. In spite of everything, the OSA carried about 26m. people in 1982.

"The establishment of the Service underscores my administration's determination to bring relief to workers and the general travelling public who spend long hours daily in queues at bus stops for transport or buses which never arrive." This was part of ex-President, Dr. Hilla Liman's address when he officially inaugurated the City Express Service on December 22, 1980. From the extract, it is clear that material conditions have hindered realisation of the objectives behind the establishment of the Service. Repairs of buses, for example, take a long time in the workshop, owing largely to an irregular supply of acetylene and oxygen gases from suppliers.

The major reason for the Service's poor performances has been lack of tyres. Out of its 394 buses in the country, 233 are off the road because there are no tyres. A total of 1,635 tyres will be needed to make the 233 buses fully operational.

Forty governmental organisations started the People's Bus Service in Accra in March, 1982. It meant that workers' buses which hitherto after dropping them at work, stood idle until closing time, were used to run passenger services. Within a month, that is, April, only 33 out of the original 110 vehicles were left and by June, 1982, all had been withdrawn except 11. As at March 18, 1983, only three were in operation.

On February 15, 1983, the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) claimed that 85 per cent of its vehicles were off the road as a result of lack of tyres and that the union needed 360,000 tyres of various sizes. According to the Union, out of the 150 vehicles plying the Accra-Kumasi route, only three were left, and two were plying the Accra-Cape Coast route instead of the usual 25 vehicles. The 45 vehicles on the Accra-Takoradi route had dwindled to two. The situation on the Accra-Aflao route is not any better. Out of over 200 vehicles, only 20 now ply the route.

As Ghana celebrated its 26th anniversary of independence on March 6, 1983, the last five Neoplan buses from available knocked-down parts had reached

### Operations of STC (maximum mobilisation)

Towns	Routes	Services	Bus Operation
Accra	51	166	92
Kumasi	22	86	38
Takoradi	11	25	15
Cape Coast	10	22	12
Tema	6	10	5
Ho	5	12	7
Bolgatanga	12	27	12
Tamale	10	22	12

the finishing stage. A source close to Neoplan (Ghana) Ltd said if the Ghana Government, which is the majority shareholder, failed to intervene, the factory would grind to a halt.

About 65 per cent of off-the-road vehicles in the country can conveniently trace their "ailment" to lack of tyres. The question a visitor to the country would ask is whether there was no tyre factory in the country. Well, there is: Firestone (Ghana) Limited was registered in September, 1967 but actually began operations in early 1969. On June 1, 1981, the Government of Ghana took over the remaining 40 per cent shares in the company and named it Bonsa Tyre Company Limited. Mr. S. K. Otoo, Controller of Bonsa Tyre Company, said in Accra that Ghana would need 500,000 tyres of different sizes to bring the transportation system to normal. From December 1982 to February 1983, the company was able to produce only 17,960 tyres for passenger, light and heavy duty vehicles. Below is a table of distribution for some towns:

As at March, 1983, the company was producing 600 tyres a week instead of 800 tyres because of intermittent water shortages and electricity failures. The company could produce 1,400 tyres a day if broken down machinery were repaired. In an exclusive interview, Mr. Otoo said the company was capable of producing 16,000 tyres a month and it had inputs to last them through May/June, 1983. The company has submitted its import licence requirements to the Ministry of Trade.

When some tyre centres occasionally get tyre supplies, cars, mainly commercial ones, spend days queueing for them. Observers are worried about one aspect, that is the way soldiers bulldoze their way through to buy two or three tyres which they sell at cut-throat prices. For example, tyre size rim 13 which sells for just under C200 is sold for any amount between C2,000-C3,000! A tyre centre in Central Accra received 164 tyres. Vehicles queued for three to four days and when it got to the 11th car, the 164 tyres had been sold. How

Town	Passenger trucks	Light trucks	Heavy duty vehicles
Accra	3,579	1,802	682
Kumasi	1,978	1,489	476
Takoradi	1,789	1,155	348
Sunyani	285	188	51
Tamale	350	233	75

many tyres were supplied to each vehicle? Soldiers jumped the queue and bought a large percentage of the tyres.

Dr. Kwesi Botchway, PNDC for Finance and Economic Planning launched a four-year economic recovery programme last December which included the following: "The crying need in Ghana today in the field of transport is for the adoption of an integrated transport policy . . . With the oil price boom which has made the prices of petroleum products prohibitive, we have no option but to adopt a forward looking transport policy which will make it possible to raise the external resources needed to rehabilitate and modernise the large fleet of buses, haulage trucks and cars in the public and private sectors which are now off the road and which constitutes a waste

of scarce capital resources in foreign exchange."

The Nigerian government's decision to expel illegal aliens has been a sort of blessing to the Ghanaian society in terms of transportation. Many of the Ghanaians returning brought vehicles which they registered. By February 28, a total of 3,582 vehicles had been registered, including 2,466 buses, 420 saloon cars, 104 trucks, 94 articulated trucks and 79 pick-ups; 294 motor cycles, 22 vans, 12 Land-Rovers and a grader were also registered. The temporary relief these vehicles have brought to the "bed-ridden" transport system is very welcome. The obvious fear is that once their tyres get worn out, these vehicles will also be parked.

[24 Oct 83 No 3454, pp 2447-2450]

[Text]

ONE OF the most disturbing facts of life in Ghana today is the acute road transport crisis. As a result of serious mechanical faults with many vehicles, or a temporary immobilisation due to absence of minor spares and tyres, activity and productivity in the country has slowed down to a crawl. Foodstuff movement is hardest hit, with problems of transport being an important contributory factor to the present food shortages in the cities, as well as the high prices of local food. Cocoa evacuation and movement of other export crops also suffers, while the PNDC's determined efforts to move cutlasses, cloth, food and fertiliser to the peasantry have sometimes founders due to inadequate transport.

Serious attempts have been made over the past year and a half to deal with the situation but the crisis is so deep that these efforts have not managed to bring a turnaround. The latest effort, an attempt to pool buses and rationalise their use has been slowly initiated in Accra following workers' demands and a positive response

by the Chairman of the PNDC, Flt-Lt. Rawlings, in a nation-wide radio and television broadcast after the austere budget. Before that, the road network, a fundamental cause, was being heroically tackled by Dr. Don Arthur with minimal resources, while Alhaji Iddrisu Mahama was sorting out the institutional problems of his establishment, the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Dr. Kwesi Botchway in his Economic Recovery Programme has also proposed some institutional and financial reorganisation in this sector.

Various alleged malpractices at Willowbrook, a British-partnered assembly plant, are being investigated by a committee of inquiry. In spite of these efforts however, the transport crisis is increasingly making life difficult for most people, becoming deeply aggravated on the occasions when petrol has been in short supply. In the urban areas for instance, ordinary social intercourse — meeting friends, going to work, to hospital, have become extremely

difficult and forces hostile to the popular process have begun to capitalise on these problems. The December 31 process itself and that higher productivity which is needed to get the country out of the rut is enormously affected by the inevitable lateness to work and the inability to move around with dispatch, once work has started.

Five months ago, the PNDC Secretary for Transport and Communications highlighted the extent of the crisis, focusing on one of the immediate causes — the spare-parts and tyres problem. As the March 31 *Ghanaian Times* reported, Alhaji Iddrisu Mahama targeted Ghana's foreign exchange needs for the transport sector as \$200m. At the same time, 70 per cent of the 92,000 vehicles in the country were supposed to be off the roads; 40 per cent of this number required tyres only to resume activity. Here also, the local tyre facility built by Czechoslovakia, and originally established by Nkrumah as a state concern, is in crisis, after its sale by the pro-Western NLC to Firestone, in 1967. After creaming off high profits and leaving the factory in a state of disrepair, Firestone sold their shares to Ghana under the Limann administration in 1980 on ridiculous terms (see *West Africa*, June 29, 1981). The factory produced only 63,000 tyres in 1982, down from a peak of 330,000 in 1976. At full capacity the factory can provide 80 per cent of the country's requirements.

Bad roads burst tyres and it is here that a lot of the cause of the crisis lies. Presently no single major highway is motorable from one starting point to the other. Large potholes, completely eroded sections, broken bridges and areas devastated by flood are more common than completely clear stretches of road. In the more remote rural areas, the state of the secondary and feeder roads is even worse. Yet it is here that the problem is doubly compounded. These are often the richer food growing areas, yet roads are so bad that transport-owners, both state and private, are reluctant to send vehicles for fear of a break-down.

The inability to effect consistent road maintenance seems traceable to four main factors. These are the lack of an integrated, vigorous and practical government approach to road maintenance (something all governments have lacked and the PNDC is now slowly trying to create); the absence of foreign exchange to import essential inputs; the destruction of large stretches of road by heavy duty articulated lorries; and corruption and theft by private road contractors in collusion with central and local government officials. At the same time, many of these officials are able to divert repair materials for their own private construction work, such as building mansions. This has led to vital bridges and culverts unrepaired for years.

In the colonial era, the Public Works Department was entrusted with maintaining the roads. The traffic pressure on the few roads that existed was not too great, while lorry sizes were small. What repair was needed was carried out promptly, and importation of necessities caused no problem since the Gold Coast colony was a part of the sterling area. After independence, and until the Ministry of Roads and Highways was created recently, there was a debilitating fragmentation of authority for roads, with various bodies being set up to take charge of roads and being superseded or never having their areas of authority precisely defined. Today the high rates of pilferage over the years have led to the institutions in charge of roads becoming a drain on the nation's resources.

The foreign exchange constraint can also not be underestimated. All large-scale road-clearing and maintenance equipment, as well as spares, are imported, as also are the basic steel and metals to make pick-axes, shovels and simpler equipment. The requirements have increasingly not been met in full as foreign exchange resources have diminished. Bitumen for road surfacing is also imported, though the Western Region of Ghana has significant bitumen resources. The vehicles, especially heavy trucks, of the road maintenance agencies, are as severely affected by the foreign exchange crisis and lack of spares, as any other sector. The Ghana Highways Authority estimates that it needs \$1,300m. to \$1,600m. to keep the 14,000 kilometres of so of roads in good condition!

It is noteworthy to mention that the Limann administration received an emergency \$25m. Highway Emergency Maintenance credit from the World Bank, while the World Bank has financed two highway projects since the 1970s. The EEC has also financed new highways as part of an Accra-Abidjan scheme giving five million European Units of Account (EUA) as a grant. The African Development Bank has also given 8.36m. AfUA for the same Accra-Abidjan Highway. However, all these credits do not add much to the overall road maintenance situation, since equipment is brought in primarily for those new highways.

The damage done to Ghana's roads by heavy articulated transport has been another quiet source of deterioration as these vehicles have a weight which cracks and destroys the road surfaces. The background is as follows: In the late 1960s and

early 1970s, various monied interests effected a dramatic change in policy as regards bulk haulage of cocoa. It had been the policy since colonial times and under Nkrumah to transport the bulk of cocoa by rail to Takoradi and Tema. Licensed buying agents of the Cocoa Marketing Board were under obligation to transport cocoa to the nearest railway depot for consignment by rail to the ports, or delivery to the processing factories. The dis-establishment of the United Farmers Co-operative Council (the monopolistic buying company) was the occasion for this sensible policy to be broken. Cocoa buying was opened up to a number of firms and articulated lorries began to proliferate, soon spreading to all types of haulage and in the process, destroying bridges and roads not built to withstand that kind of stress. The Accra-Kumasi road is the glaring example of such articulated lorry-induced road destruction. This factor might not have been so serious if there had been regular maintenance and new surfacing of roads, to take the weight of these admittedly useful and technologically more advanced vehicles. But the articulated lorry period coincided precisely with the period of abandonment of consistent road maintenance, creating a double disaster.

It has been regular practice in Ghana to award road contracts to private individuals. During the Acheampong years, this became a virtual goldmine with many contractors (male and female) acquiring mansions locally and abroad from the diverted proceeds. A regular practice was either to continuously award a contract to one person, regardless of whether he actually did the work, or certify its completion when in fact nothing had been done. Public officials also participated in this exercise. Import licences offered for equipment and spares were rather used to purchase fast-selling food and consumer items, leaving roads bereft of care even as record profits were recorded by various contractors. With the AFRC and PNDC, things changed somewhat. Various inquiries were instituted in 1979 and since December 31 many tax evaders dealt with by the CVC were contractors. The size of the registered contractors list has also been reduced leaving what can now be described as the genuine contractors. At the instance of the National Economic Review Committee and for the 1982 Budget period, some monies were withheld from all categories of contractors (not just road work) totalling C250m.

These were only paid after the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning had

organised a nation-wide survey to verify actual completion or otherwise, utilising the services of patriotic volunteers, civil engineering students and other persons from the polytechnics and the public corporations provided through the agency of the Students and Youth Task Force. Today, the proposed mechanism to check fraudulent contractors is the pre-payment of performance bonds, even before the contract is awarded. When fully operational it will be administered by the Bank for Housing and Construction.

As regards the motor vehicles themselves, the major problem is a shortage of spare parts generally and tyres in particular. Even before the dramatic pronouncement by Alhaji Iddrisu Mahama, figures given by various agencies showed a decrease of 40 per cent to 50 per cent in the vehicles on the roads. For the regions far from Accra (the main centre for spares and tyres), the situation has become impossible. These are precisely the areas where it is difficult to get spares, and yet it is here that road conditions induce more break-downs.

The spares situation has been particularly aggravated by the indiscriminate importation of motor vehicles of all kinds into the country without any backing spares. For many persons outside Ghana, the export to Ghana of any kind of car bought in Europe, usually Amsterdam or Hamburg, has become a booming business, netting at least C100,000 for a car bought at around \$800 to \$1,000. The holders of these monies in Ghana become millionaires overnight while many traders with an eye to the money of this group jacked up prices of various items. As a result the last three or four years have seen public concern in this area, and demands for a list of standardised vehicles to be promulgated and rigidly enforced.

But this move, simple and sensible though it may seem, has virtually become a political minefield. Intense lobbying has gone on around the cars to be included. A list prepared by the AFRC was thrown aside by the PNP administration only to be followed by a PNDC attempt which has still not achieved a definitive form. Chaos exists also in the area of vehicle assembly plants. There are currently supposed to be 29 such plants in the country. However, many of the owners do not assemble vehicles at all. They rather import fully-finished cars, without any spares, or utilise parts of their import licences meant for spares, to import other goods altogether. They then sell the diminished quantity of spares imported at exorbitant prices through private stores.

[31 Oct 83 No 3455, pp 2504-2505]

[Text] THE greater blame for the high prices of spares and their current shortage must however be laid at the door of the system used since colonial times to import spare parts, and which even today the Ministries operate without regard to its irrelevant and outdated nature.

Responsibility for importation of all essential spares has never been centralised. Since colonialism it has been scattered between the Ministries of Finance, Trade, Industries, and Transport and Communications. What is worse, even today, spares are imported under the category "Miscellaneous Imports" confirming the low priority given to this sector in the colonial times when vehicles were not too many. It is in this context of course, that spare parts dealers have filled in the gaps to service the boom in vehicles. They buy their own foreign exchange at black market rates, and charge fantastic prices to recoup their money thereby setting an exceedingly high price level towards which even spares imported under the inadequate neo-colonial arrangement tend to climb. Of the \$580m. worth of vehicles and spares asked for by private motor houses from 1980 to 1982, only \$18.5m. was granted, well under four per cent of what was requested.

For many simple spares, the fabrication capacity exists in various institutions with machine shops, such as Ghana Airways, Ghana Railways Corporation and the Tema Technical Institute, but no programme currently exists to import materials, or to finance and encourage their manufacture of spares. At the so-called "informal sector" level there exist two groupings of self-trained auto-mechanics at Kokompe in Accra, and Suame Magazine at Kumasi. By all accounts their degree of skill and capacity to fabricate parts is extremely high and they only require supplies of basic steels and alloys, to produce parts of varying complexity. The UST Technology Consultancy Centre — a USAID sponsored project — is currently working with various auto-mechanics, welders, etc, providing used machine tools and finance.

## Reclamation schemes

The proper thing would be for central government to step in to encourage these

workshops within the framework of a comprehensive rehabilitation, giving them contracts to produce spares for vehicles already identified as reclaimable. Since December 31, a number of such reclamation programmes did emerge but due to lack of encouragement they then ground to a halt. The first was the Machinery and Vehicle Reclamation Unit, set up by university students during their brief honeymoon with the PNDC in the first three months of 1982. A document of this now defunct institution indicates the kind of direction that can still be pursued meaningfully by the relevant authorities. The planners envisaged a national body with regional and district branches composed of skilled personnel to identify, locate and assess all broken down vehicles and their state of deterioration. Following this, the next stage was to be the rehabilitation of those that could be repaired and then the re-direction of unredeemable ones for other uses. Here, engines which were still serviceable were to be re-directed for use as irrigation pumps, threshing machines and other simple agricultural equipment. Totally unusable vehicles were then to be consigned to the scrap industry, mainly the Tema steel works and the foundries.

The assessment of the vehicles was also to be the occasion to assess the state of spare-parts requirements and detailed instructions and procedures were worked out and put into practice. These sought to ascertain whether the vehicle could be reclaimed, whether it could be reclaimed without having to import spare parts, whether it would require imported spares. Flowing from this over a period of time as a result of skilled analysis, the students expected a register to be created for those spares which could be manufactured locally and those which could not.

Around the same time, the University of Science and Technology Mechanical Engineering Department (ie the lecturers of the students) submitted an almost identical scheme to the PNDC showing that this kind of step by step inventory was perfectly feasible. Another initiative which has slowed considerably after a promising start was the National Plant and Equipment Rehabilitation Committee (NAPERC), a state body working along the lines described above, but which received no serious support from the PNDC after its initial successes. Clearly, a well co-ordinated programme of this character could, over at least one year, determine which parts could be locally

made, and organise their manufacture, whilst more precise data about the spares that actually require importation could be compiled from the inventory work of grass-roots teams, such as the students created. A more efficient usage of foreign exchange (probably less than Alhaji Mahama's \$200m.) might well result. A probable consequence could also be the placement of bulk orders for vehicles in widespread use, such as Bedford trucks, Audis, Peugeots etc. with their manufacturers, whilst impetus could be given to establishing a spare parts factory such as concerned public opinion has been demanding for some time now.

The poor management structures and practices within the various public corporations in charge of transport have also contributed to crisis. The Omnibus Services Authority for instance has consistently reported losses whilst many of its staff are virtually idle since they are assured of state subsidies. There has been no co-ordinating body to integrate the operations of the various road transport and other transport agencies, contributing to overlap, and the non-use of one type of service to complement another, in a way that would be productive. The Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning identified this problem, and to help resolve it proposed in late December the formation of a Ghana Transport Board whose composition was to be the Ghana Railways Corporation, Ghana Ports Authority, Ghana Lighterage Authority Co. Ltd., Black Star Line, Cargo Handling Co. Ltd., Ghana Airways Corporation, Volta Lake Transport Co. Ltd., State Transport Corporation, Omnibus Services Authority, City Express, and the Ghana Private Road Transport Union.

This body, which has now been formed, is to advise the PNDC Secretary for Transport on policy. In addition, membership of the board is to include a representative each of the TUC, the WDCs PDCs, the co-operative movements, organised farmers, and the Employers' Association.

To deal with the problem of finance, bad management practices and to eliminate the constant search for government subsidies, the Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning has also proposed that the two existing bus companies, the City Express and the Omnibus should be merged into a National Bus Holdings Ltd. with ten regional subsidiaries, called the Greater Accra Bus Service, Eastern Bus Service, Volta Bus Services and so on.

The National Investment Bank is to serve as banker to the national body and its

subsidiaries with authority to raise external and domestic finance to enable commercial operations break-even and repayment of its external and domestic debts, as well as to set aside money to cover the present alarming rate of bus depreciation, for which there is presently no financial provision. The group is also to enter where necessary into joint ventures with private investors at national and regional levels.

A similar structure is suggested for the State Transport Corporation which is to specialise in bulk freight transportation, as the Ghana National Freight Company Ltd. with ten subsidiaries, one in each region. This holding company as well as the subsidiaries are to be permitted to enter into joint ventures with domestic and foreign investors. To ensure a sense of duty, the employees are to be given the opportunity to subscribe to the share capital by monthly deductions from their salaries or through the Social Security and National Insurance Trust. State subsidisation of the transport sector is to be abolished completely. What is unclear about these proposals however is the fate of the fairly well run Inter-City bus service of the State Transport Corporation. Efforts are also to be made to manage the fleets of various enterprises more efficiently since this has been a major cause of the drain of scarce resources.

## Low-cost vehicles

In July the PNDC announced a programme to import on a mass scale urban transit vehicles such as small capacity scooters, motor-cycles and bicycles, for the lower-income groups. The World Bank (IDA) had also (*Daily Graphic*, June 25) offered a \$40m. quick-disbursing credit repayable over 50 years with 10 years' grace. It was aimed at the transport and agriculture sectors, with African Development Bank and unnamed bilateral donors (according to the Ministry of Information) being prepared to offer supplementary grants. \$18.7m. of the IDA credit was to go into imports of tyres, batteries, spare parts and re-treating materials for the trucking industry and public corporations involved in agriculture haulage and passenger transport. International tenders had already been put out as at August 3.

Hard work is being done to keep the crisis in check. Yet, these efforts to stave off a situation that is definitely not the PNDC's making will take time to mature. Looking at the long lines of resigned faces waiting for transport one can only hope maturation will come some time before the patience of the pedestrian runs out.

BRIEFS

NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION SET UP--The Ghana government has set up a Ghana National Petroleum Corporation. The company is to be given exploration rights in areas not covered by agreements with other companies and will have the right to participate as an equity holder in the event of any oil discovery being made. Exploration in Ghana's coastal waters slowed down earlier this year when Phillips suspended its operations. But recently the Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation has shown great interest, and has approved the drilling of two wells, at a cost of \$23m. in this South Tano structure. The Ghana government said that contracts for development of off-shore areas will be based on long-term production sharing; bidding for new exploration blocks is expected to begin next year. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3455, 31 Oct 83 p 2524]

EGYPT TO HELP COTTON INDUSTRY--The Egyptian government is to help Ghana develop her cotton industry by bringing in experts to work with the Cotton Development Board. The Egyptians are to assist the board to set up cotton farms, breed cotton seeds and control cotton diseases. Mr. Mahmoud Moustafa El Khouny, Egyptian Ambassador to Ghana, told this to newsmen in Accra just before he returned to Cairo having finished his 31 months duty tour in Ghana. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3455, 31 Oct 83 p 2535]

WFP PROMISES SPARE PARTS--The World Food Programme is to help the State Oil Palm Plantations with spare parts and milling machines to enable the plantations to step up their palm oil production. It has, therefore, requested the State Oil Palm Plantations Rehabilitation and Development Committee to submit to it a list of its spare parts and other equipment requirement for prompt action. A three-man delegation from WFP recently toured the country. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3455, 31 Oct 83 p 2535]

LOANS CHANNELED THROUGH GFAC--As from the next major farming season, loans to farmers will no longer be channelled through the banks but through the primary societies of the Ghana Federation of Agricultural Co-operatives (GFAC). Nana Owusu Gyemí, national president of the federation, who announced this, explained that the rationale behind the measure was to ensure that only genuine farmers benefited from such loans. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3455, 31 Oct 83 p 2536]

MISSING FERTILIZER--A total of 14,480 bags of fertiliser meant for farmers in the Northern Region, for use this farming season, is reported missing. This was disclosed in a report submitted by the Northern Regional Agricultural Task Force to the regional administration of agricultural production targets. Mr. Hudu Yahaya, Northern Regional Secretary, has ordered an immediate investigation into the matter. The Secretary ordered that to forestall future losses, people without authority from the regional agriculture officer, should in future not be allowed to cart fertiliser to their region. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3455, 31 Oct 83 p 2536]

CSO: 3400/295

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE MARKS NATION'S 10TH ANNIVERSARY

Bissau NO PINTCHA in Portuguese 1, 5 Oct 83

[Text of address by Nino Vieira, president of the Revolutionary Council, marking the 10th anniversary of the nation's independence, date and place not specified]

[1 Oct 83 pp 4-5]

[Excerpts]Comrades and countrymen,

If the party is the moving force for progress in our country, this same progress must rest on a secure economic base. It is for this reason that the PAIGC, since its foundation, has defined in its major program the principal lines to follow in the process of economic and social development.

Thus, among its objectives and guidelines, the party program includes the following: the elimination of all economic relations of a colonialist and imperialist nature; the achievement of economic independence; the harmonious planning and development of the economy (economic activity will be directed according to the principle of democratic centralism); the harmonious development of [agriculture] (the elimination of one-crop agriculture, the overcoming of agricultural crises, drought and hunger); the use of traditional agrarian structures and the creation of new structures to insure that the land is used to the greatest advantage for the progress of the people; development of industry and commerce on modern foundations; harmony between urban and rural economic activities.

Economic reconstruction in our country was initiated on the basis of this program. In the first years, our primary concern was to establish the essential foundations on which to build. One of the first political and economic steps was to nationalize the principal means of production and also the bank, making them the property of the state, i.e., public property.

Through this nationalization process, the state appropriated the major economic means to relaunch the economy: the land, the major industrial units and commercial enterprises, natural resources and transportation. Despite these measures and the strategy outlined by the Third Congress, however, the economic policy which was applied in practice until 14 November did not respond to our people's desires for an improvement in their living standard.

The errors that were committed, specifically the ambitious investment policy that was undertaken, did not lead to increased production but instead created a debt situation, with a substantial debt service, and a weakened marketing system, which was limiting the peasants' consumption to what they could produce themselves. The

unity of the domestic market and relations between the various branches of the nation's economy were weakened. There was not enough investment in the agricultural sector, defined as a priority sector in our development process. Investments in the sector have always been from 6 to 10 percent of total investment.

Added to these errors were the colonial legacy; the aftermath of the long armed struggle for national liberation; the institutional and human shortcomings, i.e., the lack of cadres and skilled manpower at all levels; the drought, which seriously affected production, particularly in 1977, 1979 and 1980; the extremely difficult international economic situation as a result of the increased oil prices; and a significant drop in the price quotations on the international market for the major export products of developing countries. Thus we can understand how it was possible to arrive at the difficult situation which the country is experiencing.

Of a population of about 800,000 inhabitants, some 87 percent live in the interior of the country and the remaining 13 percent are concentrated in Bissau, which is the nucleus of the monetarized economy of the public administration and the business sector. The national literacy rate is only 15 percent; school equipment is insufficient and the instruction is inadequate.

The economically active population stands at about 450,000, of whom only 25,000 are wage earners or salaried employees (civil servants, principally). About 33 percent of the active population falls into the primary sector, 3 percent in the secondary sector and 9 percent in the tertiary sector. The pyramid of the salaried population is inverse: 7 percent in the primary sector, 8 percent in the secondary sector and 85 percent in the tertiary sector. Per capita energy consumption (consumption per person) is barely 5 kilowatts per hour in the interior of the country; in the city of Bissau, consumption is seven times as high as in the rest of the country.

#### Monetarization of the Traditional Economy

As in most developing countries, the economy is bipolar: a money-based urban economy and the traditional economy elsewhere in the country, each with its own operational logic. Although there are points of contact between the two, recent developments have already indicated the breakdown of some of them.

We see a marked reduction in the domestic marketing of farm products, while an increasing proportion of our production is crossing the border. Efforts to further monetarize the traditional economy are suffering a setback. The monetarized economy is unable to establish an exchange, either direct or through currency, either because of the shortage or inexistence of the [farm] products or because the merchandise, usually imported, which the rural community needs is not available.

Some figures may illustrate this situation. Only one-third of the production of cash crops (crops for export) is marketed domestically. The productive sector of the monetarized economy is functioning at below 25 percent of the installed capacity. The peso has lost any meaning as a medium of exchange and its free market value has dropped to 25 percent of the official exchange rate.

Under the circumstances, the economic system and its mechanisms are less and less coordinated, the most characteristic indication being the inability of the marketing system to insure the distribution and sale of manufactured and intermediate products. Moreover, the disorganization of the marketing system and the lack of

transportation and storage infrastructures make it extremely difficult to distribute farm products. Trade between urban and rural areas is in such a state that essential products which are of vital interest to the peasants are increasingly rare. The problems with the balance of payments, aggravated by an import structure that does not meet the needs of most of the population, have fostered the subsistence economy or the growth of the black market, including border trade.

#### Large Budget Deficit

Regarding public finances, the budget deficit has remained at a very high level. The necessary spending to see that the government functions and to insure the present level or the gradual growth of economic activity in the country, which determines the amount of revenues, has enlarged this deficit.

As would be expected, the fiscal deficit has had significant monetary effects, increasing the money supply. This expansion has gone hand in hand with the stagnation of the real supply, causing the money demand to create strong inflationary pressure.

Finally, regarding foreign economic relations, they present regular deficits, mainly because of the persistent deficits in the trade balance. Moreover, medium- and long-range investments have given way to the entry of liquid resources, which has meant a rapid growth in the foreign debt.

#### Comrades and countrymen,

We have attempted to give a general picture of our economy in recent years. It has been and continues to be the practice of our party not to conceal anything from our people. It is essential for all of us to be clearly aware of the difficult situation which the country is experiencing. This is not the time to assess where the blame lies; it is more important to find the path that will lead us out of this situation. It is not an easy task. If, on one hand, it depends basically on internal factors over which we have some control, there are also external factors which we cannot control, which significantly influence the solutions to be adopted.

Just as in the first years of our armed struggle for liberation, however, we are certain that our people, led by the PAPC, will find the path that will lead us to the future which we envisioned when we were fighting in the jungles of our land to drive out the colonialist enemy.

Based on the guidelines of the Third Congress and the First Extraordinary Congress of our party, we are attempting to outline an operational strategy, which will encompass technical and economic dimensions, to implement the policy outlined for the development of our country. This strategy cannot be established within an indeterminate framework, namely with respect to its duration.

#### Development Strategy

Thus, in drafting our development strategy, we are adopting three successive phases to be executed in three periods. The first phase is economic stabilization, to prevent a deterioration of the situation, to normalize the functioning of the economy and finances, to open the way for true economic equilibrium. These phases will be carried out by means of a Stabilization Program, which has already been approved and which is scheduled for execution in 1983/1984; the period could be prolonged, if necessary.

Our action will concentrate on the structuring of the services, improvement in programming and the strengthening of projects which were defined as the Priority Block and the Block of Primary Support. The Priority Block will include activities which can be developed rapidly and which are important to production and to exportation. Thus it includes agriculture, fishing, forestry and lumber manufacturing and, eventually, mineral resources. We will give these sectors priority access to production tools and to foreign financing.

Regarding the Block of Primary Support, it consists of a group of sectors whose activities are in support of priority activities. These include trade, transportation, postal and telecommunications and financial services.

Increased production, depending on the development of the Priority Block, will cause a significant growth in the domestic demand. we will have to make sure that this is not manifested in a significant increase in imports. To prevent this, we will have to expand the activity of other (non-priority) sectors so they can respond to the increased demand. In this context, the civil construction sector will have to play a priority role, as will the consumer goods sector, although to a lesser extent. Finally, we will have to try to protect sectors which are basic at long range: education, information and culture, for one thing, and health, for another.

#### Firm Management of Economy and Control of Deviations

This strategy for economic readjustment calls for firm direction of the economy and of finances, appropriate management and control of deviations of any kind. They will inevitably tend to appear in a situation which will be characterized by disequilibrium until the end of the period. Since it is impossible to insure that the strategy can be properly implemented under the present operating conditions of the state apparatus for economic and financial administration (to be precise, administration as a whole), it is logically necessary to carry out a gradual and radical reform, to modernize the administration and make it more efficient.

The second phase of the strategy to be implemented in 1985/1986, will mark the beginning of the actual implementation of the re-equilibrium strategy. This stage will be characterized by a strong concentration of investments, projects and actions in the priority productive sectors, as well as a significant growth in production levels in the Priority Block.

This support will be allotted by sector, taking into account not only the precise status and time of maturity of the projects but also the established priorities and strict selectivity among the actions and projects within the framework of our overall difficulties. Among these difficulties, we will have to pay particular heed to the reduction in the financing of the budget deficit through the advance payments by the Central Bank and, consequently, the reduction in the portion of the projects which is financed locally; our capacity to carry out and manage the projects, which will require a strict policy for assignment of our cadres, technicians and skilled workers; and the immediate, intermediate and long-range foreign impact, that is, our ability to obtain enough financing for our intended goals under favorable conditions.

Finally, we will have to make an effort to create favorable conditions for the development of decentralized activities, at the regional level and through the private, cooperative or public sectors of production.

#### First 4-Year Plan

These first two phases will constitute our First 4-Year Development Plan. Its design is an important step forward in escaping from our current economic situation.

However, it is the execution of this plan which will be the decisive step. To this end, some measures must be adopted to be applied in the implementation of the plan, such as : a) to draft a budget consistent with the stabilization of expenditures. This planning must be aimed at reducing the budget deficit, which can only be achieved by severely curbing expenditures, one one hand, and by promoting the production growth that will lead to a strong increase in revenues; b) to design a detailed program for the management of foreign resources, gradually including all foreign revenue (export receipts, fishing licenses, food aid, balance of payments assistance and project aid) in a unified management plan to avoid the use of these resources outside a total framework and taking all duties into account; c) the centralized management of the economy. To this end, the Council of Minister for Economic Affairs and the National Commission for Economic Control should be the special instruments in a centralized management of the economy. The proliferation of ventures in all areas of economic activity, without regard for the policy defined by the party and government, has a negative effect on the economy.

It gives rise to incoherence, disregard of priorities, diffusion of efforts and the poor use of the scarce financial and human resources available to us. However, this centralization must not mean a stronger bureaucracy. Procrastination on decisions not only postpones the solutions to our immediate problems, but creates institutional vacuums or false margins for initiative, which are filled by decisions that are hasty and inconsistent with the options of the general policy which has already been defined.

The frame of reference for all decisions should be the National Development Plan, which, given its technical limitations, should not be interpreted rigidly. It must be enriched by an increasingly precise system of describing our economy and its mechanisms. Only under these conditions will we arrive at a collective decision process that will not be excessively rigid.

To carry out our First 4-Year Development Plan, we will have to resort to foreign aid.

With respect to the Stabilization Program, we are soon going to have a roundtable with our powerful economic partners, to try to obtain the financing for the program and for our plan in general. We are counting on the good will of the international community and we are certain that the program we submit will be well received and that we will be fully funded.

The drafting and adoption of the documents orienting our economic policy and the measures which we are going to announce will certainly help to restore the credibility and the reputation of our state and our administration.

The proper use of foreign aid will be the greatest demand which we will place upon ourselves during the period in which we will implement our First 4-Year Plan.

[5 Oct 83 pp 4-6]

[Text] Today we publish the conclusion of the message which President Joao Bernardo Vieira presented to the nation on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the proclamation of the State of Guinea-Bissau.

Measures adopted by the government to reorganize the trade sector, the education of the public on the content and significance of the 4-Year Plan, and the coordination of the party and government are focused on in this passage from the president's address.

Comrades and countrymen,

In the implementation of the Stabilization Program, we would like to use the occasion of this message on the 10th anniversary of the proclamation of independence in our country to announce the first measures taken by our government to reorganize the trade sector. Thus, we have determined:

- To create an office in the Ministry of Trade and Crafts to reorganize the trade sector. The basic objective will be to coordinate all the actions in implementation of the decisions of the Economic Council regarding the trade sector;
- To integrate the Foreign Trade departments, the commercial directorate of the People's Stores and SOCOMIN [expansion unknown], to increase the bargaining power of these enterprises, with the resulting advantage in preventing price disparities, rationalizing the import program to tailor it to the profile of demands.
- To publish the standards which will regulate transfer of the purchase and sales offices of the People's Stores and SOCOMIN to private firms;
- To publish the standards which will regulate the use of foreign exchange resulting from exports by private firms, the purpose of which will be to encourage the exportation of nontraditional products or those which no longer appear on the current list of exports. These revenues will be used for imports by private manufacturers, in percentages that will vary with the type of product exported.
- To publish the standards which will regulate purchases from private merchants, by the People's Stores, of products destined for export, and providing for partial or full payment for deliveries of imported merchandise destined for rural areas.

These measures will be followed by others for other sectors, all included in our Stabilization Program. We are more determined than ever to achieve economic recovery, to improve the living standard of our people and to strengthen the confidence of the masses in our party, and we are certain that we will succeed.

#### Man the Deciding Factor

Although we already have clear lines to guide our action, its success still depends, and decisively so, on another factor, the human factor. It is men who implement economic programs, at every level from production to management.

In a country where agriculture, the priority sector, is still underdeveloped, the effort of Guinea-Bissau's peasants is essential for the success of our 4-year plan. We are convinced that our peasants will play an active part, contributing decisively to its success.

A broad campaign to publicize our First 4-Year Plan at all levels is essential, so that, by fully understanding it, each individual will be committed to its implementation. This task is the responsibility of the party and its mass organizations, particularly its youth organization. We appeal to the JAAC [Amilcar Cabral African Youth] to organize a campaign, concentrating on the rural zones, to publicize the goals and content of our plan, as well as the measures which we have been taking to carry it out.

It is necessary to organize discussions of the lines of our first 4-year plan in the ministries, in companies and in rural areas, in assemblies of young people, workers and women. As the leading political force in our society, our party is responsible for promoting and supervising this entire process. In each phase, the party must analyse the implementation of the plan and ascertain that it is faithful to the goals and the lines as drawn. It is the government's responsibility to execute the plan, but it is the responsibility of the party, in addition to defining the general lines of action, to supervise their implementation.

Despite the difficult economic situation in which we find ourselves today, on this 10th anniversary of the proclamation of our independence, we are going to relaunch our struggle with the same spirit which excited us when the band of PAIGC guerrillas attacked the Tite garrison, in the first armed action against Portuguese colonialism. This time we are beginning the battle for economic recovery, and we are certain that we will win.

#### PAIGC Highest Expression of Sovereign Will of People

Comrades and countrymen,

Precisely 10 years ago, at the inaugural session of the first legislature of the ANP [National People's Assembly], in Boe, in my capacity as first president of the Assembly, I stated: "The PAIGC represents the highest expression of the sovereign will of the people. It is the PAIGC which determines the orientation of all state policy and insures its implementation with its own means. To achieve our objectives, we must insure the full mobilization of the masses and their participation in the drafting of state policy....Our ANP must respect and apply the principles of the party, which is the leading political force in our society and without which it would be impossible for us to officially proclaim the existence of our sovereign state."

In recalling these words, which reflected our deep belief in the historical logic of the PAIGC's existence, its actions and its true role in the overall process of the struggle of our people, we are well aware of their relevance today, as we celebrate, with pride, emotion and militant responsibility, the first 10 years of life of our young nation.

#### Party-State Coordination

At that time we could loudly proclaim the political and historical importance of our revolutionary vanguard--the PAIGC--and its dominant relationship to the government structures emanating from it and historically destined to be directed, guided and supervised by it. Today, more than ever, we must assert and confirm in daily practice the nature of the PAIGC as the directing political force in our society.

We are right to believe that the problem of coordinating the party and government, which was minutely analyzed in the Third Congress and the First Extraordinary Congress of the PAIGC, has never been as relevant as it is now in the pursuit of our struggle.

The inadequate attention given to this problem during the first years after independence and the lack of effort to preserve, in practice, the true character of the PAIGC resulted in a gradual disintegration of the essence of the party and an increasing discrepancy in the party-government linkage, with highly damaging results for the overall development of the country and the pursuit of the goals and principles of the party, creating, little by little, a vacuum in the political superstructure of the society. The Readjustment Movement of 14 November, which was a decisive moment on the path pursued by our people from the achievement of political independence to date, came fittingly to put an end to this state of affairs.

At this time when we are celebrating with great revolutionary enthusiasm the 10th anniversary of the proclamation of the independent Republic of Guinea-Bissau, we must not forget that 14 November was also a promise, a historical commitment to our fighting people, a commitment to reestablish, once and for all, the course of the impetuous current of our revolution, gradually but steadfastly realizing the dreams of our unforgettable leader, Comrade Amílcar Cabral.

#### Realities

Meanwhile, an objective examination of various aspects of national life makes it very clear that there is still much to be done before we can say that our task is completed, despite the many efforts made in various fields up to now.

Undoubtedly, one of our primary tasks is to tailor our administrative-state apparatus to our specific circumstances and to our development needs. If we do not achieve this, there will certainly be negative repercussions, not only for the functioning of the party and the full assumption of its historical mission as the sole political vanguard of our working people, but also, and more decisively, for the process of economic and social development, which is clearly defined in the revolutionary testament of the founder of our nation and the political-ideological patrimony of our great party, the PAIGC.

In this regard, we can state that some of the measures proposed to correct our economic situation, notably our First 4-Year Development Plan and the Economic Financial Stabilization Program, cannot be achieved unless the party actually serves the function which our sovereign people have attributed to it. The party must guide, supervise and dynamize the state apparatus, implement suitable measures to solve our present difficulties, especially our economic and financial problems, and promote, in a harmonious and continuous way, a close and constructive relationship with the government.

We are more than ever determined to accomplish this primary task, a condition "sine qua non" for the full achievement of the highest objectives of our revolution: to build a society free of any and every form of exploitation, to continue to develop the productive forces in the direction which Comrade Amílcar Cabral called "the highest form of existence," which for us is synonymous with absolute and total independence, social welfare and justice, full freedom and the affirmation of the African man.

#### Make the State Apparatus an Efficient Instrument

Within the planned Administrative Reform, our intent is to make our state apparatus an efficient instrument in the service of the working masses, particularly the rural masses, and the catalyst of their energy and creativity.

The basic premise which should guide our action in this regard was defined by Comrade Amílcar Cabral, founder of the PAIGC, who preached that "all decisions pertaining to the institutional apparatus must be based on the needs and circumstances of the peasants, who constitute the majority of our people."

The passivity and the poor performance of our administrative and public services and of many of our civil servants are themselves indicative of an inadequate administrative machine, which is topheavy and which reveals many of the vestiges of the old colonial order.

The future development of our country will require, among other measures, the elimination of the evils that such a machine represents and its gradual replacement by structures which are suited to our development needs and the type of society for which we are struggling.

It is clear that our party and its special instrument, the state, and all of us will be required to invest a major effort in vitalizing the structures for the full application of the principles and in seeing that the PAIGC effectively assumes its role as the directing political force in our society.

#### Support the Struggle of Peoples

As we celebrate the 10th birthday of our sovereign and independent republic, we cannot neglect to direct our militant and grateful thoughts to all the peoples, countries and progressive forces in the world which have helped and continue to help us, to they the countries of Scandinavia and the Socialist Community, which helped us during the struggle for national liberation, or others with which we have come to establish relations and bonds of cooperation and friendship following the proclamation of our state.

The celebration of this date is also a privileged occasion for us to launch, once again, from the heights of the historic rostrum which "24 September" symbolizes for our people and our great party, a ringing message of militant solidarity with all peoples who are fighting for their legitimate rights and to reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the principles and standards which govern relations among nations and the observance of which today constitutes a vital factor for world peace and stability.

We express our total support for the people of the African continent and the world who are determined to win their historical identity and their independence, led by their legitimate revolutionary vanguards. Our eternal solidarity is with the people of Namibia, led by their legitimate representative, SWAPO, in their great struggle against the perpetuation of foreign rule in their territory, the illegal exploitation of their natural resources and the denial of the basic rights of Namibian citizens by the racist, aggressive state of South Africa.

The unconditional implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 regarding Namibia is, for us, the only way to reach a just and permanent solution to the Namibian issue. We also affirm our commitment to the struggle of the South African people, led by the ANC, to eliminate the heinous apartheid regime and to build a democratic society in that African country. We voice our unconditional support for the Front Line countries, particularly Angola and Mozambique, victims of the aggressive and destabilizing policy of South Africa.

we reaffirm our militant solidarity with the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic and its revolutionary vanguard, the POLISARIO Front, in their struggle to reestablish the legitimate rights of the Saharan people, and we urge the strict application of the resolutions of the 19th OAU Summit regarding this African territory.

Regarding the thorny case of Chad, which is an open wound in Africa and a serious threat to peace and stability on the continent, we are convinced that the final and just solution to the fratricidal conflict in that African country and the reestablishment of peace within its borders, as well as the creation of favorable conditions for development and progress, can and must be accomplished by the Chadian people alone.

Therefore, we reject any and every foreign interference and any action aimed at internationalizing the conflict. We also urge the implementation of the provisions regarding Chad contained in the final communique from the secretariat of the 19th Conference of Chiefs of State and Governments of the OAU, our continental organization.

#### Commitment to Nonalignment

We affirm our fraternal support for the struggle of the people of East Timor, victims of aggression, genocide and disrespect for their basic rights. We declare our total solidarity with the Latin American and Caribbean peoples in their struggle to build democratic and just societies and we condemn the foreign interference and intervention, as well as the destabilizing maneuvers directed against the independent and progressive states in the region.

We vigorously condemn any and every type of foreign domination and exploitation, imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism and racism, including Zionism and apartheid, and we reaffirm our steadfast adherence to the policy of nonalignment, the basic instrument for world balance. On this occasion, we also reaffirm our determination to fight arm in arm with other members of the international community, lovers of peace and progress, for the establishment of a New International Economic Order and for the creation of a climate of peace and understanding in a world free of the threat of nuclear destruction.

It is the task of each and every member of the great world family to maintain peace and international security. Therefore, it is of vital importance to uphold strict respect for the standards of international law and the principles set down in the United Nations Charter, particularly those which pertain to the peaceful settlement of international differences, the non-use of force or the threat of force in relations among nations and respect for the sovereignty, independence and equality of nations.

#### Awareness

Fellow citizens and countrymen,

At this time, despite the serious problems affecting our country and the world, the people of Guinea-Bissau and their vanguard party, the PAIGC, are joyfully celebrating the first 10 years of our independence.

This is an indication of the moral tranquillity of a people and party with confidence in their ability to overcome temporary crises and confidence in the justice of the cause for which they fought against colonialism yesterday and are fighting now against underdevelopment, poverty and hunger, to build a country which is ever more progressive and revolutionary.

From the day we created our party until the day we joined the community of independent peoples and nations, and now, as we are commencing the heroic march to build a better and worthy future for our people, we have always been certain the our cause will triumph.

Yesterday we were victorious in the jungles of our land and we proved that no force, no matter how powerful, can destroy the will of an aware, organized and united people.

Today, this unshakeable will, this awareness and unity of our people still constitute the key to our victory in the struggle for economic independence, without which it will be impossible to carry out the objectives which we seek to achieve.

However, the struggle for economic independence necessarily calls for the affirmation and consolidation of our African nation. Without patriotic and national awareness, there is no independence, no progress and no well-being.

Our struggle for national liberation, which was the most sublime expression of the conscience of our people, was the moving force for the liberation of minds from tribal and ethnic preoccupations. It gave new dimensions to the concept of the Guinean man and was the germ of national unity.

This was possible only because the party of Cabral, synthesizing the interests of the working classes and of our people in general, managed to arrive at a platform which would draw together the interests of every individual, every group and every social class. This platform arose from the need to eliminate the Portuguese colonial power in our country.

In this phase of economic reconstruction, the party has also found a platform capable of uniting the interests of the great majority of the Guinean people. It is contained in the resolutions of the Third Congress, reaffirmed by the First Extraordinary PAIGC Congress, and basically defends the interests of the least advantaged classes, which constitute the vast majority of the population of Guinea-Bissau.

#### Awareness

Once this base is accepted, the party has the great responsibility of seeing that the masses fully understand our economic and social development strategy. Therefore, it is urgent to intensify the work of educating our people, as well as the ideological training of our cadres.

While it is true that people do not fight for ideals or for some idea in someone's head, it is equally true that when an ideology is accepted by the masses, it becomes a force which makes it possible to understand and overcome problems, mobilize energies and creative capacities and transcend the restricted framework of ethnic interests.

We are convinced that the correct application of our development strategy will lead us to a national consensus, to the economic, cultural and political unity of all the Guinean people.

Let us, then, comrades and countrymen, strengthen our determination to produce more and better, increasing our work productivity, and strengthen our confidence in the party of Cabral, in the certainty that the wealth we produce will primarily serve the working majority of our people.

Comrades and countrymen,

We will soon begin the process of normalizing institutional life. We are going to present our draft constitution for popular discussion and hold legislative and presidential elections. This is an important step in creating the conditions for more effective functioning of our state apparatus.

We take this opportunity to launch an urgent appeal to all our people to participate in this process, so that the culmination of this action will be a clear demonstration of the practical application of our National Revolutionary Democracy.

Viva the Republic of Guinea-Bissau!

Viva the Revolutionary Council!

Viva the PAIGC, the force, light and guide of our people!

6362

CSO: 3442/46

PRESIDENT WARNS LEBANESE COMMUNITY

AB211125 Abidjan Domestic Service in French 1245 GMT 20 Nov 83

[Text] The head of state met yesterday with representatives of the Ivory Coast's Lebanese community. Following their audience with the president, the Lebanese reaffirmed their honest determination to participate in the development of the Ivory Coast. The Lebanese community totally shares the concerns of the head of state, who wants healthy relations between Ivorians and non-Ivorians. To President Houphouet-Boigny, all foreigners living in the country should maintain good relations with the Ivorians. The head of state lauded the Lebanese, who understand the need to help the Ivory Coast in its development. He did, however, criticize a number of practices.

On the subject of residence permits, President Houphouet-Boigny called on the Lebanese to abandon the use of intermediaries, who are often unscrupulous, because the permit is free.

[Begin Houphouet-Boigny recording] Whether you come from a neighboring country or distant Lebanon, I ask you to contact the leaders of your association, who will in turn contact the ambassador, his excellency the ambassador of Lebanon, to ask permission for your entry into the Ivory Coast.

You yourselves will guarantee the respectability of the person coming in because you know him better than we do. And the minister of security will immediately grant you the permit to reside in this country. I no longer want to hear of these intermediaries who exact money from the unfortunate ones who come here. I no longer want to hear of this. The residence permit is free [end recording].

The head of state also stressed the issue of smuggling in the country. The head of state noted that some Lebanese practice this as a sport. This attitude is dangerous and must cease.

[Begin Houphouet-Boigny recording] I must point out that it is not only the Lebanese--smugglers exist in all the communities--but some of them have been indulging in smuggling. I ask you to help us to put an end to this. I will first of all ask you to advise them in a brotherly manner to renounce this practice. If they do not stop and if you do not want them to put the country's economy in jeopardy, have the courage to discreetly inform your ambassador. This is not a denunciation [words indistinct]. It is a question of public salvation. There should not be smugglers among you in this country [passage indistinct] [end recording].

In their speeches, Mr Farah and Mr Zayer, the spokesmen of the Lebanese community, mentioned two problems of importance to them: The integration of young Lebanese in the country's life and naturalization. President Felix Houphouet-Boigny promised to do something concerning these two points.

CSO: 3419/190

UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS OF CRIME SEEN AS 'DESTABILIZATION'

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3456, 7 Nov 83 pp 2554-2555

[Text] TOURIST BOOKS on the Ivory Coast describe an inexplicable jungle magic; economists used to write about its growth "miracle"; and political observers have been amazed by the longevity of a regime which sits tight in a region known for coups.

But recently, uncertainty has appeared again. President Felix Houphouët-Boigny, arrived home in a supersonic Air France Concorde jet after an astonishing five-month absence abroad. Word has it that he has set the Guinness World Record for the amount of unbroken time spent by a leader outside his country: the previous record-holder appears to have been a Roman emperor. The Ivory Coast's founding father returned home to be greeted by all his senior government officials, a loyal army, and a mass of Ivorian flag wavers.

During his time away, the president, affectionately known as "the Old Man", made official visits to the United States, Canada and Great Britain, took a holiday in France and Switzerland, where he owns private property, and participated in the 10th Franco-African Summit which took place in Vittel, France.

The Political Bureau of the country's only party, the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI), called his return a day for militants to give a welcome, equal to their attachment to their president. The minister of labour announced that all work would be stopped from 11.30 am to 2.30 pm to allow Ivorians to be out for the arrival.

But despite the carnival atmosphere, in recent months the Ivory Coast, and in particular Abidjan, has been marked by unprecedented levels of crime and banditry ranging from the delinquency of small

thefts and slashed tyres to armed robberies and attacks on wealthy residents. Even the government paper, *Fratérité Matin*, whose admission that anything could be wrong in this blessed land usually amounts to no more than a few mug shots of petty bandits, is acknowledging that the amount of aggressive illegal activity is increasing. The more serious cases, however, are not mentioned.

Bars in Abidjan which once vibrated until dawn are now strangely quiet. Said one restaurant owner: "Business isn't good. People are scared to come out." And at cocktail parties and lunches, the stories circulate in solemn tones.

If, from afar, it appears that life is still peaceful, the illusion is not due to "jungle magic". Last month, Ivorian security forces launched a round-up campaign of the underworld which is threatening the public peace. The government organised missions which sent officials throughout the country to "sensitise the population to the problems posed by the resurgence of banditism and delinquency". Ministers and deputies called upon residents to protect themselves against criminal elements. But last week, Procurator-General Louis Folquet, in his address at a judicial ceremony, cautioned that this kind of self-defence could, if not conducted properly, make matters worse. He called for more information on self-protection, as well as severe penal measures.

It is heard from good sources that foreign expertise has been called in to assist in tackling the crime wave, largely by training special security teams. This includes experienced Moroccan commandos as well as officers from France's special "Anti-Gang Brigades" who have special

technical and psychological training to deal with more serious crime.

"Destabilisation" is the catch-all word used to describe the criminal activities. But they can be traced to several origins. These include external sources, or what the PDCI has called "the large number of unqualified foreigners pouring into our country from neighbouring states, aggravating the unemployment problem and the economic crisis". Not only are the immigrants unemployed, but they come from neighbouring countries such as Upper Volta and Ghana where military governments are using socialist language which is anathema to the virulently "anti-communist" Ivoirian government. Houphouët-Boigny blamed Libyan interference as the catalyst for the student strikes which broke out in the Ivory Coast last April, and it is likely that he sees the "Gaddafi menace" rearing itself again.

But conditions in Abidjan itself are ample reason to push the poor and unemployed to desperate actions; it is a city of tin shacks and grand villas, where the "luxe" of Parisian cafés and Western goods are painful temptations. And the "conjuncture", or economic downturn, with its tendency to devastate the poor while it only bruises the rich, creates further tension.

Gone are the days of the coffee and cocoa boom when good prices for the country's major exports as well as high levels of foreign investment provided opportunities for Ivoirians from rural areas.

as well as large numbers of immigrant workers who accepted low wages on the country's plantations.

The security problem is one of many. And thus, when the president who has led the country through the miracle and into the conjuncture arrived home, he told residents that he would be convening "a very open national council which would take important decisions inspired uniquely by the superior interests of the Ivory Coast".

In its first ministerial council, the cabinet opened the coffee and cocoa campaign and raised coffee prices from its four-year-old price of 150FCFA per kilo to 175FCFA while cocoa was upped from 300FCFA to 350FCFA. A PDCI Political Bureau meeting was called for November 3, 4 and 5. Issues to be discussed are even expected to include a cabinet shuffle as well as elimination of many of the country's redundant portfolios.

Ivoirians and foreigners are also wondering if "the Old Man" will indicate who takes over when he leaves or, at the least, if he will intervene in the wrangling which is taking place in party ranks. Outside the party, there is also the ongoing investigation into corruption by government officials in the housing sector and, although students and teachers went back to school in "calm, order, and discipline", the question of whether the educational system will remain obedient still hangs in the air. Gone are the days when everyone wondered whether anything could go wrong. Welcome home, Houphouët.

CSO: 3400/303

EMERGENCE OF SHARP DIVISIONS WITHIN PRC DISCUSSED

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3454, 24 Oct 83 pp 2440-2441

[Article by Eddie Momoh: "The Struggle Within"]

[Text] THE INCREASING concern by Gen. Samuel Doe's People's Redemption Council (PRC) government about left-wing teachers who are attempting to teach socialism in whatever form to the young people of Liberia, is not, after all, an isolated matter as was at first thought, or a matter which is merely confined to the Ministry of Education alone.

It emerged last week, that the so-called hunt for left-wing teachers is merely a smoke-screen for the deep policy differences within General Doe's governing council. There are reports of general nervousness and mistrust within the Council as the proposed date to hand over government to a democratically-elected government approaches in 1985. These policy differences are now believed to have led to a number of people losing their posts, not least Dr. H. Boima Fahnbulleh, the former witty, cultured Foreign Minister, who was fired by Head of State Doe for having an "ideological philosophy . . . incompatible with the aims of the Liberian revolution". In fact, it is now known that whenever such a phrase is used, it often refers to policy differences and in most cases, this means capitalism versus socialism or Marxism, the two acrimonious camps into which General Doe's governing council is sharply divided.

Competent Liberian sources say Doe is resolved to weed his governing Council of people who he regards as communist orientated and his determination to wield the axe at the slightest hint of differences in policy, has been sharpened by the Liberian leader's increased friendship with US President Ronald Reagan. It is also understood that the influential US ambassador in

Monrovia, Mr. William Swing, had in a top-secret briefing alerted the Liberian leader that one of the fundamental and immediate threats to his rule was people with socialist leanings. It also emerged that this threat was repeated when the Liberian leader visited President Reagan at the White House last month soon after the former's address to the United Nations General Assembly. Consequently, on his return to Monrovia, General Doe promptly threatened to sack 300 teachers whom he described as socialist and communist sympathisers and "enemies of the revolution" who had to be removed from the schools.

At the same time, the government banned more than 900 students of the Sani-quellie Central High School in Nimba county from seeking admission in other schools throughout the country following serious disturbances in which 13 students were wounded. Twenty-four others who were considered as "the real leaders", were banned for two years on the recommendation from Head of State Doe. Earlier, the Liberian leader had ordered the closure of the Booker Washington Institute and the University College of Cuttington following violent riots by students with "socialist orientations".

Liberian government sources claim that Doe's dismissal of Fahnbulleh was the PRC's "biggest communist catch" to date accusing the former Foreign Minister of being on the payroll of the Libyan leader Col. Gaddafi. They also claim that since his dismissal from government, Dr. Fahnbulleh had fled to the Libyan capital, Tripoli.

## A 'brilliant' memorandum

However, what is known is that Fahnbulleh was fired because, like many others in the governing council, he strongly opposed Liberia's re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. He had prepared a "brilliant" 400-page memorandum for Head of State Doe, severely critical of the Liberian leader's rapprochement with Israel. But Doe had his own ideas. PRC insiders revealed last week that Doe had personally written to all African leaders to sound them out about his plans to renew diplomatic relations with Israel although few cared to respond because according to one Liberian source, they felt that Liberia as a sovereign nation was capable to do what it wanted.

While Fahnbulleh's memorandum was waiting at the Executive Mansion for Doe to return from West Germany where he was receiving medical treatment, intelligence sources had already leaked news about Fahnbulleh's stand in the Israeli affair for which Doe was known to be personally enthusiastic. "Doe was very upset," said Foreign Minister Dr. Ernest Eastman. However, the climax to what is now believed to be weeks of wrangling came when Fahnbulleh allegedly sent an open cable to Doe in West Germany instead of observing the usual practice of coding the message of the cable. The cable, according to informed sources, had been sent through a diplomatic channel for Head of State Doe in Monrovia from the Israeli Government in Jerusalem. It was not clear, if true, why Fahnbulleh resorted to the method he used in transmitting the message of the cable, but government sources say, it was no doubt an expression of opposition to Doe's Israel adventure.

At this stage, PRC insiders say Doe felt Dr. Fahnbulleh was becoming an intolerable liability and so fired him. It was a difficult decision, according to these sources, because of all his former Foreign Ministers. "Doe liked Fahnbulleh very much".

Nonetheless, it is also now known that the Israel affair apart, other issues have sharply divided the PRC government to the point that this is being attributed to people with socialist or communist sympathies. For example, the question of the infiltration of members of the defunct Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) into strategic areas of government is well-known. In the ministries of Economic Development and Planning and Foreign Affairs, the presence of MOJA sympathisers it is claimed, is such that policy matters are often either blocked or sat upon. "This is a serious state of affairs," said Foreign Minister Ernest Eastman. Members of MOJA, it is alleged, have also been effective in colleges and schools in recruiting members and holding secret meetings.

On the other hand, MOJA sympathisers have accused the government of dithering and slowing the pace of the revolution. For evidence, they point to the many members of the defunct True Whig Party who continue to control many important areas of government. "They are there and we know what they are up to," former Foreign Minister Fahnbulleh told this correspondent in July. It is this increasing mistrust and suspicion between the former members of MOJA, like Dr. Togba-Nah Tipoteh and Dr. Fahnbulleh, or those of the defunct People's Progressive Party (PPP), like Baccus Matthews, Oscar Quiah and Mr. Marcus Dahn, which will for a long time continue to make room for accusations and counter-accusations for those in power and those who have been thrown out of power. The hunt is only beginning.

CSO: 3400/289

QUIWONKPA DISMISSAL ANALYZED; CRACK IN PRC WIDENS

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3456, 7 Nov 83 p 2549

[Article by Eddie Momoh: "The Party is Over"]

[Text] ONE OF the principal actors in the 1980 violent coup which brought into power the present People's Redemption Council (PRC), Brigadier Thomas Quiwonkpa, was recently relieved of his duties by Head of State Doe through the executive committee of the PRC. According to a statement issued by the Council, Brigadier-General Quiwonkpa had refused to take up his new assignment as secretary-general of the PRC "until certain concerns had been addressed".

The statement said that notwithstanding "assurances" from the council, the General remained "adamant in his position of refusal". It said the former Commanding General of the armed forces even also flatly rejected an invitation by the government to take part in a recent welcoming reception in Monrovia for Presidents Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone and Sékou Touré of Guinea. Consequently, according to the statement, the governing council was left with no alternative but to resolve and to recommend that "our colleague and brother, General Thomas Quiwonkpa, be dismissed from the council and the armed forces of Liberia, together with a forfeiture of all benefits normally associated with retirement".

Despite its general ambiguities and brashness, two things seem to stand out of the council's statement. First of all, Quiwonkpa said before he would be deployed from Commanding General of the Liberian armed forces to the largely bureaucratic post of secretary-general of the PRC, he wanted the executive committee to clarify "certain concerns". Secondly, the statement said despite "assurances", Quiwonkpa had remained "adamant" to change his mind about taking up the new

post. At first glance, it would seem that the General took a knife to cut his own throat because as he very well knows, obedience is the hallmark of good soldiery: obey and complain afterwards.

But in a military force which is highly politicised and where smartly-cut Italian suits have replaced battle fatigues, the General may well have been insisting on political rather than military expediency. It was not immediately known what he may have meant in seeking further clarification on "certain concerns". Nor did the PRC statement clarify this point. But if the man's disposition is anything to go by, this ambiguity may mean that he was seeking a firm definition of his new duties and not merely wanting to become another political ball-boy of the Liberian leader. Quiwonkpa is a highly professional soldier who enjoys enormous respect within the rank and file of the Liberian armed forces; Doe's recruitment of him after the overthrow of the Tolbert regime in 1980 was not so much due to the role he played in the actual coup operation but rather because of the respect and following he commands in the army. He was always proud to be called a soldier and was often glad that his position as Commanding Officer stationed outside Monrovia, had distanced him from the political poker game at the executive mansion.

Brigadier-General Quiwonkpa's greatest achievement was to instil discipline and training in the largely illiterate and reckless Liberian military forces, especially after the 1980 coup. To this end, he has remained loyal to the revolution. "If it were not for him [Quiwonkpa] the many threats to the revolution would have succeeded," recalled a knowledgeable Liberian official.

True — for example, when rebel soldiers briefly took part of the radio station in May 1981, in an attempt to overthrow the government while General Doe was attending the ECOWAS summit in Freetown, it was Quiwonkpa who headed off the crisis when he led heavily-armed security men to the broadcasting station. It was this coup attempt which, it is alleged, implicated Doe's former number two man, Major-General Tomas Weh Syeh, who in turn was executed by General Doe.

Consequently, it appeared that Quiwonkpa may have dreaded any appointment that would take him headlong into direct contact with somebody like the highly mercurial Samuel Doe. In general, the two former sergeants are opposite extremes who seemed to have resolved to the fact that as long as they distance themselves from each other, all will be well. So it may also be said that while the government might argue that the new appointment for Quiwonkpa was a kind of elevation, Quiwonkpa on the other hand appeared to regard it all as an orchestrated arrangement to dispose of him. "Like a good soldier, Quiwonkpa made a pre-emptive strike", said an informed source. Yet, there has been no suggestion or evidence to point out why Doe may want to dispose of Quiwonkpa.

But what now looks like an imminent power struggle cum ideology may explain this fluid state of affairs.

The second point which stood clear in the PRC statement is the "assurances" which were said to have been given to the

former commanding general. The council's statement did not clarify these "assurances". But Liberian political sources indicated last week that the assurances were full of high-level bureaucratic soundings which failed to impress Quiwonkpa.

Other reports said there is a growing disillusion over General Doe's method of push and sack of officials and Quiwonkpa's refusal to take up the new appointment as secretary-general of the PRC, may have been in protest against what many now regard as an iron-handed policy. But whatever the arguments for the sacking of one of the PRC's most trusted military leaders, there is now no doubt that the crack of mistrust and deep division within General Doe's governing council is widening. Since the execution of Major-General Thomas Weh Syen in 1981, a year after the overthrow of the Tolbert regime, Quiwonkpa is the first most senior military officer in that close group of friends to have lost his post. Apparently, Doe maintains the upper hand, having eliminated the equally influential members of that group of eleven military men who in 1980 formed the People's Redemption Council (PRC). There are, of course, still in the council Vice Head of State Nathan Podier and Harrison Penue.

Whether the present goings and comings are in the cause of the people or merely a question of personal power aggrandizement, the struggle for ideological supremacy, if indeed that is all this is about, or merely to stick on to power and eliminate possible dissents the stage is apparently set.

CSO: 3400/303

LIBERIA

BRIEFS

WARNING ON RICE IMPORTS BAN--Nimba County Superintendent Brigadier General Joseph Fangalo has expressed fears that the ban on rice importation may, as he put it, plunge the country into a situation similar to that of 1979 when the Agriculture Ministry ordered a ban on the importation of rice. General Fangalo explained that at the time, the ban was imposed with the view that locally produced rice would be sufficient to feed the nation, but the plan, he said, did not work out. Mr Fangalo said the same rice issue resulted in a series of unrest in the country. Superintendent Fangalo advised government officials to be mindful of making such crucial national decisions.  
[Text] AB181730 Monrovia Radio ELWA in English 1600 GMT 18 Nov 83]

CSO: 3400/312

MOZAMBIQUE

EFFECTS OF DROUGHT IN GAZA, INHAMBALE DESCRIBED

Situation in Chibuto District

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 Oct 83 p 1

[Article by Ernesto Zucule]

[Text] The worst drought anyone remembers for the past 50 years in Mozambique is devastating all of southern Africa. It is endangering the life of nature and man and spreading distress and desolation in Gaza and Inhambane Provinces, where, despite tremendous efforts by the party and state to minimize the effects of this natural disaster, hundreds of thousands of people are still living very precariously.

Our reporter on the spot saw the devastating look of the farms, which have turned dry and dusty, and followed the day-to-day life of the inhabitants of the areas hardest hit by the drought. In some parts of Gaza Province, the drought is beginning to be called "ndlala singayi wona" (hunger never known before).

And in fact, in the country's two southern provinces, the rivers and their tributaries, the lakes, and the lagoons have dried up completely, and the ground is completely cracked or covered with very dusty sand. The land is so dry and ruined that it looks as though the farms had been burned over on purpose.

As though to say "the land is dying," extensive areas contain nothing but tree branches and dry tree trunks without a single leaf, and the beds of what once were rivers are simply barren.

A Day in Changanine, Chibuto

Changanine is the name of a village in Gaza's Chibuto District where the drought is causing suffering of all kinds, ranging from the snuffing out of human life to the desertification of regions once known as being traditionally among the most heavily populated--even during the most severe droughts that occurred around the time of World War II.

The inhabitants go several days without a single meal because the fields and forests have long since ceased providing the well-known "cacana." The only hope

of a meal appears with the sound of the food distribution trucks. Without the trucks, people even die of hunger.

People have lost any will to dig wells because, as we saw, one can dig a hole 5 or 6 meters deep without finding a single trace of water, even in places where rivers used to flow. The alternative for drinking water and water for cooking (when some flour has been received) is to go to the surviving lagoon with its dirty water, which one often has to share with livestock.

The struggle between man and livestock to find what little dirty water there is results in serious health problems for the former, as can easily be imagined.

The malnutrition to which the entire population is subjected means that many children are in a quite deplorable state of health.

The people hardest hit by this situation are predominantly the elderly and the children, since they are more vulnerable to disease. Mothers have no milk, and the only thing for them to do when they get up in the morning is to continue their crusade of searching so as not to remain with their arms folded in front of their famished children, parents, or grandparents. Very rarely (since their strength is all gone), a few mothers search the forest in vain for something that might rekindle the fire in their kitchens.

Generally, there is always a lack of one thing or the other. When "cacana"--a simple food--is gathered, there is no water in which to cook it. And when there is water, there is no cacana because, according to Celestina Moiane of Changanine, "we never have the strength to go looking for water and cacana on the same day."

#### Serious Malnutrition

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Oct 83 p 3

[Article by Ernesto Zucule]

[Text] Many hundreds of people in the areas hardest hit by the drought--in Gaza and Inhambane--are in danger of dying because they have reached one of the terminal stages of malnutrition. The party and government are making every effort to minimize the effects of the drought, but even so, the situation remains alarming, since the prospect of regular supplies of water and food for the inhabitants in that condition continues to be remote.

According to information gathered in several districts in the two most severely drought-stricken provinces in the southern part of the country, many hundreds of people are in danger of losing their lives because they have reached one of the terminal stages of malnutrition (marasmic cachexia), and the situation is made worse by the fact that the prospects for providing the inhabitants in this condition with food are not brilliant, considering the difficulties currently being faced by Mozambique.

All the same, tremendous efforts are being made by the party and government to save the people affected. Large quantities of food, medicine, and clothing are being sent to all the districts. Last week dozens of trucks were mobilized to go to Gaza and Inhambane, while sea and air shipments of products collected from various sectors on an emergency basis were also being made.

The condition of many children, some of whom have lost their mothers or fathers, is alarming, considering that domestic capacity for minimizing the disastrous effects of the drought is weaker.

#### Health Crisis for Mothers

Because some mothers have spent several days without eating, their breasts are as dry as though they had not suckled for over 5 years. For children of a tender age, going without milk or any other product that could nourish them represents quite simply the danger of death or, when the organism resists for some time, slow progress into marasmus.

Although adults are more resistant to disease than children, the fact is that no one can resist hunger and thirst.

According to statements by Luís Vaz, a physician for the Ministry of National Defense who was surveying the health situation in Inhambane and particularly in Murracine, the general condition of adults and children is practically the same--they all have marasmic cachexia.

This is what we were able to learn and see in the districts of Gaza Province suffering most severely from the drought--and where eating one meal a day is a luxury--the health situation for the inhabitants of that province is the same as in Inhambane.

According to statements by Luís Vaz, children and old people in particular--most helpless and vulnerable to disease--are in danger of losing their lives if the possibility of finding rich and nutritious products with which to rescue them cannot be found as it is now.

"The greatest pain a mother can experience is to witness the slow death of a deeply loved child," he said dauntless Laurinda Meque, who is hospitalized in Murracine and whose child is almost in a coma. She had not eaten for a long time--when leaving Matemane a week earlier to go to the district administrative center in search of food.

Ademir Góes, administrator of the Vilanculos District, said that although many efforts are being made by the party and government, the situation that has been created "does not allow us, with our resources, to solve the problems caused by the drought immediately, since the needs are greater than our ability to respond and also many of the children and even adults with marasmic cachexia."

### Food Aid for Gaza, Inhambane

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Oct 83 p 1

[Text] The Christian Council of Mozambique [CCM] is going to provide about 7,000 tons of corn and other cereals for consumption and 1.5 tons for seed for the inhabitants hard hit by drought in Gaza and Inhambane Provinces. Part of the corn intended for consumption is already being distributed to the inhabitants, according to a source in the Department for Preventing and Combating Natural Disasters. The source described the gift as a valuable contribution toward minimizing the calamitous effects of the disaster.

That religious organization recently delivered 4,000 tons of corn to the Department for Preventing and Combating Natural Disasters in response to our government's appeal to international and other organizations to help the People's Republic of Mozambique cope with the drought confronting Mozambique.

Of that total, 2,000 tons of corn for consumption were intended for Gaza Province, which has already received the entire shipment, and the other 2,000 tons are for Inhambane Province, which received 1.5 tons this week. An official in the Department for Preventing and Combating Natural Disasters said that in addition to the corn, the Christian Council of Mozambique has also supplied mapira, peanuts, and other cereals for consumption and seed.

The mapira distributed in a few districts in Maputo and Gaza Provinces is a dry crop, and its cultivation is going to be tried out in Magude and Moamba (in Maputo Province), where there is no tradition of growing it. It will also be tried out in other districts in Gaza. Inhambane, where mapira was already being grown, has also been supplied. The total seed made available to those provinces comes to about 20 tons.

Around 80% of the CCM's Project Department has told the Department for Preventing and Combating Natural Disasters that in addition to cereals, the CCM hopes to provide the inhabitants seriously harmed by the drought with such farming tools as hoes, machetes, and axes.

To get a firsthand look at the disastrous effects of the worst drought ever to devastate our country and all of southern Africa, officials from that religious organization are now visiting Inhambane Province after also visiting a number of districts in Gaza to oversee the distribution of the foodstuffs provided.

### Fight Against Bandits and Hunger

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Oct 83 p 5

[Article by Afaf Fafe]

[Text] In all the districts of Inhambane Province, there are experiences and episodes demonstrating the diligence of the inhabitants in combating hunger and armed bandits, two phenomena that are severely afflicting a large part of that province.

Among other actions aimed at minimizing the effects of the drought, use is being made of low-lying land and marshes, riverbeds are being cleaned up, and drainage ditches are being dug to help agricultural production.

Hundreds of producers associations in the family sector are appearing in several districts, and in the fishing industry, the production centers in Vilanculos, Bazaruto, Inhassaro, and Mambone are being reorganized to produce dried fish, which will be used to supply the most destitute zones and also serve as a basis of exchange for other products.

The drought that is devastating vast areas of Inhambane Province has created a serious situation of hunger. It has become so severe that dozens of people, especially children, are dying every day in Mabote, Bumane, Cometela, Tome Nhavare, and other areas.

The prolonged lack of rain has dried up almost all the rivers and streams. The land is turning dry and barren. The livestock belonging to the inhabitants has been plundered by bandits, and wild animals have fled to look for grassland and water elsewhere.

Formerly inhabited expanses covering hundreds of kilometers are becoming depopulated. The inhabitants are abandoning their homes to take refuge in areas where it is possible to obtain water or other resources indispensable to human survival.

#### Fight for Survival

In the villages of Mabote and Tome and in the circumscription of Gumane in the Covuro District, we saw dramatic scenes of people waging a difficult battle for their own survival.

We saw entire families that had reached the limit of their endurance. They were stretched out in the shade of cashew trees waiting to die. Men, old people, women, and children present a devastating picture of bulging eyes, bones on the surface of their skin, and stomachs distended from the effects of malnutrition.

Between 15 and 20 people die every day as victims of starvation following a long period of living on roots, "massalas," "macuacua," and other forest fruits.

Vasco Laice, 54, who lives in the Tome communal village, told us: "The only solution for survival in this area is 'xicutso' (the root of a forest tree), which we cut into bite-size pieces and cook in water. After boiling it, we get rid of the foam and drink the water. We put the pieces of xicutso out to dry in the sun. Then we pound them into flour and use that to make 'upsa.'"

The use of xicutso is widespread throughout a large part of Inhambane Province. From what we learned in the area, the root in question alleviates hunger temporarily, but it has no nutritional value.

Xicutso is usually mixed with leaves from a forest bush known traditionally as the "nkakana." Those leaves are also cooked in water, and because of the lack of peanuts, the only seasoning added to them is salt.

#### Episodes of War

This situation of hunger, misery, and lack of clothing is most severe in the zones in the interior, where for some time the action of armed bandits prevented the government's provincial organizations from channeling assistance to those areas. The situation is now being gradually normalized, but it will take some time before it is regularized, inasmuch as the marks are still deep: the bandits devastated farms, plundered domestic animals and clothing, and stole what little food the inhabitants had.

But despite all those difficulties, the population's hatred for the armed bandits and its determination to combat them have not weakened.

In almost all those zones, there are experiences and episodes demonstrating the patriotism and active commitment of the inhabitants in the struggle against the armed bandits. Protected by the Mozambique Armed Forces (the FPLM [Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique]), columns of inhabitants carry materiel to the battlefronts.

There are also groups of inhabitants armed with arrows and assegais who pursue and capture armed bandits. And in the village of Mabote, there is a true story about something that happened about 2 years ago.

More or less at the time when the armed bandits were intensifying their criminal incursions into the area, the inhabitants adopted the tactic of killing several of them with an active poison added to the water.

The way the story is told, it all began when one member of the population, tired of the atrocities being committed by the bandits, decided to dissolve a strong dose of poison in his jug of drinking water. One day the bandits appeared at his house and asked for water. The householder gave it to them, and after they went away, more than 10 of them died on the road.

That experiment was repeated in several homes, and by the time the bandits discovered what was happening, many dozens of them had already fallen into the trap.

One inhabitant of Mabote told us: "So then when they appeared at someone's house to demand water, they forced the householder to drink first. That was when we adopted the tactic of having two jugs in the house, one with unpoisoned water which we drank to show the bandits that it was all right. Then they would invade the house and drink all the water they could find, but the jug that was out where they could see it contained poisoned water. In that way, another 10 or 20 of them died shortly afterward."

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080: 3442/30

BRIEFS

DROUGHT CONTINUES IN GAZA AREA--The drought situation in Southern Mozambique continues to cause extensive suffering, with only some areas receiving satisfactory rainfall. A report in today's edition of the Maputo daily newspaper NOTICIAS says that some regions in the province of Gaza are desolate. In the Chibuto district of Gaza, stocks of food aid have run out and there has so far been no sign of rain to break the 3-year drought. The NOTICIAS report said people in Chibuto are reduced to eating a wild fruit known as (makwakwa), that is causing sickness because of insufficient preparation. In other parts of southern Mozambique there has been heavy rain. A torrential downpour accompanied by strong winds caused extensive damage in Maputo City last night. Roofs were blown off houses, trees uprooted, and power lines brought down. Several children were injured and admitted to the hospital, but so far no deaths have been reported. In a similar storm in the capital 2 weeks ago, three people were killed. [Text] [MB230817 Maputo in English to Southern Africa 1100 GMT 22 Nov 83]

SOLDIERS REBUILD PROPERTY--Soldiers posted to an area of Mozambique badly affected by the action of South African backed armed bandits earlier this year have been told to concentrate on rebuilding what was destroyed by the bandits. The order came from the armed forces chief of staff, Lt Gen Sebastiao Mabote, when he addressed troops and local people at Macasse in the province of Zambezia. General Mabote [rank as heard] said the soldiers should treat reconstruction of property damaged by the bandits as a priority task. General Mabote was in Macasse as part of an inspection tour of the area where the armed forces have scored considerable successes in recent months in the fight against armed banditry. [Text] [MB221624 Maputo in English to Southern Africa 1100 GMT 22 Nov 83]

HEALTH COOPERATION AGREEMENT--A cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Health and the Mozambique Red Cross and a similar humanitarian organization from Switzerland is expected to be signed in 1984. The agreement is designed to create the National Blood Transfusion Service [SNTS] in Maputo. Preparatory work in this regard has already been carried out. It includes a specific definition of the program of action to be followed and the upgrading and transformation of the blood bank of the Maputo Central Hospital into a national transfusion center. The agreement also refers that the blood banks of the Beira and Nampula hospitals will be transformed into regional centers of the SNTS. [Text] [MB222022 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1700 GMT 22 Nov 83]

PORtUGUESE AID--The authorities in the Portuguese capital, Libson, have agreed to provide assistance to improve public services in Maputo City. The agreement was reached during a visit to Lisbon by the chairman of the Muputo City Council, Alberto Massavanhan. Mr Massavanhan said on his return to Maputo yesterday that Lisbon had offered scholarships in Portugal for civil construction students at Muputo's Eduardo Mondlane University. Lisbon will also provide training for Mozambican firemen and has offered to send technicians to Maputo to train city maintenance staff. While in Europe, Mr Massavanhan also visited cities in France and Italy and he described the tour as a whole as very fruitful. [Text] [MB222022 Maputo in English to Southern Africa 1100 GMT 22 Nov 83]

FRG AID AGREEMENT- Mozambique and the Federal Republic of Germany yesterday signed an agreement on financial and technical aid to Mozambique amounting to over \$15 million. Over \$3 million will be for a diesel power station project and the importing of chemical products, while more than \$1 million will be spent on the rehabilitation of harbor cranes in the ports of Maputo, Beira, and Nacala. Further discussions are to continue on how to spend the remaining amount of money. The German side is said to be proposing that the money be spent on the grain storage silos and the financing of a telex center in Beira, while Mozambique is pointing out other priorities that include rehabilitation of trucks. The agreement followed week-long discussions between the German team led by Dr (Berth Haith) of the German Ministry of Co-operation and Mozambique's National Planning Commission. The aim of the discussions was to look into how the German aid promise made last year should be spent. [Text] [MB231221 Maputo in English to Southern Africa 1100 GMT 23 Nov 83]

CSO: 3400/318

PRIME MINISTER ADDRESSES NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

Niamey LE SAHEL in French 3 Nov 83 pp 1, 3

[Speech by Prime Minister Oumarou Mamane, president of the National Development Council (CND), at special Council session, 2 November]

[Text] The National Development Council met in special session yesterday for the first time, presided over by Prime Minister Oumarou Mamane, president of the CND.

The Council meeting began in the auditorium of the former National Assembly, attended by nearly all Council members, including all presidents of the regional development councils. During its session, which is to conclude today, the Council will hear a report on the abortive 6 October coup attempt and another on the agricultural-livestock raising season. The Council will also elect its bureau and committees.

In officially opening the work of the Council yesterday, its president, Oumarou Mamane stated that "this day should be a milestone in the history of our country because it unquestionably opens an era of new democracy, real democracy deriving its essence from the genius of our people."

The president of the CND then added: "From the time our Council was set up on 3 August 1983 until today, some time has gone by, essentially justified by the desire to enable most Council members, whose principal activity is the land, to go about their field work. As we know, that work is not yet completely finished. In certain regions, grain and corn must still be harvested and put into storage."

The following is the complete text of the prime minister's speech:

Presidents of the regional development councils, honorable National Council members, ladies and gentlemen:

The day has finally come when, thanks be to Allah, may he be glorified and praised, our august assembly, the emanation of the people's will, now meets for the first time.

This day should be a milestone in the history of our country because it unquestionably opens an era of new democracy, real democracy deriving its essence from the genius of our people.

From the time our Council was set up on 3 August 1983 until today, some time has gone by, essentially justified by the desire to enable most Council members, whose principal activity is the land, to go about their field work. As we know, that work is not yet completely finished. In certain regions, grain and corn must still be harvested and put into storage.

But as you know, my dear colleagues, there is no rest or vacation from work for the representatives of the people. Our mission is not a sinecure because we are responsible for building Nigerien society of the future.

The chief of state, Gen Seyni Kountche, gave a sample of the dimensions of the work to be accomplished on the occasion of the installation of our Council in exceedingly graphic terms. Your task, he said, is "vast and complex as well as essential. Your competence no longer stops at the limits of the village or tribe, the canton, district or department. The state will call on you whenever need be and refer to you any problem of national interest on which it will expect remarks and suggestions from you. That, at the outset, is the role of the National Council." The work to be performed is mainly that of enabling the Nigerien nation to define its development strategy by itself and for itself. That is, moreover, the ethic of the development company. It is a truly democratic institution with respect to the establishment of its structures, the makeup of its structures and the appointment of its members, as pertinently stated at the solemn ceremony of 3 August 1983.

We must ponder the weight of that responsibility in order to grasp fully our historic mission.

In particular, we must realize that this mission requires that we depart from any conformism and leave the beaten path so that, thanks to collective reflection, we may judiciously dig the foundation and properly lay every stone making up the new edifice of the Nigerien society of tomorrow.

In so doing, reflection and research must be the rule in all fields, economic, social and cultural. That is the important mission which the chief of state has entrusted to our Council, in this instance, the drafting of a National Constitution.

I am taking this opportunity to tell Nigerien intellectuals, government employees, students and employees in the private sector that their participation is more necessary than ever and that it will be sought by the National Development Council. But they must, in order to render proper services, be, to use the expression of an illustrious African historian, "organic intellectuals -- that is, branching off from and grafted onto the great trunk of the people."

The recent televised debate on the proposed constitution gives us the proof, because of the enthusiasm it has roused, that such participation will be massive.

Presidents of the regional development councils, honorable National Council members:

We must resolutely set to work in order to get our different councils moving. We must make them frameworks for dialogue and participation in economic, social and cultural development action. Unquestionably, this is a bold task because the apprenticeship of democracy has always been, throughout history and the ages, a difficult exercise. To take up the thought of an African politician, the power of the people is actually "the long march, the thankless but obstinate apprenticeship of responsibility which is tested but which cannot be improvised."

We must therefore demonstrate patience and thoroughness and not hesitate to question ourselves whenever necessary.

Most of our councils, the regional and subregional councils in particular, are already operational. I would like to render well-deserved homage to their presidents for their vigor and spirit of initiative and encourage to persevere along that path. It is to be hoped that the regional development councils, which in the near future will have broad decision-making powers in the area of regional development, will take the initiative of drawing up development operations and reflecting on all measures that could provide lasting solutions to the problems of our regional councils.

My dear colleagues:

Our session coincides with the end of the agricultural season. This was no accident, but rather, a deliberate decision bearing witness -- as if there were any need to do so -- to the great concern of our institution is development, development whose prime concern is man in all the nobility of the expression. That is why he appears here as the principal artisan of that development and, naturally, its exclusive beneficiary.

It is development that plunges its roots into the living tissue of our villages, hamlets and settlements, in short, our grass-roots communities.

These grass-roots communities will have broad decision-making powers in the area of local development thanks to a policy of decentralization of which we must be the guarantors.

Our motto must therefore be development by the people's participation. In this way, every Council member must consider himself as a militant convinced of development.

I would like to seize this excellent opportunity afforded me to pay vibrant homage to that indefatigable development militant, Gen Seyni Kountche, who, despite the burdens he bears, has toured our country every year for the past 10 years in order to see the results of the agricultural season. This is eloquent proof of his loyalty to the oath given before the Supreme Military Council on 15 April 1974 to the effect that "no son of this country will starve to death, even if we have to sacrifice the entire national budget."

I should also like to congratulate the cadres in the field, tireless development pioneers who, despite the harshness of our environment and the limited means they sometimes have, courageously train our peasant masses.

Finally, I should like to congratulate and encourage government employees, businessmen and workers in the private sector who, in response to the summons of the chief of state, helped substantially reduce the way separating us from our noble ideal, our struggle of every day, food self-sufficiency.

All these combined efforts helped ward off the spectre of hunger.

This agricultural season which the chief of state has just surveyed is an illustration. We should be proud of it and ask God to continue to bless us with His grace.

And yet, we must be more vigilant than ever in jealously conserving our grain. Every development council must make the people in its territory aware so they will avoid waste. In particular, I ask our sisters, the guardians of our family reserves, to make a near religious use of grain.

The CND asks our merchants and businessmen to exercise greater civic spirit in order to prevent the production surplus of our working people from being drained off to other countries.

Far from encouraging greed, the recent measures liberalizing commerce should sharpen your civic spirit and patriotism.

In this precise field of production, they must cause you to seek out sources of supplies, wherever they may be found, in order to flood our grain markets, thereby enabling every Nigerien man and woman, wherever he or she might be, to have food within reach and at reasonable prices. I am appealing to all Council members to initiate growing activities outside the season in order to complement traditional crops and help make up possible future food shortages.

I cannot conclude this development chapter without asking our livestock breeders to give up "contemplative" livestock raising and, in keeping with the appeal of the chief of state, to sell off their animals. Every development council is to spread this word throughout its own territory.

Presidents of the regional development councils, honorable National Council members:

Our concern is to make Niger an island of peace, peace without which we remain firmly convinced that there can be no development.

Confronted with an international environment that is increasingly cool, these noble ideals cannot be attained without the existence of certain conditions, particularly two: national unity and security. These are themes well known to our people, themes which Gen Seyni Kountche has tirelessly repeated to us since 1974.

In installing the National Development Council on 3 August, the chief of state entrusted us with the heavy task of guaranteeing that national unity and security. We must weigh each of our words and see that they are the daily concern of every Nigerien man and woman.

The recent sad events of 6 October remind us that vigilance must more than ever be our watchword so as to bar the way to our enemies at home and abroad. It must be a civic duty for all Nigeriens in order to preserve our security.

The people's enthusiasm over the tour just made by the chief of state eloquently illustrates their attachment to the policies of the Supreme Military Council and the government and its willingness to preserve peace and stability in our country.

This upsurge of nationalism must be used to advantage and judiciously channeled toward development actions. The proof of its efficiency is given to us by the young people called to do their national civic service and who have put their shoulders to the task with a remarkable sense of dedication, self-sacrifice and courage.

Consequently, it is only proper to recognize that the Nigeriens are definitely attached to a principle, to a policy that since 15 April 1974 has given them peace, tranquillity and dignity, but also to the man, the remarkable patriot worthy of example who in their eyes embodies that national unity indispensable to development. I therefore name Gen Seyni Kountche.

Backed by this conviction, the National Development Council, the faithful interpreter of the profound aspirations of our people to live in peace and dignity and to work for continued progress, assures him of its unwavering support.

Fellow Council members:

The Nigerian people is a Muslim people. For us, Islam is not only a powerful factor of national unity, but also a lofty source for the formation of our personality and stability.

In other words, in order to be morally sound and balanced, Nigerian society will have to derive the necessary virtues from the sources of the values that mankind has always honored. It will be a society in which truth, honesty, faithfulness, love of one's fellow man, tolerance, solidarity and social justice will reign, a society in which the new Nigerian, conscious of his responsibilities, will honor his commitments, do his duty and perform his work properly.

We must therefore set about spreading the moral rules which the chief of state preaches every day in the conduct of this country's affairs.

May Allah preserve this peace for us and crown our efforts with success, so that the development society that we wish to build may live and so Niger may prosper.

I hereby declare this session officially open.

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## DEBT RESCHEDULING HELPS COUNTRY'S ECONOMY

AB201110 Paris AFP in English 1042 GMT 20 Nov 83

[Report by Philippe Mudry]

[Text] Niamey, 20 Nov (AFP)--Last week's agreement by Niger's creditor nations to reschedule its debts was of capital importance for this southern Saharan country, whose efforts for the past year to improve its economic management are now beginning to make themselves felt.

Niger, one of the world's 30 least developed countries, has been a classic victim of the world economic crisis, which has meant lower demand and prices for its main source of revenue, uranium.

The uranium boom at the end of the 1970s, when income from the strategic mineral multiplied 20-fold in five years, was followed by stagnation just when Niger was starting an ambitious investment programme under its 1979 five-year plan.

The state mining companies, Somair and Cominak, have been left with mounting stocks and financial difficulties, rebounding on the national budget. Income from sales and taxes from uranium fell by half between 1979 and 1982.

A deliberate policy of investment failed to prevent Niger's growth rate tumbling from an average of plus 7.5 per cent between 1977 and 1980 to minus 0.5 per cent in 1982, and the foreign debt soaring to what informed sources say is now around 825 million dollars.

Servicing this debt will cost Niger around 85 million dollars this year, or more than a quarter of its export revenue, and the rescheduling last Monday by the "Club of Paris" will give the country a vital breather, the sources said.

The debt is said to include 3.1 million dollars to private banks.

Added to this are arrears in payments by the state to firms and banks within the country, now put at around 62.5 million dollars.

"It was becoming urgent to take the bull by the horns," commented one economic analyst here, pointing to the 1983 budget as a clear sign of the emergence of a will to do so.

Curbs on public spending begun this year will be continued in 1984, notably by cutting the national investment fund from 42.5 million dollars in 1982 to 17.5 million this year and next.

The economist also noted that the military regime had apparently become aware of the intolerable burden of the parastatal sector. Led by President Seyni Kountche, the government has made it clear that firms which could not make a profit would be closed, and has recently shut down the national furniture making company Sonifam at the cost of several hundred jobs.

Audits have also been carried out of such important enterprises as the state coal and electricity companies. The water resources branch of this latter body showed a cumulative loss of 7.5 million dollars at the end of 1982.

The state distribution service has also been brought sharply to heel. The Niger food products office, which is concerned with supplying the whole of the country with cereals, has had its outlets cut from 220 to 79.

The state monopoly on sales of many basic foods has also largely been turned over to private businessmen, who are now constantly urged to civic responsibility by a government nervous about rising prices.

In fact the inflation rate has noticeably dropped over the past two years, but at the cost of rising unemployment, notably in the parastatal sector, and stagnation of salaries. The national minimum wage has scarcely altered in this period.

Fortunately, Africa's drought has had little effect on recent harvests, which have helped the country to save precious foreign currency by importing less food. But whatever the efforts of the government, Niger remains dependent on outside factors, most in the world price of uranium currently under negotiation.

Foreign aid in 1981 was the equivalent of 200 million dollars, the same as the national budget. The former colonial power, France, is the primary source of such aid, and in 1982 provided 62.5 million dollars.

Paris has also agreed to give special aid of 37.5 million dollars over the next three years, of which 10 million has already been supplied.

Date: 2.7.87 2/

RURAL DEVELOPMENT MINISTER ON AGRICULTURAL-LIVESTOCK SITUATION

Niamey LE SAHEL in French 7 Nov 83 p 2

[Text] On Friday, Dr Ari Toubo Ibrahim, minister of rural development met with members of the diplomatic corps accredited in our country.

The purpose of the meeting was to inform participants of the agricultural and food situation and describe the grazing situation in our country. For the minister of rural development, it was a question of providing additional information on the 1983-1984 agricultural-livestock raising season, following the survey made by the chief of state, Brig Gen Seyni Kountche, following his trip.

Food and Agricultural Situation

Dr Ari Toubo said that the 1983-1984 situation was characterized by delayed rains. In the statement made by the chief of state, he indicates that the departments of Tahoua, Niamey and Dosso have had a better season, while Zinder and Maradi have had less good fortune.

In the departments of Diffa and Agadez, the situation could even be called disastrous.

As a result, this year, certain areas of the country that are generally major producers have had shortages: in the Department of Zinder, the district of Tanout and Dakoro, and in the Department of Maradi, Mayayi.

One should add to the list, in the Department of Niamey, the northeastern area of the district of Ouallam, the northern area of the district of Tillabery and the northern and western regions of the district of Tera.

As for the Department of Tahoua, the district of Bouza is hard hit.

In all, 2,065 villages with some 1,036,109 inhabitants have been hit by shortages, while last year, 1,230 villages with 662,567 inhabitants experiencing scarcities were counted. In addition, there are those population groups that do not produce (populations of cities, livestock breeders, and so on). In order to meet the needs of these areas, some 249,000 tons will have to be mobilized.

How are these needs to be met?

Along with its office (the OPVN [Nigerien Foodstuffs Office]), the government will be in charge of providing grain, either from other countries, meaning imports, or by buying surpluses from producer zones. With respect to the former, 30,000 tons of grain will have to be imported, including: 30,000 tons of millet, 20,000 tons of sorghum and 20,000 tons of wheat.

With respect to the second point, the government will buy 35,000 tons of millet and sorghum from surplus areas. For their part and insofar as possible, private parties could buy some 40,000 tons.

We wish to build up a stock of 65,000 tons and so far have 43,000. Therefore, we need to find 22,000 tons. That will constitute a small safety reserve. The DPNF had some 120,000 tons.

These explanations given by Dr Aït Toubo will enable people to understand the food and agricultural situation.

#### Grazing situation

Referring to the grazing situation, the minister of rural development said that it is similar to the agricultural situation, due to the irregularity of rainfall, which in turn results in a lack of water and of pasture for livestock.

Meeting with the population of Diffa, the minister said that never during the great famine has the department ever suffered such a disaster for agriculture and livestock.

Livestock breeders must therefore sell off their livestock and must practice compulsory, controlled transhumance. With respect to the first point, the minister called for aid to Niger through relations of cooperation existing between our country and the countries of those attending the meeting.

The purpose of the government, the minister explained, is to save the maximum number breeding stock. After herds have been reduced, livestock feed will be brought, just totaling some 17,000 tons.

Transhumance will consist in moving livestock to areas with an acceptable grazing situation and to neighboring countries, strictly applying measures in effect.

Then came time the agricultural and livestock situation in our country, the minister then answered questions posed by the audience.

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RAINFALL DETAILS FOR PAST YEAR; CROPS AFFECTED

Exceptional Drought

St Denis TÉMOIGNAGES in French 19 Oct 83 p 9

[text] In a communiqué submitted to the press, the Reunion Meteorological Service listed in details the pluviometric readings recorded from November 1982 to September 1983. The data confirm the extreme seriousness of the situation brought on by the drought which hit our island. They also justify taking more crucial measures in order to help the growers in particular.

The austral summer, generally called the warm or rainy season, lasts from November to April. The austral winter, called the cool or dry season, covers the other 6 months from May to October.

As a reminder, let us recall that there was an excess of rainfall recorded for calendar year 1982. February 1982 was the wettest month in the 32 years records have been kept and the dry season was exceptionally rainy. With regard to pluviometric readings, the 1982/1983 southern summer began auspiciously with a very rainy November for the Island as a whole. From December 1982 to April 1983, since there was no cyclonic activity over the southwestern portion of the Indian Ocean, there was much less rainfall for this period, except, however, for the island's eastern coastland where measurements were close to normal.

There was also less rain recorded during the dry season from May to September, the drought being the greater in the leeward zone which, traditionally, already receives less rain.

December 1982

Overall, there was very little rain except for St Pierre, St Joseph, l'Etang-Salé and Bellecombe. The northern half of the island received less than 50 percent of what is usual for the month.

January 1983

Although the eastern section of the island received a plentiful amount of rain (100 to 150 percent of the norm), all the leeward half received less than 50 percent of the norm, often less than 40 percent and, overall, less than 25 percent.

February 1983

A single station (Pont de la Rivière de l'Est) received more rain than usual (112 percent). The country's eastern fourth section was the only one to receive more than 50 percent of the usual rainfall for February. The rainfall received by the rest of the country continued to be less than 50 percent and, for the western and southwestern coastland, less than 25 percent.

March 1983

There was less rainfall over the department as a whole, but there was much difference between the windward and leeward half of the island.

Leeward Region

The rainfall was 25 percent less than usual beginning in March and even less than 50 percent on the western coastland as well as on the major section of the Cirques of Cilaos and Mafate. The drought was total in Airoles.

Windward Region

The range of rainfall was between 50 to 75 percent of the norme.

April 1983

There was a substantial lack of rain. The only area to escape this shortage was a small zone in the western highlands from Bernica to Piton St Leu.

The rainfall was 50 percent more than usual for April only in the extreme north and west section of the country, the plain and volcano regions and the area between Grande and Entre-Deux. It exceeded 25 percent in the cirques.

May 1983

There was more rain than usual in the Northeast and Southeast. Less rain fell on the rest of the country; this lack of rain was more pronounced on the western and southwestern coastland between Grande Chaloupe and St Pierre where the rainfall reached 50 percent of the norme for May. The drought was total on the St Paul coastline.

June 1983


Except for three isolated stations (136 to 198 percent), the lack of rain affected the department as a whole. The rainfall recorded for the leeward region was 50 percent less than usual for June, except for the more favored St Paul and St Leu areas. It was less than 25 percent from St Denis to la Possession.

July 1983

There was a substantial and general lack of rain. The leeward half of the island received 50 percent less than usual for July. Four islets of absolute drought were reported.

### RAINFALL RECORDS

November 1982/September 1983



area lacking the most in water



area lacking in water (rainfall less than the mean of previous years)

August 1983

The drought continued to hold the western part of the country. It was unrelenting from Hermitage to St Leu and on the western section of the Cirque of Mafate.

On the other hand, there was an excess of rainfall in the southwestern region which had been affected the most by the drought until then. This excess was due to moderate to heavy rain on the 12th, then from the 21st to the 24th and from a very localized rainfall on the 25th.

September 1983

The lack of rain was extensive and almost general. It was particularly pronounced in the western ~~westland~~ up to the 600 contour. The drought was total from La Possession to St Leu. Only two stations received fairly normal rainfall for the month: Pierre-fonds and St Philippe.

#### Effect on Sugar Cane

St Denis TEMOIGNAGES in French 14 Oct 83 p 5

[Text] The first quarter of 1983 was marked by a drought which, for all practical purposes, wipe out the rainy season for the country's leeward region. However, the effect of this drought was increased by the more traditional dry period which followed, particularly affecting the water supplies.

During his tour of the Saint Paul and St Leu communes, Michel Lavallois, commissioner of the republic, emphasized that all the island's officials had organized to aid the farmers who were victims of the drought. He declared that "The public had to be informed of the situation."

In-site surveys were conducted as early as March to measure the extent of the disaster. The sugar cane losses were estimated at 300,000 tons or a loss of profits of, roughly, 90 million francs, based on the price of a ton of sugar cane.

In view of this dramatic situation for the growers, the commissioner of the republic ~~had~~ fired during a meeting of the Prefecture held last May, on the 9th, that the sugar cane was a disaster crop in the western region. In another connection, due to the persisting drought, communal surveys were initiated to assess production losses in the market-gardening and food crop sectors.

#### Treasury Aid

The Council accepted in July to subsidize up to 35 percent of the price of mobile cisterns purchased by the communes and up to 50 percent of the price of single fixed cisterns purchased by individuals. In another connection, a treasury aid was granted to the communes of Saint Pierre and Saint Leu to help them implement a large-scale program aimed at intensifying the distribution of drinking water through the networks.

Still in July, the prefectoral administration submitted a report to the Public Disaster Relief Fund requesting "A substantial indemnification for sugar cane and tobacco." Another meeting was held on 11 August at the Prefecture for the purpose of studying the general aid and relief system as related to the drought.

That will for a 20 to 40 percent indemnification for the loss of sugar cane crops. The Department voted an aid of 2,400 francs per hectare for parched areas. As for the market-gardening and food crop sectors, the indemnification will consist in exempting disaster areas from paying the AMEKA dues. Finally, for the tobacco, plans will for an indemnification of 30040 [is published] of the crop losses.

On 19 August, the Bureau of Regional Council opened a 350,000 franc credit line to the regional budget to reduce the shortage of forage noted in the most affected stock breeding farms, thus avoiding slaughtering the livestock. This aid will make it possible to lease two trucks and subsidize the transport of molasses.

These measures, however, proved to be insufficient. Last 3 October, the Regional Assembly approved additional funds amounting to 350,000 francs to ensure water distribution to the livestock. During the second half of August, the AMEXA exemptions on market-gardening hectares affected by the drought were implemented without waiting for the meeting of the Public Disaster Relief Fund .

At the same time, the commissioner of the republic made an official appeal to the Reunion islanders, calling for solidarity with the farmers who were victims of the drought. For its part, the Departmental Relief Committee met and decided to allocate a 300,000 franc credit.

Last month, credits from the state ORSEC [Disaster Relief Organization] plan were released in order to put eight additional cistern trucks at the communes' disposal. Finally, twice as many people and resources were assigned to the study and building of small water reservoirs on stock breeding farms in order to complete before the end of the year the program already in progress.

Do all these measures answer the needs of the affected farmers?

Many are the cane growers whose fields resemble a wasted land. So far, they have received no help and, under the best of circumstances, they will not receive their indemnification, between 20 and 40 percent of the losses, before the beginning of next year. One can only wonder why no truly efficient measure has been devised to enlist the Reunion islanders' solidarity on behalf of the growers affected by the drought. Who is afraid of domestic solidarity?

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CSO: 3419/182

SENEGAL

OPINION POLL OF FIVE HUNDRED PERSONS ON DIOUF'S POLICIES

Dakar AFRICA in French No 154 Oct 83 pp 27-30

[Article by Massamba Thiam: "Are the Senegalese Still Counting on Abdou?"]

[Text] Prefatory Note: This poll is based on a sampling of 500 persons interviewed between 31 August and 5 September 1983. The results we publish hereunder are far from being those of a specialized institute with its modern equipment, hence lay no claim whatever to reflecting the truth or the scientific rigor that characterizes this type of operation in the developed countries.

This poll does claim to be the first attempt by a press organization in Senegal to "take an instant picture" of public opinion at a precise moment with regard to issues directly concerning it. Nevertheless, the moment chosen for it--1 week following the economic measures announced by the government--and the nature and representativeness of the socio-occupational sectors contacted (laborers, artisans, middle managers and supervisors, higher-level managers, students), 400 out of 500 persons interviewed, give our poll a degree of credibility that a specialized institute would be hard put to seriously deny.

We point out also that, for logistical reasons, this poll covers only Dakar and its larger suburbs, which thus excludes the rural areas; the latter will be covered by another poll.

Policy

1. Do you think President Abdou Diouf's performance since he has been the head of state has been:

Positive.....	55.0 percent
Negative.....	32.7 "
Indisp.....	12.3 "

The responses to this question--11 percent "very positive," 44 percent "positive," hence 55 percent of the responses, favorable in their opinion of President Abdou Diouf's performance since he became head of state--indicate clearly that the hope generated by his accession to the nation's highest office and the grace period enjoyed by all newly elected officials still retain traces of relevance in the public's mind.

Thus, despite the opposition's contesting the electoral results, despite the economic difficulties that have led to the most recent measures, which are far from being the most popular, President Abdou Diouf's public image has not undergone much erosion, especially since the percentage of negative responses and that of the "no opinion" grouping represent, all things considered, the combined percentage of abstentions and opposition as of the last presidential election.

In view of these results, and within their limitations, we can affirm that, if the elections were to be held today, candidate Abdou Diouf would come out the winner over the same opponents. We will have another look at this question at the end of the first year of his electoral mandate as president.

2. Since 1981, do you think there has been an improvement in the political situation? In the social situation? In the economic situation? Yes or no?

Political situation:

Yes..... 64.2 percent

No..... 23.6 "

No opinion.. 12.2 "

Social situation:

Yes..... 21.8 percent

No..... 70.4 "

No opinion.. 7.8 "

Economic situation:

Yes..... 10 percent

No..... 82.8 "

No opinion.. 7.2 "

The results of this second question point toward a confirmation of the results of the first, with apparent contradictions reflecting current circumstances. The political situation is deemed to have improved by 64 percent of the persons interviewed, whereas the economic and social situations are deemed not to have improved, since 1981--the year in which Abdou Diouf took office as president of the Republic--in 82 percent and 70 percent, respectively, of the opinions expressed.

In other words, public opinion perceives no effects, if effects there are, stemming from his reform policy. It expresses a positive judgement of the man Abdou Diouf, even though his economic policy has not yet yielded its expected results.

3. Were the recent presidential and legislative elections on the up-and-up or not?

On the up-and-up..... 31.2 percent

Not on the up-and-up... 57.4 "

No opinion..... 11.4 "

Fifty-seven percent of the persons interviewed feel that the recent presidential and legislative elections were tainted with irregularities, while 31 percent feel that they were in order. If one takes into account the electoral process, the all-out contesting of the results by the opposition, the slackness of the PS [Socialist Party] reaction immediately following the elections--a slackness that can be interpreted in several ways--and if account is taken of the high rate of abstentions, the results appear to confirm the impression generally held as to the irregularity of the recent elections, despite the efforts that have been deployed by the official media to convince public opinion of the contrary.

4. Do you approve of the decision of the head of state to abolish the office of prime minister, yes or no?

Yes..... 58.8 percent

No..... 20.2 "

No opinion..... 21 " "

5. Was President Abdou Diouf right in appointing technicians as ministers?

Yes..... 76.6 percent

No..... 18 "

No opinion..... 15.4 "

The confidence inspired by Abdou Diouf as head of state is confirmed by the responses to questions 4 and 5: 58 percent favorable to the elimination of the position of prime minister, and 76 percent approving the bringing of technicians into the government. These are all measures that were defended by the president of the Republic in his message to the nation immediately following his election.

It is almost certain that, had he maintained the position of prime minister, the results would have been inverted; in other words, public opinion is prepared to give him the political means he considers necessary to carry out his commitment.

6. Name three ministers who are technicians:

--Iba Der Thiam  
--Ibrahima Fall  
--Balla Moussa Daffe.

7. Can you name the three ministers you think are the best in the present governmental lineup?

--Moustapha Niasse  
--Iba Der Thiam  
--Ibrahima Fall.

Iba Der Thiam (Education), Ibrahima Fall (Higher Education), Balla Moussa Daffe (Scientific Research) are the technical ministers best known to public opinion. The first two are rated second and third below Moustapha Niasse (Foreign Affairs) who rates by far the highest standing in the public's opinion of the three best ministers in the present government.

The minister of state for foreign affairs, who was for a while the prime minister, was quick to take the measure of his functions and don the cloak of a diplomat of stature, comfortably ensconced in the esteem and popularity he enjoys within his party and the nation. The two United Nations conferences on Namibia and Palestine which he was elected to chair attest to his international standing.

Their competence as revealed by the media and by their public statements has catapulted Iba Der Thiam and Ibrahima Fall, despite their very brief presence in the government, hence evidently no concrete performance balance sheet as yet, into second and third places, over ministers who have been in office for many years. The manner in which they perform during the school that is about to commence will confirm or topple their standing in the public's opinion.

8. Do you think the existence of many parties in Senegal is a good thing or a bad thing?

Good..... 61.2 percent  
Bad..... 30.4     "  
No opinion.... 8.4     "

9. Islam is taking on more and more importance in Africa. Should it, as it does in other countries such as Iran, dominate political life in Senegal?

Yes..... 35 percent  
No..... 54     "  
No opinion.... 11     "

The wording of this question is deliberately slanted to better delimit the response. The result is that 68.40 percent of the persons interviewed indicate opposition to an intrusion by Islam in the political life of Senegal such as has taken place in Iran.

Thus, although the public is deeply attached to its religion, it is distrustful of any integrationist views, as being the source of incalculable conflicts. In a Senegal such as ours, in which Islamic cultural associations are springing up everywhere, the lesson is worthy of thought. This correctly reflects our spirit of tolerance, hence of democracy, which is confirmed by the positive majority of the responses recorded on the existence of many political parties in Senegal--see the results of the 8th question.

### 3. The economy

Q. In view of a rebound of the Senegalese economy, should the priority be placed on:

- |  |              |
|--|--------------|
| Seeking political unity.....             | 25.6 percent |
| Reducing the life style of the state.... | 56.2 "       |
| Abolishing state-owned companies.....    | 7 "          |
| Other priorities.....                    | 11.2 "       |

The responses to this question, relating to the assigning of priorities for a rebound of the Senegalese economy, translate once again the predominant state of public opinion with regard to the country's essential problems. Fifty-six percent of the persons interviewed attach a priority to the reduction of the state's life style, while only 7 percent favor the abolition of state-owned enterprises.

Public opinion appears to understand the reduction of the state's life style as meaning "extending, leasing and other advantages accorded to members of the government, to those of the executive body of the National Assembly, and to central and local-level government officials; whereas, what is actually meant is the physical number of civil service employees and of state-owned companies to be reduced, i.e., included under the national budget." Only 25 percent accord a priority to the seeking of political unity. On this basis, President Abdou Diouf appears to be taking the current in his attempt to achieve a national consensus.

Q. Do you think the campaign against illicit enrichment can contribute to the recovery of the economy?

- |                 |              |
|-----------------|--------------|
| Very much.....  | 13.8 percent |
| A little.....   | 44.4 "       |
| Not at all..... | 41.8 "       |
| Don't know..... | 1.0 "        |

A total of 82 percent favors any action toward cleaning up the administration of public funds, reflecting an opinion based much more on its moral aspect than on the results being obtained by the drive against illicit enrichment.

12. Does participation by foreigners in the Senegalese economy appear to you to be:

- |                        |              |
|------------------------|--------------|
| A good thing.....      | 31.6 percent |
| A necessary thing..... | 35.3 "       |
| A negative thing.....  | 22.6 "       |
| No opinion.....        | 10.9 "       |

Thirty-seven percent of the persons interviewed deem foreign participation in our economy a good thing; 35 percent accept it as a necessary evil. Thus, a total of 66 percent express an opinion that is favorable to participation by non-Senegalese in the economic domain, thus showing that our country is far from being xenophobic.

13. In your opinion, are the Senegalese living above their means?

- |                 |              |
|-----------------|--------------|
| Yes.....        | 76.6 percent |
| No.....         | 14.6 "       |
| No opinion..... | 11.8 "       |

This last question confirms what was already known or what was being said: 76 percent of the Senegalese feel that their countrymen are living beyond their means.

#### IV. Diplomacy

14. In your opinion, is the solution to the Gambian problem:

- |                                |              |
|--------------------------------|--------------|
| Independent confederation..... | 75.3 percent |
| Warfare.....                   | 44.4 "       |
| No opinion.....                | 29.8 "       |

The responses concerning our policy toward Gambia translate the apparent ambivalence that one always characterized this issue. Total support is favored by 75.3 percent of those interviewed, and confederation, which is the Senegalese government's official choice, by 29 percent. The 29-percent "no opinion" figure (neutrality or hostility) is a high rate that is incompatible with the efforts undertaken by the government to establish a new form of government following the bloody events of July 1981 in which a putsch in Gambia could be crystallized.

15. In its foreign relations, should Senegal maintain privileged relations with France, or should it develop its relations with new partners?

Maintain.....	53.8 percent
Diversify.....	31 " "
No opinion.....	9.6 "

Eighty-one percent of the persons interviewed favor a diversification and the development of our relations with new partners: This in no way translates an anti-French feeling, as though only 10 percent of the opinions expressed consider it necessary to maintain privileged relations with France.

The policy of subregional and regional groupings, the quest for new markets for our products, and for new providers of funds for the financing of our development (official mission of the government) play here an important role in the forming of public opinion.

16. Do you feel that, with the coming to power of President Abdou Diouf, Senegal's relations with France:

have been strengthened.....	45.8 percent
have not changed.....	34.8 "
have deteriorated.....	16 " "
No opinion.....	13.4 "

The responses to this question regarding relations with France (45.8 percent strengthened), 34.8 percent unchanged) since the advent of President Abdou Diouf, indicate clearly that France retains the place of honor in the popular mind.

17. In your opinion, which two partners, by order of importance, with whom Senegal should, in matters of priority, develop closer relations:

- 1. The subregion (Dakar)
- 2. The African continent
- 3. The French state
- 4. Europe
- 5. Asia

The interviewees' responses to this question had to do with their relative priorities, expressed upon the three partners, in the following order of preference:  
1. The international community (the subregion, Africa, Asia); 2. The French state; 3. Europe.

The international community (the subregion) in order of importance: France, the African continent, Asia. These three, then were the countries most

aid, is accorded fourth place behind the Arabic countries, the African countries and the United States. The too facile Arabic-Islam-petrodollars amalgam has rocketed the Arabic countries into first place in the listing.

13. Do you think Qadhafi may represent a danger for Africa? Yes or no?

Yes..... 36 percent

No..... 46.8 "

No opinion.... 17.2 "

3d for Senegal?

Yes..... 29.7 percent

No..... 33.4 "

No opinion.... 36.6 "

In the opinion of 46.8 percent of those interviewed, Qadhafi represents no danger whatever for Africa; 36 percent, on the other hand, think the contrary. Fifty-four percent feel he represents no danger for Senegal; 29 percent think the contrary. Here again, we are witnessing a paradoxical phenomenon based on the campaign being orchestrated by the United States, which portrays Qadhafi, at this time, as Africa's greatest danger, abroad only to compare him.

The Libyan leader has undoubtedly committed some very serious errors and bears responsibility for certain African situations--, Chad, Western Sahara, but to blame him for the teachers' strike because of funding problems, or for the delays being experienced by the Central African civil service employees in receiving their pay, is to resort to a facile propaganda which a people is well informed in that of Senegal can no longer be expected to believe.

In the second place, the situation in Chad today is such that Qadhafi has been relegated to the level of President Mitterrand, incapable of intervening for the realization of a negotiated solution, which certain do not consider the case.

1/18  
01-01-1986

## PEASANT REPORTEDLY FACES DISCENTIVES IN RICE PRODUCTION

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3456, 7 Nov 83 pp 2567-2568

[Article by Lyse Doucet]

[Text] AT NOON, inside village compounds and along city streets, Senegalese dip into bowls of oily rice and fish — tieboudienne, the national dish. However tasty, it's a curious choice for a rice importing nation. This year, the government brought in 355,000 tons of rice to support the habit. Combined with a breakfast consisting increasingly of popular French baguettes, baked with imported wheat flour, Senegalese food tastes have become a national problem. Food imports account for 24 per cent of Senegal's import bill.

Production and consumption of home-grown millet, corn and rice are being declared national priorities. "If we can't make a dent in the oil bill," declared government deputy Christian Valantin, "we can at least go back to millet couscous."

But agricultural diversification and a return to millet eating have been advocated in Senegal since the 1970s. Tieboudienne at noon is just the tip of a badly organised, export-oriented agricultural sector — one which won't be easy to change.

That agricultural sector, and the economy itself, are almost entirely centred on the groundnut. Colonial rulers, interested in increasing peanut exports, introduced rice eating to ensure that peasants grew peanuts instead of millet for urban consumption. The peanut crop has continued to benefit from high producer prices, the only organised marketing system, and a range of government subsidies.

In normal years, groundnut products, principally peanut oil, account for 40 to 50 per cent of Senegal's export earnings. But

peanut oil is far from being liquid gold. World prices are at their lowest in years — 58 per cent of their 1978 level — as less expensive and increasingly preferred oilseeds cut into the market. To shield peanut farmers from external price fluctuations, the state subsidises the producer price; this now costs about \$66.3m. So peanuts are a mixed blessing: what they give on the trade balance, they take away on the budget account. And back on the farm, overproduction of peanuts is destroying the soils.

Not everyone is unhappy about this state of affairs. The Mourides, Senegal's dominant Muslim brotherhood, have accumulated vast fortunes through their control of two-thirds of the country's peanut production. Special seed quotas, credit on very soft terms, as well as subsidies and unpaid technical assistance have been offered to the religious leaders, or Marabouts, who with their economic and spiritual control over disciples and farmers have established a mutually beneficial arrangement with the state: economic favours in exchange for rural support.

But with the IMF and the World Bank demanding that the state cut back on imports and lessen its monocrop vulnerability, the government has finally begun to turn money and interests outside the peanut basin: to the Senegal River Basin, or Fleuve, where the country's multimillion dollar dam, the OMVS project, is being constructed and irrigated rice growing promoted, and to the area with the country's best soils and rainfall, the long-neglected Casamance.

Government statements emphasise the promotion of domestic cereals. But when, as in the groundnut basin, centred on Kaolack, peanuts and millet compete for the same soil, and the farmer faces a higher price, as well as an assured buyer, for his peanut crop, millet production isn't likely to cover producers' household needs.

The government knows this. Their Sixth Plan state, that higher peanut prices work as a disincentive to cereals production. But policy changes don't reflect this awareness. Producer prices for rice, millet and corn were raised by 20 per cent this year. But while millet fetches 55CFA per kilo, peanuts are bought for 60. Since 1979, peanut producer prices have increased by 54 per cent while millet's have gone up by just 27 per cent.

While farmgate prices have risen, so have farmers' costs. This year, in an attempt to limit government spending, producers were asked to pay in cash for their previously subsidised fertiliser. Millet production is highly sensitive to the cost of this input, but it is not yet apparent that producer prices will reflect these new costs. Few people, in fact, seem to know what producer prices are based on.)

This year, millet production dropped from 736,412 tons to 585,600 tons and its land area diminished by 16 per cent. The Minister of Rural Development explained that the fall was due to degradation, parasites, and unfavourable weather conditions. All this is true enough, but fertiliser use was also down: this was due in part to a cutback in supply but also because peasants couldn't afford it when it was available.

However, even if farmers did cultivate more millet, they would have few places to sell it. In theory, the government's Food Aid Commission (CAA) is responsible for buying a certain amount but it rarely has enough money to do so. Millet is then sold to private merchants or the "hana hana" (small unlicensed sellers), but often at low prices. When production is low and demand high, as in the past year, the prices offered on these parallel markets are higher than the official price. Then, the government must resort to food aid and imported cereals.

The explanation for low millet production could be retold for corn, another highly nutritious domestic cereal with a long-neglected potential.

Production and marketing obstacles, however, are exacerbated by another hurdle. If the government's intention is to

substitute domestic cereal consumption for imported rice and wheat, then these products must be made available in a more convenient form. One reason why rice is preferred is that it is easier to prepare than millet, which must be ground by a laborious time-consuming process. Rural women still grind it — although with increasing reluctance — or use small mills to make millet couscous. But there still aren't the means to transform it on a larger scale for urban markets.

The government's Institute for Food Technology (ITA), in the late 70s, experimented with different compositions of bread flour to produce "pamble", a bread which substituted a proportion of wheat flour in bread by millet flour. Although a 30 per cent version wasn't liked — people didn't like "grey bread" — the lighter dose had some success in promotional runs. Pamble is now sold by one of the large Dakar bakeries and efforts are underway to encourage interest among other bakers and in the bread-eating public. For now, however, pamble remains relatively hard to find.

Little known to most people, there is a 1979 law which states that all bakers must use 15 per cent millet flour in bread. But its implementation was another example of poor planning. When millers went out to find the millet, there wasn't sufficient domestic supply and so they resorted to imports. Given this anomaly, the law was soon forgotten and bakers continued to turn out white, pure wheat flour baguettes, which are also popular because they are associated with an urban European life style.

A major obstacle to successful millet promotion is that consumers can buy rice more cheaply than millet or its products. While rice sells for about 105 CFA per kilo in the markets, millet can go as high as 135 to 165. In most countries, increasing the price of rice, seen as an essential part of the strategy, raises the spectre of urban riots. But the government last year increased the price, with little activity in the streets. Nevertheless, regardless of price, opinions are still divided on how willingly consumers will take to millet. Many people point out that most urban dwellers were once rural millet eaters but others point to now entrenched rice-eating habits.

Although millet and corn may make some inroads into Senegalese diets, it seems clear that the country will remain a rice-eating nation and consumption is likely to increase as population and revenue

do. Knowing this, the government is intensifying its efforts in domestic rice production.

But it's unlikely that Senegal will ever be self-sufficient, if even competitive, in rice production. In 1982-83, the country produced 105,587 tons of rice. It imported three times that amount, two-thirds of which supplied Dakar's needs. Rice production is highly labour intensive and technically demanding as well as being a crop which needs substantial rainfall or irrigation. Senegal's land and farmers are far from being optimal for rice growing and the country has been able to buy imported rice at a much cheaper price than it is able to produce it.

## Irrigation costs

In the Fleuve region, where a multi-million-dollar dam project is underway, the state decided to use the expensive water for irrigated rice production. But with all the purchased inputs, especially expensive fuel to run motor pumps and the large machinery, production costs are higher than the official price. On average, it costs the regional development agency, SAED, 200 CFA to produce a kilo of rice which sells for 105 in the market. And the farmers who cultivate the rice, whether on the small perimeters in the Upper Fleuve or the large centralised plots in the lower region, are now heavily in debt. Under pressure from peasant groups and donors, SAED has begun to decentralise the large perimeters and improve extension services for the small plots. There is talk of giving the farmers more responsibility and control over their production, and costs are beginning to come down.

Rice production in the Fleuve can only be competitive if costs are brought down significantly and if irrigated surfaces are increased. SAED's pace has been less than projected: about 2,000 ha. have been prepared each year instead of the anticipated 10,000. Furthermore, most of the increases in domestic production have not resulted in larger quantities being marketed since rural producers are now adopting the rice-eating habit. Studies indicate that peasants derive greater value from various uses of their paddy than they would from selling it to the state. They consume it, use it for festivals, store it as wealth, or barter it for other goods.

Rice produced in the Casamance region is largely consumed there as well and while, in the Fleuve area, farmers sell to SAED, they do so in order to pay the debts incurred in costly irrigation. When given a choice, they prefer to pay for inputs in cash.

The producer price for rice remained unchanged until 1981 but this year the government raised it by 25 per cent to 60 CFA per kilo. Some researchers contend, however, that given the cost of rice production and demands upon it, the price will not be high enough to persuade farmers to sell more. All told, feeding six million Senegalese is no easy task. The Diouf government appears to be finally considering the problem in its many aspects — production, marketing, transformation and consumption. But the peasant still faces the same marketing and price disincentives. So, while the government talks about supplying the nation, the peasant takes the rational decision to continue feeding himself. And in Dakar the Senegalese congregate . . . for tieboudienne at noon.

BRIEFS

PAKISTANI RAILWAY AID--Pakistan has agreed to help Tanzania to improve railway communications in the country. A statement from the Ministry of Communications and transport said under the agreement reached between the two countries, Pakistan has also agreed to give technical training, railway communications training and training for lecturers in the Tanzania railways corporation schools as well as help for the corporation to expand its railways college in Tabora. [Excerpts] [Dar es Salaam Domestic Service in Swahili 0400 GMT 22 Nov 83 EA]

CSO: 3449/6

COUNCILS FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION DISCUSSED

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3454, 24 Oct 83 pp 2445-2447

[Text]

*"All the people, young and old,  
should take on their responsibilities  
through the Committees for the  
Defence of the Revolution (CDRs),  
and little by little take in hand their  
destiny. We, the National  
Revolutionary Council, therefore  
call all convinced patriots to join our  
ranks and participate in the work of  
the revolution."*

*(Secretary General of the CDRs,  
August 25, 1983)*

THE NATIONAL Revolutionary Council (CNR) led by Capt. Thomas Sankara since August 4, 1983 looks like it is still enjoying an exhilarating honeymoon.

There is an atmosphere of carnival in Ouagadougou and other towns when whole neighbourhoods turn out on Sundays with shovels and pickaxes to unblock drains, clean up markets and fill in potholes in the roads. Placards are driven into the ground at the work site, declaring that the neighbourhood CDR is "mobilised for the revolution".

Tam tam drums and balafons are played while work proceeds. Urban dwellers thus revive the spirit and action of the tradition of collective rural labour in tasks such as weeding, harvesting, threshing and building, abandoned since they left their villages. Passers-by are saluted with clenched fists, invited to join in the work, or to buy Chinese T-shirts silk-screen printed with designs of Sankara, "hero of the revolution".

This kind of operation is organised by the socio-economic cell of the neighbourhood CDR, which calls on the radio for all

supporters of the revolution to come out and work together in solidarity at the weekend. On the actual day, organisers move around the area with loudhailers, exhorting more participation, and "cheer-leading" with propaganda slogans.

The CDRs are called the "spearhead of the revolution" by the government, and are currently most visible through the collective manual labour they do in urban areas, organised by their socio-economic cells. Each CDR comprises three other cells: the Political Cell for the "political education of the masses"; the Cultural Cell, charged with protecting the cultural heritage and forming revolutionary theatre groups; and the Military Cell whose task is to defend the revolution in each neighbourhood (or village), with arms if necessary. Elected members receive military training for this purpose, after which limited arms will be issued to them. Not all cells of all CDRs are yet constituted or active.

The call for the formation of CDRs was one of the first radio communiqués from the new CNR the day after the coup, and

ordinary people immediately began to organise themselves. The only current criteria for CDR membership are to be a resident of the neighbourhood (or village) and a "revolutionary". Clearly, most of the population have declared themselves revolutionaries, and long queues formed for signing up for CDR membership — the only alternative to this was to be identified as "enemy of the people". Many CDR members are therefore frauds or opportunists.

At the rural level, the fact that traditional village chiefs or government officials have been elected to head the CDRs indicates misunderstanding or ignorance on the part of the village "electorate" as to what the CDR is supposed to be. It is not just another bureaucratic government network the like of which they have seen so many times before, but is intended as a mechanism by which power can be spread down to the base. It is supposed to be a two-way communication system set up between the CNR and the 95 per cent agricultural population of the country in its 7,000 villages.

Such efforts at popular power encounter problems in rural areas where the majority Mossi group (over 50 per cent of the total population) remains heavily feudal, and where such feudality has been reinforced by the political inertia of the 23 years of Upper Volta's independence.

In urban areas, however, the political cells of some CDRs have been hard at work with political training sessions being held in members' homes during the night (curfew hours, 11 till dawn). Interested CDR members organise themselves into groups and request the political cell 'trainer to come to a nocturnal rendezvous to discuss a problem they identify. The trainer gives a short presentation on the topic, and the rest of the night is spent in discussion. Sometimes, the level of political awareness is almost zero, and hours are spent explaining terms such as capitalism, imperialism, colonialism or socialism. Revolutionary songs and slogans are also composed at these meetings, and later broadcast on the radio.

Attendance at these political training sessions is predominantly of literate young people. According to one political trainer, the CDRs are overwhelmingly a youth movement. There is a perceivable element of arrogance among older members of the community, that the so-called 'revolution' is for young people and is not to be taken

too seriously. This attitude prevails especially in rural areas, where only great age can qualify for genuine leadership and respect.

It is hoped that the experience of collective manual labour now being gained by CDRs in clean-up days can later be channelled into the building of popular theatres. The task of the CDRs' Cultural Cell will then be to form troupes to perform sketches for political education, from which action to combat exploitation and organise self-help development projects can ensue. This kind of activity, again, is likely to begin in the urban areas and spread out to the countryside as the idea catches on.

CDRs are also being set up within the armed forces in an attempt to remove the military's alleged "neocolonial" aspect, and put an end to the Sandhurst-style élitism and spit and polish mentality among officers, whose numbers have already been considerably reduced. A hitherto expensive, consuming institution, it is intended for the armed forces to become productive, working units engaged in construction and other activity. Officers and rank and file soldiers are already working side by side in such tasks, particularly at the air base in the capital, and in the paratrooper regiment at Pô, where Sankara and his comrades fomented their takeover of power on August 4.

Opposition to this kind of levelling democratisation in the age-old military hierarchy, which in Africa also has heavy ethnic overtones, has already emerged. (West Africa October 10 — "Zerbo tries a comeback"). The opposition still exists, despite the deaths of the two most powerful right-wing officers, Yorian Somé and Fidèle Guebré, who died in a gun battle in August soon after the coup; and despite the recent removal of other "undesirable" military men from the forces. Meanwhile, the CNR is trying to eliminate the military/civilian split and demystify the untouchable image of the soldier. Sankara declared in a recent speech that "a soldier is a civilian in uniform . . . and a civilian is a soldier on leave".

Other actions to popularise the revolution have been announced one by one. The Judiciary is an important institution which harbours reaction, particularly in its methods of meting out "justice" to criminals from different social backgrounds. The end of the practice of one law for the rich and another for the poor has been

announced — a system in which the powerful have exploited the powerless, filling prisons with petty goat and bicycle thieves, while others have calmly embezzled millions of francs of public money with impunity. A single system of justice is proposed before which all are equal.

So far there has been no suggestion of setting up "Citizens Vetting Committees" by which local communities investigate suspected tax evaders or people who conspicuously live beyond their means. But Sankara has spoken out loudly against such corrupt elements among civil servants, and the vigilance of CDRs is called upon to expose these "enemies of the people".

A striking element of the CNR's popularisation policy is to encourage women to take an active role in the revolution. Women, said Sankara in a speech, have always been exploited by men in Africa, and have been made to feel inferior to men. Speaking in Dori in August, Sankara said:

"The woman . . . is considered to be a baby machine . . . a slave burdened with all domestic chores — cooking, gardening, cleaning the house. This is not normal . . . But women are men's equals. All women, young and old, I invite to join CDRs, despite the wishes of the men who have always exploited them . . ."

Men willingly acknowledge that village women accomplish almost 80 per cent of all rural work (including child care), but shrug off the possibility of altering the sexual division of labour, which has been so well established by the ancestors. And the ancestors' infinite wisdom must be honoured! A man in Upper Volta is roughly twice as likely as a woman to be literate.

Women have joined CDRs in the capital, but even intellectuals among them (teachers, lecturers) are loathe to participate in discussion with men. Their whole life experience has been cut off from men, since almost all educational, cultural and leisure activities, even after marriage, are segregated, or only loosely or sporadically linked. At the spontaneous level, however, women and girls have participated in many urban areas in CNR support marches, and in the Namibia Day march, carrying placards and shouting anti-apartheid slogans.

In theory, then, the CDRs have potential for developing into democratic task-orientated cells which can both preserve the CNR in power through political vigilance, be heard at government level as a popular voice, and also undertake their own localised self-help activities. As such they could perhaps even constitute the framework for a political party.

Similar CDRs have been successful in Cuba since 1960 and in Nicaragua since 1980, and particularly in the important fields of primary health care and literacy work. In these two countries, however, revolution was made from below through popular armed struggle; committed and organised groups already existed to take on community tasks and political vigilance. In Upper Volta, the revolution has been imposed from above by a military coup, and the CNR has therefore the additional difficult task of combatting counter-revolution and consolidating its position through popularisation measures. Delegations from Cuba have visited on three occasions in recent weeks.

At the urban level, popularisation measures may be relatively easily understood and implemented, although no statutes or clear policy guidelines for CDRs have yet been officially announced by the CNR. At the rural level, however, it will be necessary to win the support of the social structures of traditional feudalism, which previous rightist régimes in Upper Volta have managed to co-opt. These régimes, according to the Government-controlled *Carrefour Africain*

"Used the ultra-conservative wing of the Catholic church for the indoctrination of the rural population . . . into blind fatalism. The result is the medieval system in which the Voltaic people now find themselves, and which comes from alliance between this ultra-conservative Catholic clergy with the political right wing, and the essentially Mosni feudal hierarchy."

The revolutionary mobilisation of village CDRs, therefore, constitutes an enormous educational task which will be difficult to undertake until the government announces what exactly it means by popular power and the role CDRs should play in it in practice. Until clear policy guidelines are announced by the CNR, tactical divisions and disagreements will continue. These have already become apparent as far as the democratisation of municipal power is concerned. LIPAD (Ligue Partiote pour le Développement), the Marxist pressure group which celebrates its 10th anniversary this year, and is now represented in strength in the government, is being accused of dominating politics and other progressive groups. There is also in-fighting among the other progressive political parties.

Unlike the previous CSP, which announced the restoration of constitutional democracy within two years or so, the CNR has made no announcement of its

intention to restore pluralism. The lack of a coherent overall national policy programme may soon create public anxiety, even though the CNR's popularity appears to be increasing, with continuing support marches and speeches every weekend in different urban centres. Propaganda continues on the radio to exhort militant revolutionaries to join the neighbourhood clean-up forces, to clear hospital and school grounds

and dig trenches. For the moment such comradely activities give the impression of team solidarity, but the knowledge that most CDRs harbour significant numbers of counter-revolutionaries, makes clear and unequivocal membership criteria imperative, so that such elements can be removed or else won over. The possibility of CDRs turning into agencies of abuse and corruption is also not ruled out.

CSO: 3400/289

CNR EXTENDING POWER BASE THROUGH WOMEN

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3456, 7 Nov 83 pp 2558-2560

[Text]

ALL COMMENTATORS are agreed: the women's march on October 9 was one of the largest demonstrations Ouagadougou has ever seen. Thousands upon thousands of women walked, shuffled, ran and even danced past, chanting and singing the myriad revolutionary songs and slogans that have appeared over the last two months. The noise was deafening. They were young and they were old; they were smart office ladies and they were poor old women wearing their best cloth for the occasion. Many carried signs and banners held high; many more had a baby strapped tightly to their back.

The march was led by the hundred or so female members of Ouagadougou's Committees for the Defence of the Revolution who are receiving a basic military training: all wore a plain olive green military uniform. The Minister of Social Affairs, Bernadette Pale, was amongst them, also in military uniform, as they marched from the newly renamed Place de la Revolution to the Presidential Palace, along the main road which has just been resurfaced with voluntary labour from the Defence Committees.

Part of Thomas Sankara's growing charisma has its roots in saying what everybody already knows but nobody else has dared to say publicly. He had not planned to address this rally, but after prolonged appeals from a crowd far larger than anybody had anticipated, he eventually came out and made an improvised speech which shocked many male listeners. It will also have given food for thought to many of the women on the rally who had undoubtedly come for a social gathering.

He began by saying that he would not keep the women long because he knew that their reactionary husbands were at home

waiting for their supper, but went on to outline concrete ways in which women could liberate themselves in their daily lives. Women must demand a savings account for the household money, to ensure that it is not being spent in bars or on bargirls. "How many men must a woman sleep with just to get a job as a secretary?" This must stop: telephonists and typists must denounce their bosses when they are corrupt. Voltaic women would have a chance to meet their sisters from Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya and Algeria to share their revolutionary experiences, he said.

Watching the march go past, I asked a close colleague of President Sankara what the revolution was going to do for these Voltaic women in concrete terms. He replied: "What are Voltaic women going to do for the revolution in concrete terms?" The history of women's development projects in Upper Volta suggests that this is the right approach to take.

There have been numerous so-called women's projects in Upper Volta, most of them directed at village women. The general objectives of these projects have been clear enough: increased revenue, improved health and literacy. But their results have not often been encouraging. The reasons for this lack of success are many, but the most important appears to be village women's lack of involvement in the projects' design and implementation. This is where the new Voltaic government needs to build on the enthusiasm for participation so clearly demonstrated on the march.

Health projects have often emphasised the importance of clean water to prevent hookworm. Women are responsible for the

supply of domestic water and so the promotion of water filtering has been directed at them. But the filter is made up of layers of gravel which have to be washed frequently and thoroughly to be effective. The dry season, when water is in short supply and most in need of filtering, is the time when water can least be wasted on washing the filter. If village women had been associated in the design stage of this piece of "appropriate technology", they would quickly have pointed out the drawbacks. As it is the water filter has been a failure in many villages.

Similarly, literacy has been promoted as an important part of women's projects. But reading and writing are not necessarily a women's priority, especially if they do not appear to be directly related to their daily lives. Consequently, attendance at classes has been low, and many women have failed to complete the course. This is another example of project planners drawing up their own list of priorities rather than listening to the expressed needs of women.

President Sankara first raised the question of men's exploitation of women in his Dori speech on September 22. "To make a woman believe that she is inferior to a man is just another method of exploitation and domination. Thus women are considered as baby-making machines . . . women are a source of profit to exploitative men . . . a source of pleasure."

That speech can now be seen as a preliminary to the major analysis of political direction which was given on the radio on October 2, the night before President Sankara flew to the Vittel summit. The speech lasted for an hour and a half, and while the first half was devoted to an analysis of class struggle in Voltaic society, President Sankara went on to talk about the three sectors which will be affected by

the Revolution: the army, the economy and women.

The "woman question" had hardly surfaced in Upper Volta before August 4, and it was unthinkable for it to be given such priority by a national politician. "The basis of women's domination by men is found in the system of society's political and social life. In changing the social order which oppresses women, the revolution is creating the conditions for her real emancipation . . . The revolution and women's liberation go together. And it is no act of charity or outbreak of humanism to talk about the emancipation of women. It is a basic necessity for the triumph of the revolution. Women carry the other half of the sky" . . . "Real emancipation of women will make them responsible, will link them to productive activities and to the different struggles which confront the people. Real emancipation of women will make men respect and esteem them. Emancipation is like freedom: it is not conceded, it is conquered. And it is for women themselves to put forward their claims and to organise to bring them about."

The increasing involvement of women in the Defence Committees shows how the National Council for the Revolution is extending its power base in Voltaic society. The Ministry of Social and Women's Affairs has been restructured to take account of this new involvement. The women's march on October 9 symbolised how successful the country's new rulers have been in activating women's desire to participate: they now need to learn from the often negative experience of women's projects, and in doing so help channel this new found self-consciousness of women as a political force for national development.

CSO: 3400/303

UPPER VOLTA

BRIEFS

'BOURGEOIS MUSIC' BANNED--Captain Thomas Sankara, the Chairman of the National Council for the Revolution (CNR), has ordered the closure of all night clubs and banned "anti-popular, reactionary and bourgeois music". The fight against imperialism, Sankara said, must be felt in all fields, including music, and so musicians, along with others, were called upon to serve the revolution. Without explaining exactly what was "revolutionary" and what was "reactionary" music, the Chairman of the CNR announced that henceforth popular music and dance meetings would replace night clubs, which were "privileged places where the bourgeois had the opportunity to expose their riches and practice bourgeois vices". Captain Sankara conceded that there were problems in this new policy--Voltaic musicians found it difficult to put their songs on record or cassette. But "the revolution", Sankara promised, "will find them the means to put their songs on quality records". Popular bands would also be set up, and musical contests organised. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3454, 24 Oct 83 p 2477]

SMUGGLING CONDEMNED--Captain Sankara ended a series of regional tours recently with a visit to the Boulogou Province in the east, reports Ouagadougou Radio. The people of the region were encouraged to form Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, and Captain Sankara denounced "the reprehensible activities of customs officers working in collaboration with smugglers". Lt. Daouda Traore was appointed as Head of Customs to combat smuggling. The decree appointing Lt. Traore was signed by Captain Blaise Compaore, Minister of State to the Presidency. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3454, 24 Oct 83 p 2477]

CATHOLIC STAND--"No one sleeps well these days in Ouagadougou," according to the Catholic-supported Dakar weekly AFRIQUE NOUVELLE, "whether they be those in power or those accused of being reactionary." The magazine asks what direction Upper Volta is going in when wives have to denounce their husbands if he is not in the revolutionary mould, where "children shop their parents to the authorities". It was time, AFRIQUE NOUVELLE said, for the new leaders to stop spreading hatred, for this would inevitably swallow them too: "History has always taught us that it is not those who cry 'revolution' who are the true revolutionaries." The article concluded by saying Captain Thomas Sankara is an intelligent man, but that his chances for survival depend on taking a wise, rather than a hasty course. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3454, 24 Oct 83 p 2477]

BRIEFS

**U.S. ASSISTANCE PRAISED--**A member of the Central Committee has hailed the U.S. assistance to Zambia. Northwestern province member of the Central Committee Mr (Maxwell Buyani) praised the American Government when he received the 250 books from the ambassador, Mr Nicholas Platt. He said Zambia was not able to purchase books to satisfy the local demand due to limited resources (?and that this was compounded) by a population which was scattered over a wide area. [Text] [MB191004 Lusaka Domestic Service in English 0600 19 Nov 83]

**TRADE AREA SECRETARY GENERAL SUSPENDED--**The secretary general of the Lusaka-based Preferential Trade Area (PTA) authority, Mr Semyano Kiingi, has been suspended from office with immediate effect. A State House spokesman who confirmed the suspension said in a statement today that President Kaunda, as current chairman of the PTA, had suspended Mr Kiingi on the recommendation of the first extraordinary PTA council of ministers, which met in Lusaka last Tuesday night. Mr Kiingi's suspension will remain effective until recommendation for his removal is considered by the forthcoming summit of the PTA in Harare, Zimbabwe, next month. [Text] [MB191054 Lusaka Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 18 Nov 83]

**AID AGREEMENT WITH CANADA--**Zambia and Canada today signed a general agreement on development cooperation replacing the one concluded in 1965. The agreement was signed by acting [word indistinct] secretary for national commission for development planning, Dr (Edson Kaunda), and the Canadian high commissioner to Zambia, Mr C. Douglass Fogerty. [Excerpt] [MB231012 Lusaka Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 22 Nov 83 MB]

**ELECTION LOSERS FILE OBJECTIONS--**SI candidates who lost in the recent presidential and parliamentary elections have filed in petitions against their defeats in Lusaka High Court. The High Court registrar said today that more are expected to file their petitions. He said more than six other petitions have been sent back to their owners to correct minor defects. [Text] [MB221955 Lusaka Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 22 Nov 83]

CSO: 3400/310

MUGABE SAYS SEVERAL FORMER MUZOREWA AUXILIARIES ARRESTED

Bulawayo THE SUNDAY NEWS in English 6 Nov 83 p 1

[Text]

THE Government has arrested several of the 5 000 former auxiliaries sent shortly after independence for military training in South Africa by the UANC leader, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the Prime Minister, Cde Mugabe said in Marondera yesterday.

He told a ZANU(PF) Mashonaland East women's meeting in Marondera that other auxiliaries had been sent by South Africa to Mozambique and Namibia in order to destabilise those countries.

"But those who have been sent back here have been arrested," he said.

The Prime Minister could however, not say when the former auxiliaries were arrested.

Cde Mugabe, who is on the "Meet the Women" tour which will take him to all districts in the country, said the arrest of Bishop Muzorewa should serve as an example to all those who wanted to work against his Government.

"I have warned the bishop many times and those who do not listen to my warnings will be taken in the keep," he said.

Turning to the security

situation in Matabeleland, Cde Mugabe said the situation in some parts of the province had not yet improved because other people were still feeding and collaborating with dissidents.

However, he said security forces were working hard to bring the situation back to normal. — Ziana.

CSO: 3400/294

BRIEFS

HARARE ENEMY OF U.S.--We were pleased to see that the American ambassador, Mr Keeley, is beginning finally to have an inkling of the type of people he is dealing with in Harare. You probably saw the story in the regime's rag, THE HERALD, last week which accuses America of building a huge missile base in South Africa. Mr Keeley said that he denied all elements of the story, and criticized the HERALD for lending itself wittingly as a tool for the worldwide effort by the Soviets to discredit the United States. Wake up, Mr Keeley. Of course THE HERALD lent itself wittingly as a tool. That is what it is all about. You quite rightly point out that THE HERALD is a tool in the plot to discredit the United States, as are its masters in Harare. Zimbabwe has joined the ranks of all those other so-called socialist states, who, orchestrated by Moscow, are striving mightily to pull the United States down around your ears. Harare and its regime are not lukewarm allies. They are very far from even being neutral. They are implacable and controlled enemies of America and all she stands for. The quicker you and President Reagan wake up to that fact, the better. You at least might save some money and effort. [Text] [Station commentary] [MB200630 (Clandestine) Radio Truth in English to Zimbabwe 0430 GMT 19 Nov 83]

HUNGARIAN DELEGATION--A 13-member Hungarian delegation led by the copresident of the International Chamber of Commerce, East-West, Comrade Odon Kallos, arrived in Harare this morning at the start of a 5-day visit to Zimbabwe. The delegation was met by the president of the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce, ZNCC, Mr (Abner Besch). Comrade Kallos told a news conference that he is confident that Hungary can assist Zimbabwe in the field of agriculture, [word indistinct], and other fields. He said during his stay in Zimbabwe he will hold talks with government officials and visit various industrial institutions to examine ways of opening up trade between the two countries. Comrade Kallos said two draft agreements signed during the prime minister's visit to Hungary are still being studied with the Zimbabwe Government. [Excerpt] [MB200654 Harare Domestic Service in English 1115 GMT 19 Nov 83]

FOREIGN DONORS PROTEST DUTIES--Harare, 20 Nov, SAPA--Foreign donors aiming to help the disabled in Zimbabwe are threatening to take their aid elsewhere unless import taxes and duties are scrapped. The SUNDAY MAIL newspaper in Harare today quoted Mr Bob Stumbles, chairman of the National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped, as saying member organisations suffered "inconvenience and hardship as a result of the continued imposition of import tax and

surtax on donated equipment from outside the country." "Some potential donors have now indicated that unless items can be imported into the country for member organisations free of all tax and duty they will direct their attention to helping other countries." Voluntary organisations have frequently complained that sorely needed equipment and supplies are held up, sometimes for months, by tax duties and import red tape. [Text] [MB200853 Johannesburg SAPA in English 0918 GMT 20 Nov 83]

LAW RESTRICTS COMMENT ON PRESIDENT--According to an amendment to the Law and Order Maintenance Act, it is now illegal to do or say anything likely to undermine the president personally. The amendment, gazetted at the weekend, says it is also illegal to engender feelings of hostility, cause hatred, contempt, or ridicule the head of state and his office. Those found guilty will face a fine of \$1,000, 5 years' imprisonment, or both. [Text] [MB190712 Harare Domestic Service in English 0600 GMT 19 Nov 83]

MINISTER ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS--The minister of legal and parliamentary affairs, Comrade Eddison Zvobgo, has reiterated the stand by both ZANU-PF and the government of upholding the rights of an individual and tolerating opposition views. Addressing the Public Services Club in Harare last night, Comrade Zvobgo said once a government has broken the law, it has lost all humanity and respect of its citizens. He said that although the government does not accept the Lancaster House Constitution, it will not tear it up as this would be a prerequisite of constitutional disorder. The minister warned that the road to constitutional reform will be long, but ZANU-PF will instill an atmosphere of legality in adhering to law and the protection of humanity. He cited as flaws in the present constitution the upper house, whose major role is only that of statutory revision, as well as a separate role for whites. On the question of the civil service remaining apolitical, comrade Zvobgo said ZANU-PF expects commitment to mass wishes and government policies. [Text] [MB240908 Harare Domestic Service in English 0400 GMT 24 Nov 83]

MINISTER ON YOUTH BRIGADES--Over 450,000 youths have joined youth brigades throughout the country. The minister of youth, sport, and recreation, Comrade Ernest Kadungura, told the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation in Harare today that the only groups of youths who have not joined are whites, coloreds, and Asians. The minister called on these groups to join hands with other youths throughout the country to ensure the socioeconomic development of Zimbabwe. Comrade Kadungura applauded the progress made in training youths in 13 of the ministries and 15 youth training centers. The centers offer training in agriculture, home economics, basic mechanics, carpentry, and building. Other youths joined the polytechnics and other technical schools through the Ministry of Manpower, Planning and Development. [Text] [MB171310 Harare Domestic Service in English 1115 GMT 17 Nov 83]

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